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ABSTRACT
In the current globalized market, multinational corporations are experiencing heightened
external social and environmental pressures to operate more responsibly. Transnational activist
groups and advocacy NGOs are successfully framing normative expectations on corporate social
responsibility and using tactics to name and shame socially and environmentally controversial
corporations to pressure them to change their practices. An international norm of corporate social
responsibility is increasingly shared by states, intergovernmental organizations and the private
sector itself, and visibly emerging in the market place. Corporations engage with NGOs to
demonstrate their conformance to the norm.
The study explains why corporations engage with NGOs in different ways. It argues that
corporations weigh the material incentives associated with the social and environmental
consequences of their activities, and conform to the norm accordingly. They thus use the norm to
further their material interests. Given that corporations are exposed to different levels of

normative external pressures, there are different engagement strategies. In order to explain the
terms under which corporations are likely to choose a particular kind of engagement strategy, a
three-level concept of vulnerability is introduced. The more a corporation is vulnerable to the
external normative pressures, the deeper it is willing to work with NGO/NGOs to ease that
pressure. Hence, in NGO-business engagements, actors collaborate in order to gain the
anticipated positive rewards of cooperation. They perceive those advantages greater than if they
had pursued their goals separately.
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“Lines between these camps were once clearly drawn. Now formal antagonists work together in
ways that are uncomfortable, controversial, and yet often highly effective… In their heart of
hearts, most environmental NGO leaders would probably prefer public policy solutions to
industry partnerships. And most industry executives would probably prefer to focus on business,
not environmental work. But we live in an era of strange bedfellows.” (Glenn Prickett,
Conservation International, in Esty & Winston 2006, 184)
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Chapter I

Introduction

The September 2010 issue of Harvard Business Review discussed how on July 1st 2009
Jeff Swartz, the CEO of a footwear company Timberland, began receiving angry emails accusing
the company of supporting slave labor, destroying tropical forests, and exacerbating global
warming. The emails kept coming for few weeks totaling to over 65 000. The angry writers were
Greenpeace supporters reacting to a newly released Greenpeace report about deforestation in the
Amazon. At the time, Timberland was sourcing seven percent of its leather from Brazil. Because
that many people were taking the time to send e-mails, Swartz was sure that there must be at
least half a million not sending e-mails who were also annoyed. He knew the brand was at stake.1
According to the article, Greenpeace was pressuring Timberland to pull out of Brazil.
Swartz knew that the protestors were asking legitimate questions that the company should have
been asking itself. So “instead of standing there with arms folded and mind closed”, Swartz
decided to engage with the activist group to work together with the company’s Brazilian
suppliers in “hopes of making a positive difference”. With the help of Greenpeace, Timberland
began to trace the origin of all the cattle they source and make sure they are not contributing to
Amazon deforestation. This required working with the suppliers to meet traceability targets. In
return, Greenpeace issued a statement that Timberland had taken a leadership position on the
issue.
1

Jeff Swartz, Timberland’s CEO on Standing Up to 65,000 Angry Activists. Harvard Business Review, September
2010, 39-43.
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Sixteen years earlier, Chiquita CEO Carl Lindner received 6000 letters from children
begging him to stop killing turtles. These kids were the readers of Ranger Rick, the National
Wildlife Federation’s nature magazine, and they wanted to let Lindner know how worried they
were about sea turtles being strangled by the blue plastic bags then used to protect the fruit from
insects. Lindner - a well-respected man in his community - was disturbed by the fact that his
company was killing turtles. He decided to do something about the situation. Partly because of
the letters, the company intensified its collaboration with the Rainforest Alliance and began a
large company-wide program to improve its dirty processes to become an industry leader in
environmental and social issues.2
These stories tell about increasingly typical trade-offs non-profit non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and for-profit companies negotiate to achieve end-results that satisfy both
parties. These trade-offs evolve when companies benefit from corporate social responsibility and
NGOs increase their impact by harnessing the power of business to solve social and
environmental problems.
These engagements that go beyond traditional philanthropy started to accelerate in the
1980s and 1990s. Since then a new collaborative culture between NGOs and companies across
the world has been rooting and increasingly nurtured. Although these engagements have rapidly
proliferated, in most cases NGOs and companies still perceive each other “long-standing
adversaries”3 and “bitter enemies”4 and their conflicts often end up in the media5. However, a
growing number of NGOs and companies have recognized that they have joint agendas on
certain issues, and despite their different views of problems they have begun to look for

2

Taylor & Scharlin 2004, 35; McLaughlin, interview in December 2010.
Murphy & Bendell 1999.
4
Stafford & Hartman 1996.
5
Duncan, Jancar-Webster & Switsky 2009.
3
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complementary resources and capabilities to work together constructively to find solutions that
go beyond their own visions.6
This study focuses on these trade-offs by exploring multinational corporations that choose
cooperation instead of confrontation and begin working constructively together with an NGO for
a common goal. By so doing, their collaboration illuminates the gradual melting of the traditional
antagonistic relationship between NGOs and the private sector - the tension between valuedriven organizations highly dedicated to and passionate about their specific goals of political,
social or environmental change and profit-driven companies that aim to maximize their
shareholder value.
Corporations that enter into collaboration with NGOs do it for social and environmental
goals7. Equally, the more established NGOs are inviting corporations for result-driven
collaboration8. In these engagements, corporations are taking on a variety of social and
environmental endeavors that aim to, and often do, positively impact the societies in which they
operate. Some of them are even transforming from being environmentally destructive and greedy
to becoming private sector advocates of sustainable development that emphasize environmental
and community stewardship9.
Evidence of such engagements is widespread. The real beginning of these engagements
was the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in September
2002, where the business sector10 was defined as one of the key actors to contribute to and
reinforce the implementation of the outcomes of the intergovernmental negotiations of the
6

Schwesinger Berlie 2010, 2; Huisjstee & Glasbergen 2010; Berger & Cunningham & Drumwright. 2004.
Vogel 2005; Gerencser, van Lee, Napolitano & Kelly 2008; Yaziji & Doh 2009; Brown, Roemer-Mahler &
Vetterlein 2009; Schiller 2005; Uttig 2005.
8
Yaziji & Doh 2009; Zadek 2001, Kourula 2009.
9
Porter & Kramer 2004.
10
It should be stressed that business is not regarded here as a homogenous agency and it is recognized that industries
are arenas for conflict, cooperation, power and governance.
7
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WSSD.11 Since the summit, companies have increasingly entered into voluntary arrangements
with NGOs and the two sectors have formed different kinds of partnerships ranging from looser
alliances to strategic partnerships in which they seek innovative solutions to position both
companies and NGOs as leaders, not only in their market, but also in society in general.12
Studies of the engagements have emerged from various disciplines such as political
science, organizational studies, economics, non-profit management, health care, education and
the natural sciences. During the past ten years, there has been a twenty-fold increase in citations
of ”NGOs” or ”non-governmental organizations” in The Wall Street Journal and The Financial
Times13. For many observers, the meltdown of the wall between activists and corporations begun
when oil corporations BP (British Petroleum) and Shell International included human rights and
sustainable development issues in their corporate annual reports by the closing of the twentieth
century14.
In NGO-business engagements, NGOs provide advice and external view to social and
environmental issues that are new to the private sector and through collaboration significant new
scientific expertise as well as useful local networks are generated15. Companies also engage
NGOs in strategy work because it helps them avoid conflict with other external groups. Many
large multinationals have invited an NGO executive to serve on their boards. It is viewed that
NGO collaboration increases a company’s credibility by providing a credible “seal” to it.16
NGOs have greater public trust in social and environmental issues than do governments, the

11

Hirschland 2006.
Schwesinger Berlie 2010; Warner & Sullivan 2004; Crutchfield & Grant 2008; Senge 2008; Jamali & Keshishian
2008; Neergaard, Thusgaard & Jensen 2009.
13
Yaziji & Doh 2009.
14
Taylor and Scharlin 2004.
15
Stafford, Polonsky & Hartman 2000.
16
Bishop, interview in January 2010.
12
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media and corporations17. They are often seen as working in the public interest as they are
designed around and focused on their causes18. By collaborating with NGOs, corporations can
thus improve legitimacy and trust for their social and environmental initiatives, and thereby
safeguard their business continuity in the long run.
Hence, although some radical NGOs19 view corporate partnering a sign of “selling out” or
“doing a deal with the devil”20, a growing number of NGOs work with businesses to leverage the
global business community as collaborating partners rather than as traditional adversaries to
sustainable practices and ethical code of conduct21. In their book, Forces for Good. The Six
Practices of High-Impact Nonprofits, Leslie Crutchfield and Heather McLeod Grant write that,
nonprofits are…”social entrepreneurs – highly adoptive, innovative leaders who see new ways to
solve old problems and who find points of leverage to create large-scale systemic change”.
According to them, “The most effective of these groups (nonprofits) employ a strategy of
leverage, using government, business, the public, and other nonprofits as forces for good, helping
them deliver even greater social change than they could possibly achieve alone.”22
As the Timberland case illuminates, Greenpeace, which has its roots in peace activists who
wanted to stop a planned nuclear weapons test at Amchitka in September 1971, “seeks to inspire
others to take action to bring about positive change”. According to the organization, “Where we
find problems, we offer viable solutions. Greenpeace works with a wide range of people,

17

Wootliff & Deri 2001, Boli & Thomas 1999. Yaziji & Doh 2009.
Yaziji & Doh 2009.
19
For instance, Corporate Accountability International (CAI) and SOMO (the Centre for Research on Multinational
Corporations). CAI is a grass-root watchdog organization and SOMO is a non-profit Dutch research and advisory.
Both organizations have investigated transnational corporations’ policies and practices worldwide over 30 years.
20
Crutchfield & McLeod Grant 2008, 56.
21
Brugmann & Prahalad. 2007; Schwesinger Berlie 2010; Kourula 2009.
22
Crutchfield & McLeod Grant 2008, 6.
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communities and organizations to bring about real and positive change. As the issues on which
we work continue to evolve, so shall we.”23
During the years, Greenpeace has begun to leverage market forces in its attempt to make
change. In addition to being a global campaigning organization to which campaigning is a way to
commit to positive change through action, it is also known for successful collaboration with
corporations. One of them is its collaboration with the world’s largest tissue-product
manufacturer Kimberly Clark. After nearly five years of its so-called Kleercut campaign against
the company, in which hundreds of protests led to more than fifty activists arrested in acts of
peaceful civic disobedience, in 2010 the disparate parties found common ground in protecting
forests. According to Greenpeace, the “successful conclusion” was reached when Kimberly
Clark released stronger paper policy including protection of the world’s most endangered forests,
increased support of sustainable forest management and the increased use of recycled fiber in
Kimberly Clark’s products.24
One of the first large environmental organizations that have changed its tactic from
confrontation to collaboration is Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). It was initially found in
the late 1960s to ban the pesticide DDT to stop killing endangered birds25, but has since the late
1980s been known for its successful corporate partnering. The organization was influential by
using traditional means such as suing companies and government agencies to end practices and
lobbying for new federal regulation. However it decided to turn directly to companies to help
them create environmental programs to deliver greater conservation results.
23

Greenpeace International. Another similar environmental group is Friends of the Earth, active in 68 countries.
When determining which action is appropriate for its target groups, it applies a “ladder of escalation”. The group
will initially take soft measures, but changes to harder ones if the target remains insensitive to its attempts. (van
Huijstee & Goldberger 2010)
24
www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/canada/en/documents-and-links/publications/the-policy-of-kimberly-clark.pdf
25
As of April 2011, EDF consists of a staff of three hundred and five hundred thousand member base with an annual
budget of nearly 70 million.
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This idea, as the story goes, occurred somewhat unexpectedly to the mind of Fred Krupp,
the president of Environmental Defense Fund in 1987, while he was enjoying a meal with his
three children in a Manhattan McDonald’s. At that time, the public debate about overflowed
landfills was heated and the situation especially in New York was tough. According to the story,
Krupp had looked around at the Styrofoam, plastic wrappers, and colored non-recycled paper
and found himself thinking that: “I think we can help them do better”. He wrote a letter to the
CEO of McDonald’s proposing that the company work with Environmental Defense Fund on a
plan to reduce its waste. It took six months that the company started to replace polystyrene
“clamshell” containers in which it sold over billion hamburgers with eco-friendly materials. As a
result, McDonald’s eliminated 150 000 tons of packaging waste over ten years.26
In the late 1980s, a number of other fast-food chains followed McDonalds, which resulted
in more waste reduction. Since the engagement with McDonald’s Environmental Defense Fund
has helped companies take into account their negative environmental impacts and used marketbased strategies that help change corporate behavior. For instance, it is helping FedEx convert its
midsized truck fleet to hybrid vehicles and Wal-Mart to become more environmentally
sustainable.27
The reason for NGOs to engage with the private sector is practical: changing the course of
major corporations creates significant social and environmental benefits, since millions of people
use their products and rely on their service. And these environmental damages are not small: the
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) estimated in 2008 that 3000
largest listed companies in the world were responsible for environmental externalities amounting

26

Environmental Defense Fund, Press Release December 21, 1999;
Crutchfield & McLeod Grant 2008.
27
Crutchfield & McLeod Grant 2008, 13.
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to over US $ 2 trillion in Net Present Value terms. This amounts to about seven percent of their
combined revenues and up to a third of their combined profits28.
However, not all NGOs appreciate corporate partners and there are different approaches to
corporate engagements within the NGO community29. In the early days of NGO-business
collaboration, Sierra Club leader David Brower commented the collaboration between
Environmental Defense Fund and McDonald’s: “There is too much movement away from the
ideals and too much emphasis on bottom lines. The MBAs are taking over from the people who
have the dreams.”30 Some radical environmental groups believe that it is better not to get
involved with the private sector. They see NGOs that collaborate with companies as
compromising their values for corporate resources31.
These purist NGOs often accuse corporate-friendly NGOs of “greenwashing” or windowdressing32. They have, for instance, criticized Environmental Defense Fund for compromising its
values, when it joined with BP, Shell and other major corporations to form the Partnership for
Climate Action to reduce CO2 emissions.33
But NGO-engagements are not necessary about compromising values for taking money. In
fact there are differences among NGOs in their approaches to corporate partnering. Most notably
NGOs vary in which corporations they choose to work with. Some of them remain very selective
and exclude industries that have large environmental externalities such as oil and energy sector
and refuse to work with them, or they refuse to work with industries that they see harmful to
society, such as tobacco and alcohol, guns and armaments and adult entertainment. For instance,

28

United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment 2008.
Yaziji & Doh 2009; Hirschland 2006.
30
Quoted in Crutchfield & McLeod Grant 2008, 56.
31
Yaziji & Doh 2009.
32
Wille, interview April 2011.
33
Stephens 2010.
29
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Greenpeace, which seeks to actively work with corporations to achieve concrete results for its
environmental work, excludes nuclear power companies as its potential allies. Working with a
nuclear power company would strongly contradict its goal of working for a nuclear-free world.
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), also widely known for its corporate partners, does not partner with
oil and energy industry. In contrast, Conservation International (CI) emphasizes that
collaborating with industries that have large environmental footprints is essential to reduce
environmental harm34. In March 2011, about twenty energy and environmental groups, including
CI, Sierra Club and Audubon, had joined with BP Wind Energy to form the American Wind and
Wildlife Institute, which work to “protect wildlife through responsible development of wind
farms”.35
Although these pragmatic NGOs stress that partnering is the best way to create large-scale
change, they sometimes need to defend their corporate engagements to their supporters too. For
instance, in May 2010, a month after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, CI chief executive
Mark Tercek needed to defend the partnership with BP to its supporters. They were concerned
that the environmental organization’s relationship with BP “has lent BP an Earth-friendly
image”. Tercek defended the collaboration on the group’s web site after criticism from CI
supporters:
"Anyone serious about doing conservation in this region must engage these companies, so
they are not just part of the problem but so they can be part of the effort to restore this
incredible ecosystem"36.

If NGOs differ in which companies they work with, they also differ in their policies to
corporate donations. Some NGOs actively reach out to corporations to find financial support37,
34

Conservation International, Annual Report 2009.
Stephens 2010.
36
Quoted in Stephens 2010.
35
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while others have strict policies and accept only money against travel and other expenses.
According to Gwen Ruta, vice president of corporate partnerships at Environmental Defense
Fund, “To maintain our objectivity, we accept no funding from our corporate partners. That
independence frees us to set aggressive goals and drive change across entire industries”38. For
instance, Nature Conservancy has accepted nearly $10 million in cash and land contributions
from BP and affiliated corporations over the years. WWF openly informs that corporate
donations are a significant source of its budget. Some NGOs, like Greenpeace, seek to maintain
independency from formal institutions, and do not accept money from any other than individual
donators.
NGOs also differ in ways they term and make public their collaboration with their
corporate counterparts. Greenpeace has precise guides to its identity and prefer to term their
collaboration with companies as “activities” rather than making a formal agreement of
collaboration.39 WWF and CARE International, in contrast, have publicly open policies for
corporate engagements.
Hence, some groups are stricter with their relationship with the corporate world and seek to
maintain more independence from it than groups that seek to collect corporate money. Despite
these differences, for all NGOs that work with companies in a way or another, the private sector
allies represent a strategically important opportunity to further their own missions and deliver on
their promises40. When they help companies reduce environmental pollution, greenhouse gas
emissions, natural resources extraction, labor violations and poverty, significant improvements in
habitat protection, nature conservation, and human rights enhancement are generated and thus

37

Those include Care International, Earthwatch, Mercycorps, Oxfam, WWF, and World Vision.
www.edf.org/page.cfm?tagID=50930
39
Aromaa, Interview in March 2011.
40
Schwesinger Berlie 2010; Kourula 2010.
38
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positive change made41. Moreover, working with the markets and not against them is also
meaningful because through market mechanisms positive impact is often likely to multiply:
action taken by market leaders often encourages others to follow the suit, spreading the benefits
yet further.42
For example for Oxfam, an international human rights advocacy NGO, corporate
collaboration represents a new choice of tactics at the disposal of NGOs: “There are huge
opportunities for civil society to engage with corporations to explore how they might use their
influence to raise performance standards, distribute resources, share knowledge, and innovate for
the common good.”43 Director of an animal rights advocacy group PETA44 views that
collaboration has become more meaningful than confrontation: “We have found that we can
change a lot by standing outside a business shouting at the top of our lungs, but that we can
change even more by sitting down with the same business’s leaders to address both sides’
concern in a cooperative spirit”45.
Also, many environmental NGOs view that they cannot find long-term solutions without
the involvement of companies, whose natural resource consumption and pollution strongly
impact the planet. US chief officer Marcia March of WWF explains why corporate partnerships
are critical to the organization:
“The simple fact is that we are failing relative to our larger goals. Despite our success in
raising public awareness and funding, species are disappearing at historic rates. Habitat
continues to be destroyed. Working alone, NGOs are simply unable to reverse the tide of
global change. To do this, we will have to develop new partnership with business and
governments, partnerships whose scale of impact is commensurate with the problem we
face.”46
41

Wootliff & Deri 2001.
Crutchfield & McLeod 2008.
43
Oxfam 2005.
44
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.
45
Quoted in Schiller 2005.
46
Quoted in Senge et al 2004, 78.
42
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Hence, in addition to pressuring corporations to change their course, NGOs also
increasingly help corporations to reduce the negative impacts of their activities and bring about
positive societal benefits. For them, corporate engagements is a way to open a constructive
dialogue with a company to help develop new insights and initiate new projects and processes
that lead to a diminishing of its ecological impacts or improved human rights, animal rights and
other significant human conditions, that is to improve their corporate social responsibility.
In the heart of NGO-business partnerships is thus what economists call externalities. They
are the negative or positive side effects of businesses on its broader scene, either directly or
indirectly, but which companies are not obligated to pay for or which they are not used to take
into account in their decision-making.
As the Timberland and Chiquita cases show, a growing number of corporations take
increasing responsibility for the externalities of their business operations and strive to reduce the
impacts they have on the larger communities. They engage with NGOs for help in reducing their
negative impacts or to generate more positive societal benefits. As Meyer and Kirby argue47,
much has changed since 1980s when the executives at Philip Morris were holding back the
evidence that cigarettes cause lung cancer and claimed that customers were exercising free will
in choosing to smoke. Now twenty years later, tobacco companies have crafted programs for
“responsible smoking”. They are educating people of the health damages smoking causes and
informing them that “smoking kills”.
We may witness similar development across industries. For instance, raising societal
concerns about diet, nutrition and obesity have made food industries to take action, especially
after the health implications of trans fats were discovered. They have changed ingredients,
funded public education programs and created reduced-fat products before regulatory
47
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compulsion. When the concern for obesity grew, McDonald’s developed a “healthy lifestyles”
program, offering additional fruit and salads48. These examples show that over the past twenty
years, the impacts of business on society has become widely recognized and also in many cases
too substantial to ignore making it for many companies wiser to take responsibility for them.49
According to Gray, partnerships evolve if there is enough trust between the partners and
they have discovered that their agendas overlap in some way. They then commit to carry out a
certain assignment or project together, and their motivations do not need to be the same. van
Huijstee and Glasbergen50 have noted that the company construes the NGO’s attitude as
constructive, neutral or adversarial. According to them, it depends on the attitude of the group,
which kind of interaction can evolve rather than the choice for an interaction process. Companies
most likely invite NGOs that are likely to conduct activities on the issue of their concern and
which can have a positive impact on the company. van Huijstee and Glasbergen also point out
that there are always practical reasons that account too. Those include time and budget
constraints that determine how many NGOs can realistically be involved.
Although this trend is growing, the overall picture is not always this positive. There are
many companies that still do not disclose the negative aspects of their products and not all
companies are equally responsible and transparent in their activities. Many companies lag behind
the normative expectations different external groups have for their operations and continue to do
“business as usual”.
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The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement

Since the late 1990s and early 2000 action-oriented NGO-business partnerships have
become common, and different kinds of engagements in areas of environmental protection and
conservation, health care, education, emergency relief, and human rights have proliferated
around the world51. These engagements take seemingly different forms. Some are loose projectbased alliances that are not much different from traditional philanthropy and corporate
sponsoring. Some partnerships have developed from projects that were initially corporate
communication tactics but developed into cooperation to improve corporate practices. Some
partnerships are ambitious agreements to achieve measurable goals and they are designed to
create larger societal benefits than reducing negative corporate environmental impacts. In these
cases, NGOs help companies to develop new skills and knowledge to reach a deeper appreciation
of societal needs and their link to company productivity.
Despite their differences in scope and depth of the cooperation, all these NGO-business
partnerships reflect the growing role of anti-globalization movement and its advocacy for
corporate social responsibility as an emerging international norm and responsiveness from the
part of corporations to conform to that norm52.
Although there were campaigns against corporations already in 1960s, these informal
groups have become increasingly powerful after the street protests at the meeting of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999, which manifested the beginning of the global antiglobalization movement. The activism in Seattle against global corporations was fuelled by a
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growing criticism that corporations cause negative impacts that they should be more accountable
for. The activists protested particularly against the relocation of production to developing
countries where in the absence of appropriate regulation to protect the health of workers and the
environment corporations can ignore the social and environmental consequences of their
activities and thus make more profits. For activists, multinational corporations are a major
driving force in the “race to the bottom” induced by globalization. According to Ruggie,
“Although it remains contested, the principle is taking hold that transnational firms… ought to be
held accountable not only to their shareholders, but also to a broader community of stakeholders
who are affected by their decisions and behavior53”.
Behind this development is a clear shift in NGOs’ emphasis to use the power of
corporations as “vehicles for the pursuit of principled goals”. Whereas they once used to
concentrate solely in pressuring governments, NGOs are now also using market mechanisms to
supplement political pressure.54 So instead of only targeting governments to influence change,
they also mobilize to direct their pressure at corporations and important corporate constituencies
to pressure for corporate change. They protest against mistreated workers and animals and
environmental damage, or question the product itself, such as furs and tobacco. They make laud
noise over the clearance of land and forests or pollution and other environmental abuses to third
parties. According to Yaziji & Doh55, NGOs seek to “normatively delegitimize” companies by
using tactics that diminish a company’s normative legitimacy. Given that “legitimacy is a
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially construed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”56,
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companies are increasingly facing constraints in terms of being able to legitimate their operations
and their behavior.
Yaziji and Doh have identified two types of campaigns: “watchdog campaigns” and “proxy
wars”. In watchdog campaigns, NGOs target corporations that fail to conform the norm of
corporate social responsibility and pressure them to change their processes. These campaigns can
also generate “powerful spillover effects”. These effects evolve after an NGO has first demanded
better performance from a corporation and threatened with a campaign if the demands are not
met. If a company is not responsive, NGO uses a highly visible campaign until the company
meets the demands. To build a snowball effect and to create more mass to its impact, the NGO
moves on the next company in the same industry and demands it to change practices. Often this
second company prefers meeting the demands instead of facing a campaign after having seen the
downsides of the first campaign.57
Proxy wars, in turn, are “expressions of a broader conflict over norms, values and
regulatory environments” and they are targeted against corporations that represent the institution
of multinational corporations58. For instance, after having traced that McNuggets being sold in
Europe had been fed on soy grown in the Amazon rainforest, Greenpeace supporters protested
against the company by wearing chicken suits at several McDonald’s restaurants in the UK. The
pressure led to a moratorium on the purchase of Brazilian soy grown on newly deforested land
and an alliance with other UK retailers to build pressure on the soy suppliers to stop sourcing soy
from the Amazon.59
Yaziji and Doh point out that NGOs also work indirectly to pressure corporations. This is
because NGOs are informal actors and they cannot directly institute laws and regulations. They
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also lack the financial leverage over companies that suppliers, customers and rivals have. They
therefore use institutions that can influence a company’s economic outcomes. Those include
regulators, the courts, politicians, voters, consumers, employees, suppliers, and shareholders.
Their power can take the following forms: regulations and fines, court decisions, taxation, laws,
purchase decisions, refusal to do business, and shareholder resolutions directing and restraining
management choices. In addition, NGOs can use media to influence those institutions.60
According to Yaziji and Doh, a typical chain of events among these institutions takes place
after NGO community informs them that a company in question has harmful impacts on society.
They then start to evaluate and respond to NGOs’ critics against the company, which might lead
to economic losses by the company or constraints on its behavior. These losses include costs
associated with changes to the regulatory environment, reduced market share, diminished brand
value, shareholder constraints on behavior, lawsuits, work hold-ups and lowered employee
morale. Hence, in order to support the norm of corporate social responsibility and other values
that the NGOs are dedicated to promote, they pressure companies, under threat of
delegitimization and its attendant costs.61
Relying on their ability to damage corporations with consumer and public pressure,
international brands have become especially vulnerable, as activists attack them to draw attention
to their social or environmental agendas. Activists prefer to target successful brands as they set
the example for their respective industries and thus help forge compliance. NGOs thus make
clear strategic choices about which corporations to target first in their campaigns.62 Yaziji and
Doh argue that highly visible companies make the easiest targets, insofar as the NGO does not
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need to make extra effort introducing the company to the public before attacking it63. Taylor and
Scharlin64 view that “global brands are now supervulnerable to ‘internetworked’ protests around
the world”. NGOs “brand jack” brands in order to call larger public attention to their
organization’s agendas. This tactic works better than attacking unknown brands, as more people
can relate to the issue by knowing the brands. According to Spar and La Mure, “an NGO delivers
a powerful message when it first identifies a problem that it feels passionate about redressing,
and then elects a target with the greatest potential to affect the problem at hand and the greatest
susceptibility to external pressure”65.
The examples of brand jacking are many. One of the earliest cases dates back to 1991,
when labor activist Jeff Ballinger was working on a report for the Asian-American Free Labor
Association (AAFLI) on labor conditions and wages at Indonesian factories. He decided to
choose Nike to “capitalize on Nike’s brand name to catch greater public attention” on the labor
abuses in overseas factories. The decision turned out to be powerful. It generated enormous
public outrage. In the following year, Ballinger’s article in Harper’s fuelled public protest
against Nike. In the article, he compared Michael Jordan’s Nike contract to an Indonesian factory
worker’s pay and noted that it would take 44 492 years to earn Jordan’s pay. After the article,
Nike was widely known and protested for its “sweatshops”, most notably at the 1992 Barcelona
Olympics.66
Anti-globalization groups like to campaign against McDonalds for the same reason.
Because they take the company to represent the institution of multinational corporations, they
use it to draw attention to their causes. According to the McInformation Network,
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“Yes, we appreciate that McDonald’s only sell hamburgers and loads of other corporations
are just as bad. But that’s not the point. They have been used as a symbol of all
multinationals and big business relentlessly pursuing their profits at the expense of
anything that stands in their way.”67

As a result of these campaigns, the private sector is struggling with new normative
expectations and dealing with pressure to live up to these expectations. Many corporations have
altered their behavior to bring it in line with the NGOs mandate. Corporations seek to show their
customers that they have responded to these pressures as consumers are increasingly asking who
is behind the brand.68
Much has changed also in the ways NGOs work with corporations to influence change. In
addition to that they have been successful in framing new expectations on how corporations
should behave to be socially and environmentally responsible. NGOs need to be able to deliver
on their promises. They therefore have become increasingly mature in their tactics of how they
engage companies to change harmful practices. Whereas in 1960s activists pressured Dow
Chemicals to stop producing napalm and framed their argument exclusively in moral terms,
environmentalists are now often working inside the company to show how reducing
environmental impacts will also save money. Many investors also use business interest argument
when they ask corporation to act more responsibly on the grounds that doing so reduces their
costs and increases profits.69
Simultaneously, it has become much more difficult for companies to ignore the external
normative pressure they have become exposed to. Media distributes horrific images of
environmental violations and abuses of mistreated workers around the globe in instant time and
helps tell stories that shock people. These stories continue to be told, and people will learn more
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about child labor, physical violence, and unsafe and unsanitary working conditions along with
other failures such as providing adequate wages to workers, animal cruelty, sexual harassment
and environmental degradation. Social media has made it easy for people to protest these
wrongdoers.

Diffusion of Corporate Social Responsibility

By directing their attention to unethical behavior of multinational corporations and making
sure that the world knows about it, NGOs are doing their traditional job as “norm entrepreneurs”
as they seek to persuade other people to accept new norms70. They are actors in world affairs that
practice “civic intervention” as they are working to change understandings, interpretations, and
behavior of other actors, and thereby creating, institutionalizing and monitoring norms.71 Since
Seattle the norm of corporate social responsibility has been diffused through these norm
entrepreneurs and the norm is increasingly shared by states, civil society and the corporations
themselves.
This is reflected in the success of NGOs in keeping social and environment issues on the
global agenda and corporate misbehavior under the public eye. International environmental and
labor treaties as well as international agreements and guidelines to corporations have also been
issued. Those include the International Labor Union (ILO) labor standards and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines for multinational corporations
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that encourage companies to follow guidelines covering nine aspects of business conduct,
including disclosure, labor relations, the environment and bribery. In some cases international
organizations are also able to exercise economic leverage over a company. For instance, the
International Financial Corporation (IFC), the only body of the Word Bank group’s mandated to
formally engage with the private sector, has attached social and environmental conditions to its
loans.
In July 2001, the European Commission (EC) published a Green Paper to launched a
debate on how the European Union (EU) could promote corporate social responsibility at both
the European and international level. A year later, in July 2002, the EC proposed a strategy to
enhance the involvement of business in sustainable development and the establishment of multistakeholder forum. The first forum took place in 2002 and has since gathered together
companies, NGOs, trade unions, investors and consumers.72
Also collective institutions have evolved to help corporations with their corporate social
responsibility. One of the largest ones is the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), which is
an attempt to lay the foundations for a partnership between the United Nations (UN) and the
international business community. It was launched at the G-7 meeting in Davos, Switzerland in
January 1999 by Mr. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General. It aims to encourage
corporations to engage in dialogue and learning around the issue of corporate social
responsibility and to establish a global corporate social responsibility network based on a pledge
by member companies to commit to ten principles. Those principles cover human rights, labor
standards, the environment, and anticorruption.73 According to Mr. Annan,
“Globalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility. The
problem is this. The spread of markets outpaces the ability of societies and their political
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systems to adjust to them, let alone to guide the course they take. History teaches us that
such an imbalance between the economic, social and political realms can never be
sustained for very long. The industrialized countries learned that lesson in their bitter and
costly encounter with the Great Depression. In order to restore social harmony and political
stability, they adopted social safety nets and other measures, designed to limit economic
volatility and compensate the victims of market failures. That consensus made possible
successive moves towards liberalization, which brought about long post-war period of
expansion. Our challenge today is to devise a similar compact on the global scale, to
underpin the new global economy.”74

In December 2010, over 5 300 businesses from 130 countries have joined the initiative75.
Other significant and widely spread collective action institutions include the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI). It provides a list of indicators for reporting on companies’ social, environmental
and economic performance. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has also
developed a standard for corporate social responsibility, ISO 2600 standard, which entails a set
of operational guidelines for a global corporate social responsibility. Also, the International
Business Leader Forum (IBLF), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) have been promoting corporate social
responsibility at the international level.
There has also been a visible increase in voluntary certification institutions almost in all
industries. Companies join these private self- and co-regulation initiatives and institutions to gain
reputational benefits associated with memberships76. These certification institutions provide
guidelines as policy tools to set general principles and goals for a company’s daily practices and
regulate labor and environmental conditions in workplaces supplying multinationals77. The most
successful ones have been the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC). By 2006, FSC has certified over sixty-eight million hectares of responsibly
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managed forest, altogether 775 forests in sixty-six countries, according to its responsible forest
management criteria. MSC was found in 1991 to protect fish stocks. The Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (ETI) is a coalition of nineteen major oil, gas and mining companies to
discourage corruption with a mutual agreement of full public disclosure and verification of all
corporate payments to governments in the countries. Fair Labor Association (FLA) was formed
in late 1990s to set up standards to labor issues as a response to the growing critics of the apparel
companies such as Gap, Nike and Reebok on the conditions of their factories overseas.
Individual companies have also begun to consider the social and environmental
consequences of their activities and take action to improve them78. Many corporations establish
codes of conducts and guidelines for ethical behavior. For instance, Levi Strauss uses “Global
Sourcing Guidelines” to ensure that its sourcing partners scattered throughout Latin America are
ethical. The Economist described the trend in January 2005:
“Today all companies, but especially the big ones, are enjoying from every side to worry
less about profits and to be socially responsible instead. Surprisingly, perhaps, these
demands have elicited a willing, not to say avid, response in enlightened boardrooms
everywhere: companies at every opportunity now pay elaborate obeisance to the principle
of CSR. They have CSR officers, CSR consultants, CSR Departments, and CSR initiatives
coming out of their ears.”79

The amount of research and conferences around the world devoted to corporate social
responsibility and the list of companies that run social and environmental programs and report
about them annually all reflect the fact that companies view conformance to the norm
increasingly important. In 2005, eighty-one percent of executives surveyed said that corporate
social responsibility is essential to their business.80 Five years later, an UN-related study found
that ninety-three percent of business leaders think that the way how they respond to these issues
78
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is important to the success of their business, some of them think that they are critical to the
continuity of their business81..
Since 1980s onwards, there has been a visible growth in number of corporations
voluntarily communicating about their social and environmental impacts issuing reports and
reviews in line with general ethical values, following international standards such as GRI and
Environmental Management System (EMAS). In 2005, sixty-four percent of the 250 largest
corporations published corporate social responsibility reports82, while in 2008 eighty-nine
companies out of a hundred largest companies in the world by revenue published a corporate
social responsibility report83. In addition, many have sought to have their production processes
certified by independent parties as socially and environmentally sound. Many corporations also
report their greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation efforts.84
All these developments suggest that corporate social responsibility has emerged and is
increasingly shared by different societal actors. What constitutes a responsible corporation is
thus defined by external groups who regard company as responsible when they perceive that it is
taking responsibility for its negative impacts on society. New institutions have been created
because corporate communication cannot command credibility with NGOs and other groups
skeptical of corporate motivations.
And to be sure, skeptical views exist and remain strong. Many of the skeptics question the
motivation of corporations to commit to practices that systematically hurt their own ability to
produce profits. Despite extensive commitments to sustainability via corporate social
responsibility policies and engagements in multi-stakeholder initiatives and programs, these
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critical views are often legitimized. The track record on corporate abuses is long and many
companies maintain their bad behavior even if they are publicly committed to responsible
practices. Many companies have been found guilty of greenwashing.
A part of the NGO community remains very skeptical to the level of commitment of
corporate self-regulation and to social and environmental reform in general85. Friends of the
Earth claim that corporations that are publicly engaged with corporate social responsibility “can
create the perception that it is implausible that such companies are involved in social and
environmental malpractices”86.
CAI claims that particularly multinational corporations often “get away with the serious
harm they inflict on people and the environment because they use their influence to block or
eliminate proposed public protections and promote and enact policies and regulations that benefit
them at the expense of the public good”.87 According to CAI, only few voluntary self-regulation
initiatives have led to some improved corporate conduct and as a governance model they are
“inherently and seriously flawed and are not a substitute for binding and meaningful mechanisms
for real oversight”. CAI stresses that because partnership concept has an obvious appeal, “the
very concept implies a cessation of hostilities and the commencement of efforts towards a
common goal based on shared beliefs and objectives” and … “equal roles in public policymaking
for governments and business as well as joint decision-making”, and this “ignores or downplays
the need for safeguards against conflicts of interest”. CAI stresses that these roles should not be
equal, because “each sector has its own role to play in society at large and the increased use of
partnerships as a tool for mediating governance dilutes governance itself, pre-empts robust
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governance, and creates a race to the bottom, masked as increased corporate social
responsibility.”
Therefore, CAI has strongly criticized for instance UNGC for “vague and undefined
principles“ and for the lack of “consistent accountability mechanisms”. This has, according to
CAI, allowed a number of UNCG signatories, including Nestlé, Bayer, Souza Cruz88, PetroChina
(CNOC), Chevron, Shell and BP, to remain within the initiative, despite “being subject to NGO
pressure campaigns, systematic exclusion from socially responsible investment portfolios and
concerned responses from corporate shareholders because of their continued violations of human
rights and environmental sustainability standards”.89
The Polaris Institute, another NGO skeptical about corporate social responsibility, argues
that the UNGC gives corporations the opportunity to “wrap themselves in the blue flag of the
United Nations without taking solid action to support UN rights based mandates”, and thus
obtain more benefit from these close relationships than the UN and its member states. It claims:
“The UN has ventured a long way down the road of business partnerships and private financing
to the point where cooperating with business and using corporate funding has become a
fundamental cornerstone of the entire institution.”90
Hence, corporate social responsibility will clearly remain controversial, as it is likely that
many companies will continue ignoring the social and environmental consequences of their
practices, while others seek to bear responsibility over them. If it would be a self-evident issue,
there would be no corporate abuses and shocking headlines. However, there is still strong
evidence that corporate social responsibility has become increasingly important.
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Existing Research and the Aims of This Study

Even though NGO-business partnerships represent a new way to tackle social and
environmental challenges, there is surprisingly little research on the topic in international
relations and social sciences more generally91. The research on NGO-business partnerships is
still in its infancy and key research gaps remain. Current research mainly concentrates on the
above-described emergence of the new voluntary rules and issue-specific certifications designed
to achieve corporate compliance with new transnational social and environmental rules92. The
above-mentioned World Commission on Dams has been the often-used example, as it has been
created to generate standards for the construction, operation, and shutdowns of large dams.93
Because the compliance is assured not by the rule of law, but by implementation and
monitoring procedures to which the signatories have agreed upon, scholars have emphasized that
these new partnerships represent a shift from public to private forms of governance94.
Partnerships thus represent a “hybrid type” of governance functions, in which non-state actors
co-govern along with state actors for the provision of collective goods, and thereby adopt
governance functions that have formerly been the sole authority of states95.
Rationalists explain that this is either related to the governance gaps associated with
globalization and the incapability of governments and international organizations to solve
them96. Explanations that stress the rational actors’ tactic to obtain resources that they would not
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otherwise have are also common97. Self-regulation is seen more flexible and more easily
adjustable to changing social, economic and technological circumstances than regulation by
governments.
Constructivists98, in turn, view that there is a new “global public domain” emerging in
which a normative structure shapes the identity and interests of actors. According to John
Ruggie99:
“It is not that there has been an actual shift away from public to private sectors, but instead
firms have created a new transnational world of transaction flows that themselves and for
reaction to with their subsidiaries, suppliers, and distributors that they deem necessary
given the scope, pace, and complexity of operating in those transnational spaces.
Companies have gone global and function in near real time, leaving behind the slower
moving, state-mediated inter-national world of arms-length economic transactions and
traditional international legal mechanism, even as they depend on that world for their
licenses to operate and to protect their property rights.”

Within it the production of collective public goods is no longer the responsibility of states
alone but is increasingly accomplished by NGOs and corporations that have accepted
responsibility for the provision of collective goods, and are responding to the expectations
generated in this new institutional arena.
For neo-Gramsian scholars100, the emergence of voluntary institutions is a political strategy
through which business aims to secure corporate hegemony. It is a way to reduce the pressure for
statutory legislation, and further legitimize globalization. Partnerships emerge to reproduce a
corporate-friendly environment, as corporations need to react to these pressures from the antiglobalization movement. Corporations therefore proactively create strategies to demonstrate their
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corporate social responsibility to maintain their hegemonic stability.101 According to Ronit and
Schneider102, the voluntary adoption of a Code of Pharmaceutical Market Practices of the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association is an example of such
self-regulating through partnerships. They argue that such code has been established to avoid
further regulation of marketing practices after WTO had decided a code of ethical and scientific
standards.
Despite different theoretical explanations, private governance approach still says actually
very little about the impact of corporate social responsibility as an emerging international norm
on corporate behavior at the corporate strategy level. It is therefore weak in explaining how the
diffusion of the norm in the market place has changed corporate cultures and behavior. It does
not say much about how each actor partners with another to translate the emerging norm of
corporate social responsibility into mutually beneficial concrete objectives to achieve its goal
while at the same time helping the other partner to achieve its goal. Furthermore, the research
lacks understanding of the societal impacts of corporate social responsibility at the community
level. The empirical evidence of the social benefits are little discussed, e.g. what the beneficiaries
of the cooperation gain in concrete terms.
The private governance approach thus contributes very little to our understanding of how
actual collaboration within a partnership context can advance each actor’s own agendas. Nor
does it explain how companies review their relation to society. It is therefore incapable of
providing a comprehensive explanation for why companies adopt corporate social responsibility.
Moreover, it does not explain why and how they differ in their corporate social responsibility
policies and programs.
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In addition to the popular private governance approach, only few international relations
scholars have studied NGO-business partnerships under the topic of corporate social
responsibility. The existing literature remains illustrative and conclusive103. According to
Michael Blowfield, this research has primarily concentrated on the impacts of individual
companies’ environmental footprints or economic benefits. It therefore tells very little about the
actual relationship between society and business, and the consequences of corporate social
responsibility for the intended beneficiaries in whose name it is being conducted104.
Moreover, the research is also often divided in two parts roughly along the lines of the
proponents of corporate social responsibility and its opponents. This makes much of the research
highly normative in nature and weakens its explanatory power. The proponents view corporate
social responsibility as a positive trend, and stress the positive effects of such networks in
humanitarianism105, human rights106, environmental issues and international development107. The
opponents in turn are neo-Gramsians who argue that corporate social responsibility only
strengthens the role of the powerful corporations108. Newell argues that companies build their
reputations as “good corporate citizens while performing poorly away from the limelight”109.
The question of what kind of engagement strategies between NGOs and companies exist
and why is still most neglected110. Given that there are different NGOs and different companies,
partnerships should and do vary considerably. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that some
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partnerships are looser alliances than others; some are fixed-term projects while others reflect
deep mutual trust and commitment in achieving their respective goals111.
Naturally, partnerships that are built upon both organizations’ long-term strategies are
rooted in new collaborative mindsets that are new to both NGOs and companies. These
partnerships require deep organizational learning processes through which each side learns to
respect the other side and view it as a significant strategic partner that can be trusted112. This
takes a long time, as typically both sides are initially skeptical towards each other. NGOs are
skeptical because they tend to have a negative view of business and don’t trust those who work
for the companies they have seen as their enemy113. Companies often have a hard time
understanding the business benefits of working with NGOs. For them, reconciling private
business goals and public social purposes is a long process that may involve re-consideration of
the use of human resources to organize for improved responsibility. It often involves identifying
philanthropic, community, and voluntary programs for the company.
Taking the research further, it is thus important to look what kinds of different partnerships
exist and to look at the outcomes of different engagements. It is important to evaluate not only
whether these engagements are win-wins or win-looses between different actors, but also to
analyze the reasons why NGOs and businesses work together in a certain way. In order to fully
understand the phenomenon, we need to go beyond the normative judgment of corporate social
responsibility and to pay more attention to why NGOs and companies tackle same problems and
in what forms. Why do they have interests to tackle same problems, and what do they gain from
building a specific type of partnership? This is important as both sides have had to learn to listen
and share in a world view which at first they have found difficult to accept. Furthermore, what
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does a specific type of partnership provide to the parties involved that they choose it as their
engagement form? What trade-offs do they make by choosing a specific type of engagement?
The main questions this study seeks to answer are:
Why do partnerships vary? What accounts for the differences between the depths of
cooperation? Why do some companies develop deep partnerships with NGOs and others settle
with fixed-form projects? What is the reason for such variation?

The Argument

This study argues that corporations primarily care about corporate social responsibility
because there are strong materialistic motives that are associated with the social and
environmental consequences of their activities. They thus use the norm to further their
materialistic interests. But how they use it depends on how much the company is exposed to
harmful external normative pressure and how vulnerable the company is to that pressure to
change its processes and practices. The study argues that the more a company is vulnerable to
normative pressure it faces, the more likely a dialogue with the external groups is deemed
necessary to turn adversarial relations into constructive ones, and thereby the deeper it is likely to
engage with NGO or NGOs to demonstrate its conformance to the norm to ease the pressure.
Hence, the need of companies to redefine their relationship with society varies. Due to this
variance there are different NGO engagement strategies to “do the trick”. It thus depends on the
ability of external groups to put corporations under costly and harmful campaigning that hurts
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their bottom line. In a nutshell, the underlying argument of this study is that corporate
vulnerability to harmful external normative pressure determines the engagement strategies.
Corporations carefully weigh the material incentives associated with the social and
environmental consequences of their activities, and are likely to choose a particular type of
engagement strategy accordingly.
The study assumes that all multinational corporations are vulnerable to societal
expectations of what is considered socially and environmentally responsible. It argues that this
vulnerability varies and takes three levels: low vulnerability, process vulnerability, and systemic
vulnerability. Low vulnerability refers to conditions under which companies do not operate
under harmful normative pressure, while medium and high vulnerability refer to conditions
under which companies do operate under harmful pressure. The category of low vulnerability
incorporates both companies that are not harmed by the societal expectations on how they should
be behaving as well as companies that have been harmed before but have managed to improve
their practices and regain back their lost normative legitimacy. These companies are generally
regarded as good corporate citizens and they do not therefore operate under harmful pressure.
However, they operate under low vulnerability, as they constantly need to live up to quickly
changing societal expectations on corporate behavior in order to maintain their good relationship
with the society.
In turn companies that operate under harmful pressure include companies that negatively
affect the communities where they operate in and the nature, and their actions are therefore
defined unethical by the society, hence the external groups have called into question the terms of
their social license to operate, despite their legal permits. As discussed above, these external
groups in society are various NGOs that work to change these companies’ practices by framing
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issues to make them comprehensible, to attract maximum attention and encourage action against
these companies both within their own networks and within the markets by using market
mechanisms such as pressuring shareholders, investors and consumers. All this seriously harms
the normative legitimacy of these companies, their brand reputation, and profit potential and in
many cases causes considerable confusion, conflict and economic losses.
Furthermore, companies that operate under harmful pressure are distinguished by their
vulnerability, because the level of vulnerability is here predicted to explain their varying
motivation to engage in partnerships with NGOs. These companies can be distinguished into two
groups: companies that have unethical processes and companies that are systemically dependent
on the declining natural resources – the commons. The companies are operating under process
vulnerability and systemic vulnerability, respectively.
The difference between these types of vulnerabilities is that process vulnerability is not
systemic in nature and it can be fixed by improving the internal processes, while systemic
vulnerability makes the company highly dependent on the community it operates in and its
natural resources, thus its relationship with the community becomes critical to the continuity of
its business. The study argues that the more a corporation is vulnerable to external normative
pressure, the more it is likely to seek NGO-engagement to ease that pressure to ensure its
legitimacy that is threatened by the confrontation. The depth of engagement as a dependent
variable is thus explained by the level of vulnerability as an independent variable.
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Contribution

This study explains that companies choose a particular type of partnership because their
level of vulnerability to external normative pressure varies. Because the literature of NGObusiness relations lacks understanding on how and why partnerships vary, the study thus
contributes to it by providing an explanation why NGOs and companies choose different kinds of
engagement forms, hence why the partnerships they form differ from each other in scope and
scale.
More specifically, the study introduces three types of NGO-engagement strategies that
companies choose, and explains the conditions under which companies are likely to choose a
particular type of engagement strategy to achieve their goals. The study shows that companies
that operate under the lowest level of vulnerability, hence under low vulnerability, are likely to
form symbolic partnerships with NGOs as symbolic gestures to further demonstrate their
conformance to the norm of corporate social responsibility. In turn, the two other types of
vulnerabilities are likely to lead companies into much deeper forms of cooperation with NGOs.
More specifically, companies that become attacked by NGOs because of their unethical
processes are likely to form instrumental partnerships with NGOs in which the partnership is an
instrument to improve the poor corporate practices. Companies that are systemically dependent
on declining natural resources operate under highest level of vulnerability and are therefore
exposed to constant and bitter campaigning by groups that claim for the community rights over
the commercial use of those resources. Systematically vulnerable companies are likely to form
pioneering partnerships with NGOs in which they cooperate closely with NGOs to search for
solutions to solve the conflict with the community in order to earn back their lost normative
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legitimacy. In discussing these issues, the study takes us further in explaining why companies
conform to the corporate social responsibility norm in different ways and how their engagements
with NGOs reflect those differences.
The study also contributes to our understanding of international cooperation, and especially
how change happens. It contributes to our understanding of how NGOs and companies engage
in dialogues and why they turn controversial relations into constructive ones, and what kinds of
interaction between them exists and what they gain from those different types of interaction.
The study also discusses the emergence of the norm of corporate social responsibility. It
explains why the norm is spreading across the world and why companies conform to it, hence
what drives their conformance to norm compliance.
These questions are important not only because cooperation in important social and
environmental issues is often regarded desirable, but also because there is relatively little
research on corporate NGO-engagements from the point of view of corporate social
responsibility. New research on why actors cooperate, how they work and what kinds of impact
they had is needed in order to understand this new transnational phenomenon.

The Question of New Form of Transnational Relations

According to Sandler114, “collective action arises when the efforts of two or more
individuals are needed to achieve an outcome”. In collective action, efforts of one individual
influence the actions of the other individuals. NGO-business partnerships reflect thus clearly a
114
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new phenomenon in transnational relations115: a raising number of NGOs have chosen to help
companies take additional social or economic goals beyond their mere financial goals and by so
doing corporations are helping NGOs to achieve their respective goals. According to
Schwesinger Berlie, NGO-business partnerships are specific insofar as they present a “significant
evolution in the types of relationship between these two parties, which have traditionally been
characterized by confrontation, mutual ignorance or, when they tended towards cooperation,
sponsorship.”116
In the tradition of international relations, it has been characteristic to view civil society and
the private sector as conflicting, if not antagonistic players in international arena117. This division
has been based on a clear analytical bifurcation of ideas and interests in which principled goals
track with ideas and norms and instrumental goals track with interests, mirroring the traditional
distinction between the rationalist versus constructivist camps118. Research in transnational
relations has been mainly interested in explaining transnational activism119, transnational
advocacy, and transnational coalitions120. These groups coalesce around ideas or a collective
commitment to some shared belief or principle121. The private sector, in turn, has been viewed in
opposition: the negative social and environmental implications of large foreign investments that
multinational corporations and their overseas operations have conducted became highly
controversial issues in 1970s and in 1990s.122
Now the visible proliferation of action-oriented NGO-business partnerships suggests
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melting of this sharp contradiction. Although NGOs are ultimately driven by idealistic goals that
they also impose on corporations, many of them are today oriented towards business. They view
big corporations as having the money and the power to be major change agents, especially as
their dominance and influence begin to exceed those of many other institutions in the world123.
NGOs also engage in corporate partnerships to purely enhance their standing and influence124.
Because NGOs have increased in number and weight, they are increasingly competing with each
other for resources, contracts for work, donor money, media attention, and reputation125. They
are also accountable to their financial contributors, board members, executives, staff and
beneficiaries, and corporate partnerships can maximize their influence. Although a close
partnership with a company often means extra funding and media coverage, many NGOs seek a
direct access to influence a company’s internal decision-making processes.126
Studying what kinds of action-oriented NGO-business partnerships exist and why they
vary is important to our understanding of the changing dynamics of society and business and the
form of cooperation. Why has the relationship intensified between the sectors that have
traditionally been in conflict with each other, and why have these two sectors converted? What
does this tell us about NGOs as “change agents”, and their power to force change?
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The Question of Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsibility

In the core of studying the different ways NGOs and companies collaborate, it is a question
of why corporate social responsibility as an international norm is changing corporate behavior,
and how. By looking at the different types of corporate NGO-engagements, the study contributes
to our understanding of why do companies increasingly conform to corporate social
responsibility and what motivates them to do so. Do companies conform to it because there are
rational reasons involved or do they do it for merely altruistic reasons? In other words, to what
extent can it be argued that there are norm-based reasons for corporations becoming more
responsible?

Corporate Social Responsibility Defined

There are different definitions of corporate social responsibility127. This study draws from
the EU’s definition, according to which corporate social responsibility is understood as the
voluntary integration of social and environmental concerns into the business operations of
companies and their external groups.128 At a minimum, it can be viewed as a cluster of a
company’s policies, programs, and outcomes that are beyond the requirements of law.
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NGO-Business Partnership Defined

What is common to all NGO-business partnerships is that they are agreements between
parties to jointly advance an agenda in which both parties share an interest. Hence, this study
builds on the often-used definition of a public-private partnership by Olson129. According to
Olson, a partnership is “a form of collective action in which otherwise independent organizations
join forces in pursuit of a common objective.” This definition is descriptive as it highlights the
interdependency between the partners. Among many others, Alter and Hage130 argue that the
“perceived need” and “willingness” of organizations to collaborate with each other are the
underlying conditions for any collaborative partnership between two or more organizations.
Glendinning131 highlights that partnership between organizations, groups or agencies is a
relationship in which one or more common goals, interests and or dependencies are identified,
acknowledged and acted upon, but whereby the autonomy of the partner organizations can
remain unchanged.132
Building upon these definitions, an action-oriented NGO-business partnership is defined
here as a form of collaboration in which an NGO and a company have agreed to work together
towards a common goal to advance a social or environmental cause or project which they both
benefit from. That is, the collaboration is designed in ways that offer sufficient business as well
as social gains to attract sustained NGO and corporate involvement. Partnerships represent thus a
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new way of collaboration in areas where an organization would not be successful by acting
alone. They build on the idea that each sector has core competencies and resources that are
complementary to one another. Partnerships are based on “discussing, promoting and
establishing solutions to global issues”, and they thus go beyond traditional philanthropy133.
Next the methodology of the study is introduced. The study is designed to explain why
NGO-business engagements vary. It introduces three types of NGO-engagement strategies that
companies choose and points out the differences between the conditions under which companies
and NGOs are likely to choose a particular type of engagement strategy to achieve their
respective goals, hence the link between the level of vulnerability and the form of engagement
strategy. Three empirical cases thus illuminate how each company conforms to the corporate
social responsibility norm differently and how the engagement strategy it chooses reflects that
difference.

Methodology

This study is a qualitative study, which is set out to investigate and explain the dynamics
of the new relationship between NGOs and business. The study utilizes qualitative analysis of
three case studies and explains why there are differences between NGO-business engagements.
The three empirical cases were selected to explore the theory of NGO-business partnership
developed in this study, with each case demonstrating one of the three types of partnerships. The
cases illuminate the different levels of motivations that corporations have to engage with NGOs.
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In addition, the cases are selected because there is very little international relations research on
partnerships. It is hoped that this analysis will draw conclusions that enhance partnership
scholarship and their work while also being useful for practitioners.
The case companies, Nokia, Chiquita and Coca-Cola, were selected according to the
following criteria. First, they are all widely known consumer brands. Second, they are all large
globally operating corporations. Third, each company runs programs with international NGOs.
Hence, the selection of the three cases within the same timeframe and their goal of demonstrating
the corporate social responsibility norm through partnerships enable this study to hold these and
other important variables relatively constant.
The differences between the cases suggest that there will be differences in partnerships.
Therefore the new patterns of interaction are explored inductively by studying three case
histories of particular organizations engaged in partnerships. What are the reasons why each
company has encountered NGO? What goals these engagements are designed to serve? How do
these engagements differ?
In the empirical section, the method of process tracing is used to explore the types of
partnership building suggested in my theory. In conducting the research, the study has relied
upon “triangulation” of data, where multiple sources and types of data have been utilized. The
data is drawn from a variety of primary and secondary documentation, including written and
electronic documentation, media coverage and personal interviews. At the international level,
information about international meetings, conferences, and agreements have been collected and
evaluated through reports, meeting reports and press releases of key actors. At the organizational
level annual reports, web site texts and media coverage have been analyzed. Interdisciplinary

43
research texts and academic analysis are also utilized to provide insight into the issues
themselves and the case study organizations.
Interviews with core representatives in all three case studies have been conducted both inperson and via phone and e-mail. These semi-structured interviews were designed to collect and
elicit general background information about the individuals’ and organizations’ work on the
issue and more specific information on the joint activities. The goal of these interviews has been
to acquire non-published information about the internal dynamics of partnerships, including
leadership roles, resource allegation, shared responsibilities, challenges of collaboration and
conflicting views within organizations.

Plan of the Study

Explaining what kinds of NGO-business partnerships exist and why they vary requires
discussion on the motives of partnering. This raises the following important questions: Why do
corporations conform to corporate social responsibility as an international norm in the first
place? How can we explain their conformance? Why do some corporations go deeper with their
relationship with NGOs and engage with NGO activities than others? Why do we see
engagements that just barely exceed the criteria for traditional corporate philanthropy, and why
some corporations actively pursue large community programs targeted to make measurable
improvements in the standards of local communities? The study is structured around these
questions, and each chapter is designed to set light to these questions.
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Chapter 2 is divided in two sections. The first section discusses the corporate motives by
exploring the existing international relations literature on norm compliance. It reviews the
rationalist and constructivist explanations, and concludes that corporate social responsibility as
an international norm matters. This is because the norm has been increasingly recognized in the
market place and is thus influencing the behavior of corporations. The evidence that corporations
themselves had internalized the norm, as expected by constructivism, is too weak and therefore
the constructivist argument about norm compliance is difficult, if not impossible, to establish.
Drawing from rationalism, the second section of the chapter introduces the theory developed for
explaining why partnerships vary.
The theoretical chapter is followed by three empirical chapters. Chapter 3 examines
Nokia’s NGO-engagement strategy as a prototype of symbolic partnerships, i.e. cases where a
multinational corporation operates under low vulnerability and forms a partnership as a symbolic
gesture to demonstrate the company’s conformance to the norm of corporate social
responsibility. The chapter discusses Nokia’s corporate social responsibility policy as a brand
insurance to operate in highly complex global market and the supporting NGO-engagements as
the company’s community programs of that policy. These engagements are designed to reflect
the corporate good will, and thus to demonstrate that the company is a good corporate citizen in
communities it operates in.
Chapter 4 examines Chiquita’s engagement with the Rainforest Alliance as an instrumental
partnership. The chapter explores the reasons why Chiquita became in the early 1990s vulnerable
to the external normative pressure and how it harmed the company, and the decision that
followed to partner with the Rainforest Alliance. The engagement was chosen to reduce the
negative environmental and social externalities of the banana plantations after the growing local
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discontent and the raise of the political consumerism in Europe, a growing consumer interest of
the ethics of food production and trade and buying decisions based on these values. NGObusiness engagement is thus an instrument for the parties to improve Chiquita’s dirty practices to
increase the volume of the Rainforest Alliance’s work to conserve tropical forests.
Chapter 5 examines Coca-Cola’s engagement with WWF as an example of pioneering
partnership between an NGO and a company. The chapter discusses how Coca-Cola became
highly vulnerable to the pressure by the external groups, particularly in India, and the gradual
understanding of the management that the external criticism and continuous NGO attacks are
jeopardizing the company’s business continuity. The chapter explores how these events led to an
extensive partnership with WWF that not only aims to tackle the issues that threaten the
company on ground but also creates notable societal benefits to the communities where CocaCola has business operations.
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Chapter II

Why Do Partnerships Differ from Each Other?

Part One: International Norms Compliance – Two Explanations

The purpose of this study is to explain why do corporations choose different types of
NGO-engagements, in other words why such partnerships differ from each other. In explaining
the variation between the depths of NGO-engagement, the question of why corporations conform
to corporate social responsibility as an international norm in the first place is critical. Why do
corporations respond to the norm differently, and how the conformance to the norm can be
explained? What explains this? And, how this is reflected by their NGO-engagement strategies?
This chapter reviews the literature and proposes its own answers to these questions in the
light of the tradition of collective action. This tradition assumes that actors weigh both the
probability and the consequence of their collective actions, and make decisions based on their
estimations of gains. From this follows, actors conform to corporate social responsibility norm
according to their self-interests. In the case of corporations, the primarily interests are
materialistic. Because corporations are increasingly expected to behave in ways that do less harm
to workers, communities where they operate in and the nature, corporations can no longer ignore
the negative externalities they produce. When they are not living up to these normative
expectations, they put themselves and their profits at risk. This is why many of them consider
conforming to the norm a critical business issue.
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Reviewing international relations literature on norm compliance, two explanations
dominate. Rationalists have focused on coercion and cost-benefit calculations as drivers of norm
compliance. This suggests that corporations are utility-maximizing agents who adopt norms
based on their strategic choices shaped by their existing incentive structures. The literature lists
that such possible influences include a range of political, economic and social risks that include
the role of nationally and internationally based NGOs, the impact of government regulation and
regulatory uncertainty, denial of operating permits, consumer boycotts and concern over a
company’s reputation134. Although all these factors are important, international relations scholars
have mainly concentrated on the impact of NGOs, consumer boycotts, regulatory uncertainty,
and natural resource constraints.
In his book, The Market for Virtue, David Vogel135 argues that companies adopt corporate
social responsibility only if it is important to their brand, or if they are subject to consumer,
media or NGO pressure. The start of a corporate social responsibility policy often is triggered by
a change in awareness by company leaders of developments in the operational environment and
their impact on the organization136. Negative coverage in the press, pressure by NGOs or a
significant consumer reaction can induce that decision in a reactive manner to take an increased
interest in corporate social responsibility issues137. Corporations have thus strong interest in
those issues, as they can only gain reputational benefits if they are sensitive to the public
interests, while they conversely only can avoid negative reputational consequences if they are
perceived as good corporate citizens138. According to The Economist:
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“The kind of self-interest that advances the public good is rational and enlightened.
Rational, calculating self-interest makes a person, or firm, worry about its reputation for
honesty and fair dealing, for paying debts and honouring agreements. It looks beyond the
short term and plans ahead. It considers sacrifices today for the sake of gains tomorrow, or
five years from now. It makes good neighbours.”139

The findings of Shanahan and Kragram support the rationalist argument that conformance
to corporate social responsibility is driven by materialistic interests. They studied 600 articles of
corporate social responsibility and found that almost two-thirds of all work since the 1970s dealt
with the evaluation of the financial impacts. Their findings thus indicate that corporate social
responsibility is primarily connected to maximizing profit or shareholder value.140 van Huijstee
& Glasbergen found that the strong impact of NGO campaigns made corporate representatives
realize that specific external groups are able to put a company’s continuity in jeopardy and a
dialogue with these groups was deemed necessary to turn confrontation into collaboration141.
Constructivism provides an alternative explanation to rationalist one. It emphasizes the
process of social learning and socialization, and highlights how actors’ interaction and social
learning shape actors’ interests, and how mutual learning and the selection of new preferences
may lead to normative compliance142. Although the literature is mainly concerned with how state
behavior is influenced by those shifting norms and the efforts of transnational advocacy
networks, companies can be expected to respond to shifts with regard to acceptable corporate
behavior. Actors thus comply because a rule is perceived as appropriate and ought to be
obeyed.143
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By pressing the transformation of corporations through norm internalization144, the
constructivist approach brings valuable insights to our understanding of corporate social
responsibility. First, it highlights the normative aspect of corporate social engagements. It views
corporate social responsibility as a response to what is perceived as appropriate behavior,
according to the “logic of appropriateness”145, and thus stresses the conformance to corporate
social responsibility more than just profit making activity by bringing the social content in it.
Secondly, constructivists are interested in how social norms emerge and diffuse in a population
and they emphasize the role of “norm entrepreneurs”146. These norm entrepreneurs advocate
different ideas about appropriate behavior from organizational platforms that give their ideas
credence. Norm entrepreneurs convince actors to change their ideas, and when a “critical mass”
accepts the new ideas as appropriate, norm cascade (rapid diffusion) takes place. When the norm
acceptance rate increases rapidly, norm contagion has evolved. The last step is norm
internalization. Norms are then “so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and
achieve a taken for granted quality that makes conformance with norms almost automatic”147.
This approach is engaged with explanations on how inter-subjective meanings of ideas,
norms and values become “collective understandings” that can be regarded as collective
intentionality. On one hand organizations are embedded in a dense network of international
institutions that shape their perceptions, preferences, policies, and norms, hence leading to
institutional “isomorphism”148 across societies. On the other hand norms serve as collective
expectations with “regulatory” effects on the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.149
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Three Rational Reasons for Corporate Social Responsibility

In weighing these two explanations, vital evidence for the rationalist argument over the
constructivism one can be found. First, corporate social responsibility has emerged as an
international norm in the market place and increasingly challenges corporations to think twice
about the social and environmental consequences of their activities. Second, there is a notable
lack of trust in corporations and people are increasingly concerned of misbehavior of
corporations worldwide. Third, the declining natural resources set new limitations on
commercial interests and is bringing new obstacles to business continuity. Moreover, the natural
resources are complicated by the classic “tragedy of the commons” dynamics, in which joint
coordination and sacrifice are needed for the greater good, but in which every player has
incentives to leave the sacrifice for others. According to this Hardian thesis (1968), multiple
individuals acting interdependently in their own self-interest can ultimately destroy a shared
limited resource even when it is clear that it is not in anyone’s long-term interest for this to
happen.
Hence, these three facts create explicit and implicit societal expectations and constraints
that are putting new limitations to corporate practices, and the significance of brands and
reputation makes multinational corporations especially vulnerable to these external normative
pressures. When external groups are delegitimizing companies by spreading information on the
Internet and questioning the brands’ normative legitimacy to operate, they can significantly hurt
the profits.
As the theory of collective action expects, actors weigh cost and benefit issues related to
these developments, resource leverage, and diverse social pressures, and make decisions based
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on their estimations of gains. Next, the developments that have challenged companies to review
their relation to society are discussed in more detail and the argument that the rationalist
explanation provides a more sufficient reasoning for companies to conform to corporate social
responsibility than the constructivist one is developed.

Corporate Social Responsibility in the Market Place

The fact that corporate social responsibility is gaining ground in the market place is
reflected by a growing body of multi-disciplinary literature. The literature suggests that a
company’s ultimate success should be measured not just by the traditional financial bottom line,
but also by their social and environmental behavior150. One element for understanding the change
in the market place is found in the shift in consumer behavior. Public concern about
environmental problems has developed rapidly after 1960s and raised by such important works
as Rachel Carlsson’s book Silent Spring (1962), The Club of Rome report Limits to Growth
(1972), and the introduction of the concept sustainable development by Brundtland’s
Commission (1987)151.
Recent studies show that increasingly informed shoppers pay careful attention to the social
conditions the products are made in and what environmental impact the products have. Peattie
defines green consuming as “the purchasing and non-purchasing decisions made by customers,
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based at least partly on environmental or social criteria”152. These people do not want to buy
products that they know are made in sweatshops and they are increasingly concerned about the
rights of local producers. They want to know whether small farmers are being displaced as land
is increasingly turned over to production for export or other commercial purposes. They want to
know whether rainforests and land have been cleared for commercial reasons such as for palm
oil cultivation.153 However, the studies also indicate that although these consumers prefer ethical
goods and services, labels and fair trade certifications that enable them to make more informed
choices, these expectations are not necessary transcribed into purchasing decisions154. However,
this does not mean that corporate social responsibility has not emerged into the market place.
Investment communities also emphasize the ethical behavior155. There is growing evidence
that institutional investors are increasingly reconsidering their investment approaches and they
are seeking more responsible and sustainable forms of investing. 156 According to Booz &
Company 2008 forecast, by 2015 fifteen to twenty percent of the world’s assets under
management will be managed according to corporate social responsibility principles. The rising
number of signatories to the UN principles also exemplifies the growing interest for responsible
investment. The most important principles concern the integration of environmental, social and
governance (ESG) factors into investment processes and the need for engagement with
companies.157
With shareholder resolutions investors are able to pressure companies to change their
course. In 2005, over 360 different corporate social responsibility –related shareholder
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resolutions were filed on issues ranging from labor conditions to global warming158. For
example, investors have forced US electric utilities, American Electric Power and Cinergy, to be
more transparent about their strategy and disclose their emissions and implementing emissions
reduction programs and targets159.
According to Waddock and Graves, companies with strong corporate social responsibility
reputation can generate enhanced support from customers, employees, and investors160. The fact
that consumers, investors and other important groups are demanding more responsible corporate
practices is an important incentive to review the rewards of conforming to corporate social
responsibility.

Lack of Trust in Corporations

The rise of economic liberalism and the spread of free market economy have generated
economic wellbeing in many countries but also led to a growing public demand for more
transparent corporate practices and accountability. Several studies report a growing public
interest in corporate misbehavior and the public dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in
companies as a consequence of the numerous scandals of the early 2000161. Awareness of the
need for change has only grown in the wake of the recent subprime mortgage crisis162.
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Also, as pointed out by Kourula, the popularity of movies like Wal-Mart: The High Cost of
Low Price, Enron, Black Gold, The Corporation, Supersize Me, and books like Fast Food Nation
by Eric Schlosser, No Logo by Naomi Klein, Noreena Hertz’s The Silent Takeover: Global
Capitalism and the Death of Democracy, and Corporation Nation by Charles Derber, indicate
the growing public interest in corporate behavior163.

Declining Natural Capital Sets New Constraints

The third, and perhaps the most significant factor supporting the rationalist argument for
norm compliance, is that international community has become increasingly concerned of the
Earth’s carrying capacity. The potential social and environmental threats caused by the declining
carrying capacity along with climate change, water shortage and biodiversity crisis with the
raising world population and economic growth has become one of the core global concerns164. It
is expected that in 2050 the world population will exceed nine billion. There is scientific
evidence that human activities produce climate change, particularly electricity generation, land
use changes from deforestration, agriculture and transport. These changes are expected to
accelerate over the coming years and resulting in the increasing severity of whether.165
The International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that: “Water and its
availability will be the main pressures on, and issues for, societies and the environment under
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climate change.”166 According to the United Nation’s Development Program’s (UNDP) 2006
Human Development Report “Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis167,
water reserves are already being used faster than they can be replenished, and over one billion
people have no access to safe drinking water168. There are severe water shortages in India, many
parts in Africa, and the Middle East, eastern Asia, and increasingly many parts of the southern
and western USA. Furthermore, the demand for water will be more severe as the world
population continues to rise and agriculture will demand more water. The World Commission on
Water, established by the World Water Council (WWC)169, has estimated that in 2025 some four
billion people, almost half of the world’s population, will be living in areas that will be “severely
water stressed”.170
Although the international community has set ambitious Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) of providing clean water and improved sanitation to at least half of the people
worldwide, the work has proved difficult. This is because sustainable water management poses
enormous challenges requiring mobilization of global capital — natural, social and financial —
as well as wide consensus on the best ways to allocate these resources. Also, water and sanitation
infrastructure provided across the world remain challenging development issues. Freshwater
scarcity and growing water demand, underinvestment in infrastructure in both developed and
developing countries, corruption, and controversy over the appropriate roles of the public and
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private sectors in ownership of water resources and responsibility for service delivery are major
international challenges that remain to be solved.171
But it is not only water and climate change which threaten both people and businesses, an
international concern for biodiversity loss is also growing. The Economics of Ecosystems
(TEEB) study, published in 2010, stresses the significance of healthy ecosystems for human
societies and that biological diversity (biodiversity) underpins human wellbeing. Biodiversity is
defined as “the variability among living organisms from all sources including, terrestrial, marine
and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are a part of; this
includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystem”.172 The TEEB study was
launched in 2007 by environmental ministers from the governments of the G8+5 countries in
Potsdam Germany, to emphasize that serious consequences on society will follow as ecosystems
become incapable of providing the goods and services on which hundreds of millions of people
depend on.173
According to the study: ”There is growing evidence that many ecosystems have been
degraded to such an extent that they are nearing critical thresholds or tipping points, beyond
which their capacity to provide useful services may be drastically reduced”. Such thresholds
have already been passed in certain coastal areas where “dead zones” exist. The study shows that
a range of coral reefs and lakes are no longer able to sustain aquatic species, and some dry land
areas have been transformed into deserts. Also some thresholds have been passed for some fish
stocks. Another large international study, The Living Planet Report 2010, published by WWF,
confirms that global biodiversity is being lost at a rate of many times higher than that of natural
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extinction due to land conversation, climate change, pollution, unsustainable harvesting of
natural resources, and the introduction of nonnative species.
According to TEEB, these systemic issues affect the quantity and quality of natural
capital, and thus present a whole new layer of operational constraints and normative challenges
not only to the states and their institutions but also to businesses174. This is for at least two
reasons. First, every business depends on biodiversity and the health of ecosystems. Many
natural resources such as water, land, fish, non-renewable energy and some rare minerals that
have in many parts of the world become increasingly scarce can thus seriously threaten many
companies’ business prospects, as scarce natural resources have become more expensive, and
social unrest and conflicts occur over them175. Second, every business has direct or indirect
impact on biodiversity and the health of the ecosystems. As the public perception for the urge for
more sustainable solutions is likely to grow, companies that generate large externalities by the
use of the commons are more likely to be spotlighted. Because these externalities concern a wide
range of citizens and consumers, campaigns against them are more likely to gain resources and
garner support176.
Summing up, corporations that are dependent on the commons, hence systemic resources,
that are declining are more likely to experience heightened social and environmental pressures to
operate more responsibly. In many communities where natural resources are scarce, a
corporation can experience risk of loosing its “social license to operate”, that is its license to
operate is no longer assured by governmental permits, but can be delegitimized by NGOs that are
jeopardizing the company’s business and in some cases even its continuity. Therefore, for
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companies that are dependent on these systemic resources, social and environmental issues have
become a foundational business concern.

Flaws of Constructivist Explanations

Constructivism expects that organizations adopt norms through norm internalization and
the norm then “guides” the behavior. According to Hevina Dashwood, the dissemination of
global norm of corporate social responsibility is best conceptualized as a dynamic process, where
corporations are playing a central role, often in conjunction with NGOs and states. Her empirical
study concentrates on two Canadian mining corporations, Placer Dome and Noranda, which she
views are not only reacting to global developments, but also actively constructing the norm of
corporate social responsibility inside the industry. 177
According to Dashwood, the companies have participated in shaping of these emerging
global norms within the mining and metals sector and worked through industry associations and
international organizations to promote standards of behavior applicable to the sector. The most
salient example of this is the creation in 1991 of the International Council on Metals and the
Environment (ICME) and in 2001 of the ICME’s successor organization, the International
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). Through these efforts, she argues, the global norms
have not “simply filtered down, but have also been shaped by companies themselves, in an
interactive or dynamic process”.
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John Ruggie shares this view by arguing that partnerships offer “learning potential” for the
partners involved178. In fact, many forums exist that have been developed to support companies
in developing, implementing, and communicating about corporate social responsibility. For
instance, the UNGC has been seen as a forerunner of these new social learning engagements,
where civil society organizations are included in concrete projects with businesses without
necessarily being formally accredited by UN organizations179.
However, although many corporations are engaging in learning about corporate social
responsibility and involved in specific organizations and forums that advocate the norm, it is yet
unclear how they affect the member organizations. If the UNGC proves to be a learning forum to
make corporations to comply corporate social responsibility, human right norms, labor and
environmental standards will have to become a part of institutional system in which business
operates. Mwangi and Schmitz180 remain skeptical about the ability of the UNGC to make
companies responsible. This is partly because they view that the initiator Mr. Kofi Annan is no
longer in the leadership position, and thus no longer the main champion and entrepreneur of
corporate social responsibility. They also argue that the UNGC does not provide a compelling
learning environment for the needed socialization. Sandra Waddock has also noted that by 2002,
“…hundreds of companies globally had submitted letters of commitment to upholding the
principles of the Global Compact. But the Global Compact had not yet reached a ‘tipping
point’. One of the unspoken questions underlying the Global Compact conference, thus,
was the fundamental question: what will it take to create this tipping point of corporate
responsibility especially among US firms?”181

Bremer’s study on UNGC confirms that although the UNGC is the largest system among
collective action institutions for corporate social responsibility, it has not reached critical mass.
178

Ruggie 2001.
Runhaar & Lafferty 2009.
180
Wagaki & Schmitz 2009.
181
Waddock 2004.
179

60
She found three reasons for it. First, limited penetration among the largest corporations, as only
three percent of them are members. Second, the membership is heavily represented by Western
European companies. Third, there are weaknesses in compliance with the reporting system.182
Taken together, skeptics argue that the UNGC is merely window dressing and an opportunity to
“bluewash” for the corporate sector. They argue that the UNGC would be more effective if it
created monitoring systems to watch company compliance and enforced sanctions in cases of
rule violations.183
The constructivism assumption, that the corporations that are committed to changing their
practices through internalization of corporate social responsibility as an integral part of their
decision-making process, seems to be difficult to establish. This would require a full-length norm
internalization process, which in turn would require that all decisions within the corporation are
made through “norm lens” and that all practices are consistent with the norm. In the case of
multinational corporations, which operate in multiple countries and cultures and varying societal
expectations and use multiple suppliers, such consistency with corporate social responsibility
norm compliance is difficult, if not impossible, to track.
Furthermore, the capitalist logic of the maximizing profits seems to sustain strongly, even
in the cases of most corporate social responsibility oriented companies. The blowout in the Gulf
of Mexico in April 2010, which killed eleven men and spewed almost five million barrels of oil
into the Gulf, illustrates this aptly. Until the accident, BP has been known for a decade long
tradition of learning and commitment to corporate social responsibility to the extent that BP has
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been recognized as a sustainability leader by many organizations and authors184. According to
CEO Lord John Browne:
“At BP, environmental and social responsibility is interwoven with operational and
financial responsibility – treated with the same discipline, rigor and attention to detail…I
believe we will build on our record and become what we aspire to be – a great company in
a sustainable world”.

The company has invested in renewable energy and has thrown large amounts of support
behind ethics and compliance initiatives, including a written code of conduct for its 92 000
employees and significant reduction of green house gas emissions.185 However, the recent
allegations of misbehavior reveal that BP’s commitment to take the norm of corporate social
responsibility into account in all decisions and operations has been subordinated to the
materialistic interests in cost of responsibility.
In its report, the seven-member national oil spill commission stated in January 2011 that
the accident was an avoidable disaster caused in part by a series of cost-cutting decisions made
by BP and its partners. According to the commission, a systemic management failure at BP,
Transocean, and Halliburton caused the blowout as many of the poor decisions taken on the
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig before the accident were taken to save time and money.
According to the report: "Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton,
and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those
companies significant time (and money).“ The report continues that: "BP did not have adequate
controls in place to ensure that key decisions in the months leading up to the blow-out were safe
or sound from an engineering perspective."
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As a result of the disaster, a civil lawsuit has been filed in December 2010 by the US
Justice Department against BP, Transocean and other companies involved in the spill for
damages to the environment. In addition, Gulf residents have filed hundreds of lawsuits for the
lost of their livelihoods because of the spill. The report estimates that BP and the other
companies could be liable for billions more in compensation to people who have lost money
because of the oil spill, and for damage to natural resources.186
The BP accident hence demonstrates that even corporations that are regarded as corporate
social responsibility champions make cost-benefit calculations involving their social and
environmental impacts, and when unexpected accidents happen the consequences of their
activities can be destructive to the system upon which many people relay on. So despite few
companies that have been found for other than profit-making purposes, such as the Body
Shop187, corporate social responsibility seems to be connected to powerful material incentives
that companies view worthwhile to take into account and take action accordingly. This is also
why corporations are moving from confrontational relationship towards collaborative
relationship with NGOs.

A Need to Reconsider the Relation to Society

Corporations are now facing increasingly complex challenges that go beyond short-term
costs and benefits to complex social issues encompassing considerations of reputation, the
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normative expectations of external groups and the public demand of more transparency as well
as the impacts of climate change, declining natural resources and the declining quality of
ecosystems.
As a result of this complexity, public goods are no longer free to the same extent than
before. If public goods, such as clean water and air, have not previously been valued in monetary
terms or priced in markets in the past, the situation is changing. The carbon trading system is an
example of this development. Also techniques for calculating an economic price for forest are
under development188.
In other words, due to the growing public concern on the treatment of workers and the
larger systemic inputs of corporations on the society’s wellbeing by harmful environmental
impacts and the use of the declining commons, companies confront risks that can hurt corporate
legitimacy, and thus profits. The normative legitimacy is increasingly challenged if a company
does not live up to the expectations of what is considered ethically right. As the Nike case
illustrates, even though the company had not broken any laws, the activist campaigning against
Nike for the inequity of workers resulted in customer boycotts and generated large-scale public
outrage against the company.
The emerging norm of corporate social responsibility has thus influenced many
corporations’ calculation of their financial interests, and are now changing the ways companies
view their relation to society. However, it should be emphasized that even if some corporations
have changed their policies in response to evolving societal expectations about responsible
corporate behavior, they are not genuinely committed to changing practices. This further
supports the rationalist argument that corporations are using the norm to further their own
materialistic interests.
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Existing Explanations of NGO-Business Partnership Types

The second section of this chapter explains why action-oriented NGO-business
partnerships vary. Faced with increasing and rapidly evolving complex normative external
expectations and pressures, companies need to review their relation to society and conform to the
norm of corporate social responsibility by adjusting their activities according to the norm. One
of the contemporary ways to demonstrate that they conform to the norm is to work with NGOs in
important social and environmental issues. Companies gain in expertise in issues they do not
have prior knowledge in and thereby gain credibility to their corporate social responsibility
agenda. NGOs in turn get direct access to influence the company’s decision-making from within
and thereby maximize their impacts. The parties thus create win-wins, that is they design
engagement forms that help both parties to achieve their own goals.
Companies thus seek NGO collaboration to demonstrate their corporate social
responsibility. However, there is relatively little literature that explains what kinds of NGOengagements a company is likely to choose. In Alliances for Sustainable Development, Laurence
Schwesinger Berlie builds upon Elkington and Fennell189, who argue that two characteristics are
decisive: the desirability to work with civil society actors and the willingness to become part of
the solution towards sustainable development instead of remaining part of the problem. Hence,
according to Elkington and Fennell, companies that are open-minded towards working with
NGOs and willing to offer their resources to find solutions to global challenges are more likely to
seek partnering engagements with NGOs.
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In her book, Schwesinger Berlie partly supplements this view, but adds a new dimension
into the equation by stressing the importance of vulnerability. According to her, it is not so much
about the mature alliance policy towards NGOs that accounts – as suggested by Elkington and
Fennell - but external pressures that a company is exposed to. Her empirical findings suggest
that companies that have been under confrontation seek NGO engagements. Hence, vulnerable
position is a critical factor since the NGO can offer the company “valuable resources to
compensate for this vulnerability”. According to van Huijstee and Glasberger, improved NGO
relationship diminishes the risk that the NGO will pursue a naming and shaming strategy. They
also argue that a good relationship with one NGO can “cushion” the impact of a public attack by
another NGO.
Schwesinger Berlie also stresses the role of leadership. There must be ability within the
company to change its values and management. From this follows, a company which has a wellestablished policy towards NGO-engagement and which is under external pressure will be more
interested in forming partnerships. She stresses – opposed to Elkington and Fennell – that
confrontation often precedes collaboration. According to her, “when you cannot beat your
enemy, the best strategy is to join them”.
Schwesinger Berlie illustrates her argument by developing a typology of three types of
companies, the exposed company, the neutral company, and the committed company on the basis
of her empirical findings. In her categorization, exposed companies are heavy polluters (e.g.
chemical, quarries, mines) or their products are polluting (e.g. fertilizers, household goods).
Exposed companies are also those companies that are strongly “depending on non-renewable
natural resources” (e.g. oil, natural gas) or “exploitation has exceeded the limits of renewal of
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stocks” (e.g. fishing). According to her, these companies are in “conflict with the environment”
or they are in “conflict with the local communities”.
For Schwesinger Berlie, neutral companies, in turn, are characterized as companies that
pollute little, consume little energy, and are not highly dependent on natural resources. These
companies are not in conflict with society, and they do not therefore attract the attention of
NGOs. Committed companies are the ones whose leaders think that profits should not be made at
the expense of the environment.
Hence, because of their vulnerability, Schwesinger Berlie stresses that exposed companies
are the most obvious companies to seek partnerships, followed by committed companies.
Fineman and Clark provide support for this view190. According to them, companies with a
negative environmental history or whose activities are polluting or endangering the environment
are more aware of the external pressures they are exposed to. In the study carried out by Antoine
Mach191, a connection between pressure and partnership is demonstrated. It found that out of
nine cases, seven have ended up to a partnership formation192.
All these typologies give valuable insights to explaining different types of partnerships.
However, they all are insufficient in terms of explaining the current phenomenon. First, although
Schwesinger Berlie aptly stresses the importance of NGO confrontation as a main driver for
companies to seek NGO engagement, her typology is weak in explaining the differences between
the external pressure companies are exposed to. In her model, there are the exposed companies
that face the pressure and the other two types of companies - neutral and committed companies that do not face any pressure.
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However, in current globalized economy, all companies are exposed to normative
pressures and their reputation can be ruined in a very short time, as discussed above. This means
that all companies are vulnerable, and thus questions the existence of neutral companies. In
Schwesinger Berlie’s model, the neutral companies are not in conflict with their external groups.
However, there is always potential that those companies face external normative pressure
someday, because issues can evolve and they can be “framed” later. Hence, there is a probability
that an issue will gain importance in the public’s perception and harm the company.
Second, although companies can influence their relation to society by seeking to ensure
their legitimacy, they cannot control it wholly193. From this follows, companies cannot be
categorized in the way Schwesinger Berlie does. Due to the emergence of the corporate social
responsibility norm in the market place, it is the external groups that perceive the company
responsible or irresponsible, not necessary the company itself. One illustration of this is, for
example, that many companies use recognitions they are granted by private sector associations
for their outstanding corporate social responsibility performance. However, other external groups
who score the leading corporations by using different criteria might not regard the same
companies responsible at all. Many NGOs remain therefore skeptical to private sector awards
and labels, and tend to view them as too subjective.
Thirdly, as discussed above, many corporations have crafted corporate social responsibility
programs and engaged in voluntary initiatives such as the UNGC and thus show their willingness
to reduce their environmental footprint, improve their labor conditions and contribute to the
communities they are a part of. Furthermore, there is evidence that companies that have been
highly exposed to normative pressure have sought to ease the pressure by establishing corporate
social responsibility functions and commitments to improve their social and ecological issues.
193

Baron 2009.

68
For instance, after finding to be vulnerable to external normative expectations of how to treat
workers overseas, Nike has developed a comprehensive corporate social responsibility programs
to improve its practices194. This, again, makes it difficult to differentiate between neutral,
committed and exposed companies, especially as many companies communicate that they are
committed to corporate social responsibility.
Finally, and most importantly, Schwesinger Berlie does not take into account that
vulnerability varies. For her, vulnerability is a static condition of the exposed companies. The
characteristics of those companies are that they pollute or make polluting products, or they are
strongly dependent on non-renewable natural resources or that the exploitation has exceeded the
limit of renewal of stocks. According to Schwesinger Berlie, the exposed companies are in
conflict with the environment and with the local communities. However, given that all
companies are vulnerable to external normative pressure, some companies are more vulnerable
than others. This is because different industries have different social and environmental issues,
and they thus face different levels of pressure. This makes the concept of vulnerability a variable.
But how does vulnerability vary? The concept of vulnerability is introduced next.

Vulnerability Re-Defined

This study builds upon Schwesinger Berlie’s rational argument that corporations that are
vulnerable seek NGO-engagements, but differs from her assumption by stressing that all
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companies are vulnerable and that vulnerability varies. Hence as discussed in the introduction
chapter above, companies are not equally vulnerable and the type of vulnerability matters.
Epstein lists such factors: locations of facilities, product and customer characteristics, the
nature of employment relationships, and general industry characteristics195. Traditionally
notorious industries are industries such as mining, footwear, apparel, toys, and chemicals. In
recent years companies operating in the oil, sportswear, timber, banana and biotechnology
industries have been particularly affected196.. Dashwood197 argues that among the mining
companies, a most salient risk is opposition from the local communities in which they operate.
This is because unlike manufacturing multinationals, which have greater mobility, mining
companies choose their locations based on the availability of metals to extract. Failure to
establish and maintain good community relations could result in a company losing its social
license to operate, even where the company possesses a regulatory license to operate.
The Schwesinger Berlie model groups companies that pollute or make polluting products
and companies depending on scarce natural resources into a one group. However, it is important
to make a distinction between these two types of companies, because their vulnerability differs
from each other. How vulnerability varies can, as explained above, be determined by using
systemic thinking, which helps to make a distinction between procedural and systemic
vulnerability.
Drawing from the idea that things influence one another within a whole, systems thinking
provides a valuable insight on how companies that are vulnerable to external pressure differ from
each other by the level of their vulnerability. As a general approach, it views problems as parts of
an overall system, rather than reacting to specific part, outcomes or events, and sees the
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combination of problems as potentially contributing to further development of unintended
consequences198. Using a more system-oriented logic, companies that pollute or make polluting
products are vulnerable to external groups because their manufacturing processes are harmful to
the environment. NGOs pressure these companies to correct their course. Therefore, as noted
earlier in the introduction chapter, these companies face process vulnerability. From a systemic
perspective, companies that are dependent on systemic resources such as certain minerals, fish
stocks, water, land, and oil and gas are dependent on the system and its resources, and are
therefore systematically vulnerable. Those companies operate under systemic vulnerability.
From a system perspective, the two types of vulnerabilities mainly differ in how companies
are able to respond to the harmful outside pressure they are exposed to, hence whether they can
ease the pressure or not. Companies that are vulnerable in terms of their processes have potential
avenues to respond quickly by changing and improving production processes in ways that
address criticisms by NGOs and others. In contrast, companies that are systemically vulnerable
cannot regain their legitimacy only by improving their processes. This is because dependency on
systemic resources is difficult or too expensive to replace with alternatives.
When companies are dependent on the systemic resources that are critical to the health of
the system they are a part of, they are likely to generate large amounts of negative externalities
that affect the wellbeing of the communities. These declining commons poses serious challenges
not only for the relegitimation efforts, but also for the continuity of the particular business. In the
current world of constrained natural resources and the intensified global discussion over the use
and the governing of the commons, companies that use scarce commons for commercial
purposes are easily accused of resource exploitation from the local people which in turn
generates bad press and consumer protests. Through NGO campaigns and media coverage, these
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companies easily become, in the eyes of the global public, contributors to the global problems
such as climate change, water crises, the collapse of biodiversity, and poverty. The negative
externalities caused by the use of the commons can easily be identified and communicated to
contribute to the global problems.
For instance, several NGOs, including Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, campaign
aggressively against Finnish petroleum refiner, Neste Oil. The company is protested for its
supply with palm oil from the Malaysian company IOI, as the main material for its biological
fuel. Neste Oil uses palm oil and other renewable materials for the production of biological
diesel fuel at its refineries. According to Friends of the Earth’s report Too Green to Be True199,
the activities of IOI are not sustainable and the group accuses Neste Oil of expanding its palm oil
plantations in a non-sustainable manner. The company is put into the global spot by the claims
that growth in the use of palm oil could actually accelerate climate change through the
destruction of tropical forests.
In January 2011, Greenpeace Switzerland and the Berne Declaration200 named Neste Oil
the “Worst Company in the World” in Davos during the World Economic Forum in order to raise
global awareness on the link between biofuels, deforestration and the climate issue201. According
to Greenpeace, commercial palm oil cultivation requires large areas of soil and tropical
deforestation, which severely threatens ecosystems. Deforestation is a significant global issue as
forests currently occupy about one-thirds of the Earth’s land surface and are estimated to contain
more than half of all terrestrial species, especially in the tropics. Furthermore, forest ecosystems
are key component of the carbon cycle and climate as they account for over two-thirds of net
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primarily production on land, through i.e. conversation of solar energy into biomass through
photosynthesis.202 According to IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, land-use change, including
deforestation, is responsible for twenty-five percent of human-caused carbon dioxide
emissions.203
Industries that are heavily dependent on systemic resources are therefore more likely going
to be under constant criticism by environmental and social advocacy groups. Those include
mining, forestry, fishery, oil and gas, and food and beverage industry. According to TEEB,
mining industry is a heavy user of ecosystem services. Also, it requires massive amounts of
freshwater for mineral processing. It also has harmful impacts on biodiversity due to habitat
disturbance and conversion caused by the removal of large habitats as well as disturbance caused
to ecosystems and human communities through noise, dust, pollution and waste.204
As the awareness of the importance of sustainable development grows and gains weight,
these companies become highly interdependent with the communities they operate in, as they
need to maintain their social legitimacy to operate that is ultimately depending on those
communities. The continuation of the particular businesses is thus highly dependent on the health
of a larger system the company is a part of. From this follows, sustainable development of the
communities where the company operates becomes a business interest for the company.
Given that all companies are vulnerable, this study identifies three types of corporate
vulnerability:
1) companies that operate under low vulnerability
2) companies that are vulnerable due to their irresponsible or unethical processes
3) companies that are vulnerable due to their dependence on the system and its scarce resources
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These types differ from each other in that companies that operate under low vulnerability
have not been under harmful normative pressure or they have been but through improvements of
operations they have regained back their normative legitimacy, while the two other types of
companies operate under harmful pressure due to their unethical processes or their dependency
on scarce commons. Next, a new theory to explain why it is important to take into account that
the concept of vulnerability varies when explaining the differences between corporate NGOengagements, is introduced.

Part Two: Theory

Types of Vulnerabilities

This section introduces a new theory why NGO-business partnerships differ from each
other. It lays out the factors that determine partnerships and then introduces the typology of
partnerships that introduces three different types: symbolic partnerships, instrumental
partnerships, and pioneering partnerships.
In explaining under what terms actors are likely to choose a particular kind of engagement
strategy, the following elements are critical. First, companies seek NGO-engagements to ensure
their normative legitimacy. Companies are primarily motivated by material incentives and they
conform to corporate social responsibility according to the material incentives associated with
their normative legitimacy. Those include reputation, shareholder, investor and consumer
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satisfaction as well as ensuring business operations. In the light of these incentives, companies
weigh their needs to improve the social and environmental consequences of their activities. They
consider whether there is a need to improve their relation to society and they then take action
according to these calculations. They thus use the norm of corporate social responsibility to
further their corporate goals.
Secondly, companies’ efforts to ensure legitimacy through NGO-engagement suggests that
the way companies perceive the complexity of the normative expectations of the external groups
is critical in a company’s decision on how to engage with an NGO. How the NGO-engagements
vary then depends on how companies specify their interests within their existing incentive
structures that involve norm of corporate social responsibility. The perception determines their
understanding of their need to engage NGOs to these activities. Companies thus turn to NGOs
for help and adjust their activities in the anticipation of the rewards the cooperation provides,
hence trade-offs.
Thirdly, vulnerability matters since it explains how motivated a company is to adopt a
meaningful corporate responsibility program and the possible forms that partnerships with NGOs
may take. Vulnerability affects the motivation level of companies to ensure company
legitimacy. Because legitimacy is at stake, how companies perceive their need to review their
relation to society depends largely on the normative expectations they encounter and the
magnitude of the harmful outside pressure to align their operations accordingly. From this
follows, partnerships vary because the need of companies to redefine their relationship to society
varies. Companies choose a particular type of engagement strategy attuned to opportunities that
the cooperation provides. The more companies are vulnerable to the normative claims of external
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groups, the more likely a company is willing to work with an NGO or NGOs to ease the
pressure.
Using systems thinking approach, one may differentiate between the levels of
vulnerability, hence the levels of company exposure to the harmful external normative pressures.
Companies are exposed to different levels of exposure due to the type of business they conduct
and the wider implications of that business to the health of the larger community they are a part
of. Vulnerability thus varies depending on whether there are systemic issues or process issues
that the company needs to tackle with. Companies that are highly dependent on the system and
its resources do not have other alternatives to choose from or the other alternatives are not
economically viable. This makes the company more dependent on the health of the larger system
it is a part of, and there is an obvious need to gain legitimacy from the local people, and thus
explains their interest in deep and comprehensive collaboration with respected NGOs as partners
to build the needed social trust. In contrast, if the issues NGOs are criticizing the company for
are process-related, there is a higher chance that after fixing them, the company will gradually
regain its legitimacy in the eyes of the external groups. Therefore, as explained in the
introduction, the study introduces a classification of three levels of vulnerability:
1)

Low vulnerability

2)

Medium vulnerability

3)

High vulnerability

Low vulnerability refers to conditions in which companies have not been harmed by the
external pressure. Important external groups commonly perceive these companies as good
corporate citizens, and these companies have been recognized for sincere and continuous efforts
to improve their processes to be more socially and environmentally sound. These companies

76
have not been under considerable negative external pressure, or they have been in conflict with
these groups but they have improved their processes to reclaim legitimacy and achieve a status of
good corporate citizen. Nike is an example of that. After having felt considerable pain and
market protest after NGOs attacked it due to its ignorance on labor issues in factories in southern
Asia in late 1990s, Nike is known as one of the most progressive corporations in terms of
corporate social responsibility. The mistakes made the company to build comprehensive
corporate social responsibility programs and it has managed to regain its normative
legitimacy.205
A company that operates under low vulnerability can maintain its NGO engagements
distant. Distant in this context means distance from the corporate operations and that the
programs with NGOs are external to the company. Such company seeks NGO engagement to
demonstrate corporate social responsibility as a normative deed. The NGO, in this case,
leverages its impact by taking financial and in-kind resources from a company in return of being
associated with the company in a common project. Typically industries that operate under low
vulnerability include media and entertainment, information and telecommunications, and health
care. Companies from other industries can also operate under low vulnerability if they have
consistent corporate social responsibility programs in place and proactive strategies to eliminate
and reduce all social and environmental risks they might become exposed to.
Medium vulnerability refers to the conditions under which a company is viewed to be in
conflict with the environment and the local communities due to its unethical processes. Such
companies are under intense activist campaigning and have been publicly shamed by negative
media coverage. Because the pressure can hurt profits, these companies perceive a strong need to
respond to the accusations by improving their operations. These companies are likely to seek
205
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NGO-engagements to clean up their practices to regain their legitimacy and attain appreciation.
Typical industries that operate under medium vulnerability include apparel and footwear,
construction, toy and other consumer goods industries.
High vulnerability refers to the conditions under which a company is not only in conflict
with an environment and the local communities, but also dependent on systemic resources and is
therefore accused of exploiting the local resources for commercial purposes. Under such
vulnerability it is difficult to establish and maintain good community relations and regain social
license to operate, even where the company possesses a regulatory license to operate. The high
degree of dependency on systemic resources poses thus a serious threat to a company’s business
continuity both operationally and emotionally. There is a high risk that these companies are not
only in conflict with both environment and the local communities, but also with global
community that is increasingly concerned with the use of the commons and how to regulate
them.
These companies join “the enemy” because they cannot beat them. Furthermore, the more
companies are dependent on the systemic resources, the more they have incentives to work with
NGOs to help solve the tragedy of the commons. These corporations need to earn their license to
operate from society, both literally through planning and permitting processes, and in a wider
sense through gaining the status of good corporate citizenship. This necessitates giving back to
society more than what is being taken in the form of natural capital206. For these companies
conformance to corporate social responsibility is not only a means to ensure their legitimacy but
also a key to continue their business.
This is also why these companies try to find new technical solutions to production in ways
that do not weaken the already stressed systemic resources. Likewise, the more there are
206

Bishop, interview in January 2011.

78
concerns embedded in a company’s operations that need to be improved, the more an NGO
views it as its opportunity to maximize its own impact. In fact, companies that are dependent on
systemic resources offer an NGO an opportunity to build a pioneering relationship. In such an
engagement, the NGO can help the company not only to improve its processes, but also to
transform its culture and practices. In these cases, NGOs help companies to build programs to be
more resource efficient. NGOs also challenge these companies to view their decisions from the
larger systemic point of view. NGOs also help companies improve relations with company
constituencies through meaningful dialogue and collaboration within the local communities and
in other important external groups.
Summing up, distinguishing between the levels of vulnerability is important as it affects
the motivation of a particular company to collaborate with an NGO or NGOs. A company that is
vulnerable due to its pollution, but is not dependent on the systemic resources, has differing
motivations to engage with an NGO than that of a company, which is dependent on systemic
resources, the commons. Companies that pollute or violate human rights seek NGO collaboration
to fix those concerns to ease the social pressure and regain legitimacy. Working with these
companies, NGOs can leverage its influence by helping the company to improve their processes
to be more responsible. In contrast, a company that is highly dependent on systemic resources
seeks NGO collaboration not only to gain legitimacy but also to ensure business.
Hence, the fact that vulnerability varies affects the motivations of a company to view its
relations to society. The variation of vulnerability makes companies to consider their relation to
society differently. Because there are differences in these needs, there are different NGO
engagement strategies. The theory thus explains that partnerships vary, because the need of
companies to redefine their relationship with society varies. The more vulnerable the company
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is, the more likely a dialogue with the external groups is deemed necessary to turn adversarial
relations into constructive ones. The preferences and interests of the actors involved thus
determine the particular type of an engagement strategy NGOs and companies use to achieve
their respective goals. Next, the typology of partnerships is introduced.

Typology of NGO-Business Partnerships

The typology identifies three types of engagement strategies that are useful for different
kinds of goals on both sides207. These three types of partnerships are symbolic partnerships,
instrumental208 partnerships, and pioneering partnerships. Each partnership results to a particular
type of outcome - that is a different degree of positive change in corporate behavior. The
engagement categories are based on a simple classification of the outcomes according to three
criteria:

1. Companies partner with NGOs to demonstrate their conformance to corporate social
responsibility
2. Companies partner with NGOs to improve internal company processes to regain company
legitimacy
3. Companies partner with NGOs to regain legitimacy and ensure the continuity of a particular
business
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These partnerships make up a partnership typology along which there are three types of
NGO-business interaction.

Table 1: Partnership Typology
Type of Engagement
Type of Action

Type of Vulnerability

Symbolic
Partnership
A normative
deed

Instrumental
Partnership
Consistent
process
improvements

Low
Vulnerability

Medium
Vulnerability

Pioneering
Partnership
Consistent process
improvements and
contributions to wider systemic
benefits
High
Vulnerability

The theory presented above predicts that the more companies are vulnerable to normative
pressure they face, the deeper they are likely to engage with an NGO or NGOs to demonstrate
their conformance to the norm to ease that pressure. In other words, companies that are more
vulnerable have more materialistic reasons to engage deeper with NGOs than companies that are
operating under low vulnerable to external normative pressure. Hence, companies operate under
different types of vulnerabilities and this determines the type of partnership they are likely to
form with NGOs.
From this follows, there is a clear relationship between companies’ vulnerabilities and the
types of partnerships. Companies that operate under harmful normative pressure are likely to
form instrumental and pioneering partnerships in order to redefine their relationship with society.
And, companies that are not operating under harmful vulnerability use the norm of corporate
social responsibility to further demonstrate their good manners and thus gain further societal
appreciation. Next differences between the partnerships are explored more in detail.
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Symbolic Partnerships

Corporations are more likely to choose a symbolic partnership as their engagement strategy
with NGOs when they operate under low vulnerability. These companies engage with NGOs to
respond to appeals to appreciation along the spreading of corporate social responsibility.
Because these companies are not in conflict with external groups, engagement strategy is then a
symbolic gesture of a moral duty to achieve rewards of cooperation.
For a company those rewards include reputation benefits, as the partnership creates
positive associations with NGOs that bring brand value and good reputation. Being able to use a
specific NGO label a company expects to gain credibility to its social and environmental cause.
In order to gain the rewards of cooperation, a company chooses symbolic partnership with an
appropriate and well-respected NGO. In this way, a company “gives back to society” in one-way
manner.
In contrasts to the two other partnership types, instrumental and pioneering ones, which
rely on active NGO participation into a company’s internal operations, symbolic partnerships are
chosen when a company wants to associate with an NGO but keep NGO distant. For an NGO,
the reward of cooperation of a symbolic partnership is that companies can use their extensive
marketing and communication infrastructure to make NGO mission more public. In addition, in
symbolic partnering arrangements NGO receives funding and in-kind services from the
corporation it partners with.
A symbolic partnership is formed under the following conditions. Because the company
operates under low vulnerability, it is not in need to build programs that involve direct NGO
involvement to improve its internal issues. In other words, such company does not need to
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redefine and rebuild its relationship with society as it is generally considered a good corporate
citizen. In comparison to companies, which engage with NGOs in instrumental and pioneering
partnerships, this kind of a company can maintain its relation to society at the symbolic level.
In symbolic partnerships actors do not need to trust each other. The collaboration does not
involve confidential issues, and is carried out in out-house manner. The level of engagement
between NGOs and companies is relatively low. The engagement is typically a fixed term
project, which is carried out under a strict budget. It differs from traditional philanthropy in that
it is a public commitment to achieve measurable outcomes. The level of change in corporate
practices is low. The potential to make social contribution is much more modest than in the other
two partnership types.

Instrumental Partnerships

Instrumental partnerships are likely to be chosen as an engagement strategy when a
company faces medium level of external normative pressure due to its unethical processes; hence
its vulnerability is process-related. This means that the company’s internal processes are not
socially or environmentally responsible and need to be fixed to regain normative legitimacy.
NGOs have targeted and harmed these companies and the companies seek to ease the pressures
by working with NGOs to improve their internal processes. Although actors seek together to
improve the existing social and social environmental concerns, sustainable development of the
larger system is not their primary concern.
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Instrumental partnerships are thus formed to take action to change corporate social and
environmental practices. Actors cooperate because they acknowledge the mutuality of interests
in reducing a company’s negative externalities by stopping the company from causing more
harm. The engagement between the actors is an instrument in achieving the rewards of
cooperation. The reward for instrumental cooperation for a company is the regaining of lost
legitimacy. By helping companies to develop their processes, NGOs in turn view that they are
better able to spread their mission and make positive change in social and environmental issues
in areas they view critical.
An instrumental partnership differs from symbolic partnerships in that it is a pragmatic
approach to collaboration. It goes beyond PR considerations and focuses on improving internal
company processes to lessen the NGO pressure and to regain legitimacy. Instead, a symbolic
partnership focuses on specific groups or projects in a company’s external environment that are
not motivated by the need to regain legitimacy.
Instrumental partnership requires mutual understanding and trust that takes time to
develop. A company needs to open its operations to the NGO it works with. Because an
instrumental partnership is formed to improve a company’s processes with using an NGO’s
knowledge, interaction is defined as a process through which the actors share control over
development initiatives and decisions. Therefore a high level of transparency is needed.
Instrumental partnerships require that organizations develop specific working rules and
monitoring tools. Instrumental partnerships last a fixed period during which a common purpose
project is carried out.
In instrumental partnerships, the engagement is thus an instrument through which each
organization is set out to gain in partnership context. The societal benefit is generated trough
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reducing the negative externalities that generate benefits not only for the company and an NGO
in question but also to wider societal groups in communities where the company is present.

Pioneering Partnerships

Actors are more likely to choose a pioneering partnership as their engagement strategy
when a company is highly dependent on systemic resources and has been aggressively and
harmfully targeted by NGOs, and thus operates under high vulnerability. These companies are to
a great deal threatened by the external normative expectations of responsible business and the
growing public concern for the commercial use of the commons, and thus seek NGO partners to
help them craft comprehensive corporate social responsibility agenda that go beyond their own
operations and value chains to reach larger systemic benefits. Companies that form pioneering
partnerships with NGOs have undoubtedly realized their need to ensure the continuity of their
business by acquiring legitimacy not only from the communities they operate but also from a
larger public by promoting sustainable development. These companies have realized that their
business is highly depending on their relationship with the larger system and the natural
resources available, and they therefore want to ensure that they are well prepared to respond to
the pressure they face.
In pioneering partnerships partners build comprehensive social and environmental
programs as a response to pressure from outside. This, however, should not be understood as
greenwashing or window dressing. Instead it is consistent work in which an NGO is directly
involved in the process by helping the company improve its internal processes and build
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credibility with external groups. Partners work closely together to apply scientific knowledge
and expertise to examine how the company operations rely on and affect nature, the natural
resources and the health of the communities where the company has presence. The aim of the
collaboration is to advance the incorporation of corporate social responsibility into business, and
to take action to protect the Earth’s natural systems and the services they provide for people, for
the benefit of business and society.
The collaboration is designed to help the company innovate new approaches to critical
challenges it faces. The NGO first helps the company evaluate its current status. It then helps the
company identify improvement targets and methods of measuring the improvements
transparently. Transparency is key to credibility. NGOs view this situation favorable as such
companies seek NGO-assistance in being more resource effective and leveraging their power to
promote sustainability of the larger system.
The engagement between the actors is thus pioneering. Actors are pioneers in societybusiness relationship, as they build long-term relationships with each other in issues with high
strategic importance to both of them. Because interaction is necessary to obtain the strategic
goals of each actor, the partnership has been granted high priority by both actors and integrated
into their core strategies. The relationship between the partners is thus interdependent. This is
also why pioneering partnerships represent the most advanced level of relationship between
NGOs and corporations.
Although instrumental partnerships and pioneering partnerships are relatively similar they
also have differences in focus. If instrumental partnerships are formed to improve social and
environmental conditions within a company’s internal processes in order to regain legitimacy,
pioneering partnerships are formed to ensure a much broader social legitimacy and partners
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commit to common objectives that are highly ambitious public commitments to promote social
and environmental issues in a long-term perspective. They aim at changing a company’s
behavior in a way that larger societal benefits are generated than in instrumental partnerships. In
instrumental partnerships, companies make these commitments alone, and the role of NGOs is to
assist them to achieve those commitments. In pioneering partnerships companies let NGOs in
their operations alike in instrumental partnerships, but also engage NGOs to their strategy work.
This requires considerable amount of trust from the corporate part and a high level of risk taking
and public commitment from the part of the NGO to work publicly towards joint goals.
A pioneering partnership thus requires perfect mutual trust and clear understanding of each
organization’s agendas and ways of operation. There are high-level risks involved as a company
is exposing confidential in-house issues, and trusting that the information is not used wrongly.
Engaging with a company at the strategy level, an NGO takes a high risk of compromising its
credibility, as it can easily be criticized for loosing objectivity. This is why monitoring and
reporting of achievements help actors to maintain the trust needed. In pioneering partnerships,
the potential for making the most change in corporate practice is the highest, as both an NGO
and a company have committed to achieve measurable results. In these partnerships, the level of
societal benefit is the highest.
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Table 2: Partnership Continuum and Three Types of Partnerships
TYPE OF
PARTNERSHIP
TYPE OF
SOC
IETYBUSINESS
RELATIONSHIP
•
Characteristic
features
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

SYMBOLIC PARTNERSHIP

INSTRUMENTAL
PARTNERSHIP

PIONEERING PARTNERSHIP

“Dating”

“Engagement”

“Marriage”

Symbolic gesture to enter public
•
dialogue
•
Reputational benefits
•

Inclusive engagement •
process
•
Focus on specific
•
company process
improvements
•
•
Viewed important for
corporate social license •to
operate
•

High strategic relevance to the
performances of actors involved

Relatively short-term
engagements utilizing
•
communication and campaigns•

Initiatives external to corporate
practice, such as community •
development, conservation
• Resource intensive
•
projects, and other “good works” process
•
and community partnerships •
programs
• Actors share control over
•
•
development of initiatives
•
• No confidential issues
•
•
•
• Involves confidential •
• Limited risks
issues
•
•
• Involves risks
•
•
• Opportunity for improved
•
learning and operational•
• efficiency through deeper
cooperation
•
•
•
• Increases good reputation
•
when successful
•
•
•
• Helps regain trust and •
legitimacy when
successful
•
•
•
Type of agents Adopters
Instrumentalists
Level of trust Not critical to the outcome
Needed
Level of
Low
Medium
engagement

Partnership work viewed necessary to
advance the goals of the actors involved
Highly ambitious publicly stated
commitments with global media coverage
Viewed necessary for corporate social
license to operate
High profile partnership, senior
management committed
Long-term engagement
Focus on company-wide process
improvements
Very resource intensive & time
consuming
Actors share control over development of
initiatives and decisions
Actors’ core capabilities employed
Strong community aspect
Highly confidential issues, major risks
involved
Monitoring, rules and responsibilities
sanctions
Pioneers
Necessary
High
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Chapter III

“Mobile Technologies to Do Good Things for Society”209

Part One: Growing Importance of Corporate Social Responsibility and Nokia’s Awakening to It

Introduction

In the era of heightened importance of corporate social responsibility companies that
embrace the norm can be a source of pride, retention and inspiration for employees and owners,
and are also more likely to engender the support and societal appreciation. Those multinationals
that are considered good corporate citizens often take extra action to demonstrate their
conformance to the norm to garner yet broader positive attention and appreciation for their
activities. Because they are not harmed by normative pressure, they do not need to fix their
processes to regain back their normative legitimacy.
This allows them to maintain their relationship with society symbolic. Due to the low level
of vulnerability these companies operate in, they engage with NGOs in symbolic ways in order
to show their responsibility to the society they are a part of. For these companies, the main driver
for partnering with NGOs is the brand rewards that the cooperation provides. And these rewards
are warmly welcomed as they further strengthen the perception of these companies as gooddoers in the market place.
209
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This chapter explores Nokia Corporation as an example of a multinational company that
operates under low vulnerability, despite some negative social and environmental externalities
related to the ITC industry and some specific criticism that the company has been exposed to.
The chapter shows that with its consistent work on corporate social responsibility, Nokia has
managed the external pressure associated with its global operations and maintained its normative
legitimacy. In fact, Nokia is widely known for its firm corporate social responsibility and its
active engagements with various NGOs to demonstrate its conformance to the norm.
Because the company has not been in the need of fixing its internal processes, its various
engagements with NGOs represent examples of symbolic partnerships as identified above.
Typical to companies operating under low vulnerability, Nokia’s engagements with NGOs are a
collection of programs with international NGOs primarily focused on bringing reputational
rewards and appreciation. The programs are thus a reflection of a clear understanding that in the
era of heightened attention to corporate behavior, it pays off to be a corporate steward in social
and environmental issues. This requires however more than complying with the laws and
regulations. It requires that through NGO-engagement the company positively contributes to
communities it is a part of.
The chapter traces back to the corporate social responsibility concerns of the ICT industry
and the developments that illuminate how Nokia has, despite criticism from outside groups,
managed to safeguard itself from harsh and financially harmful activist campaigning. Its NGOprograms have focused on the communities it is present and the main impetus has been to further
demonstrate its corporate good will to build and strengthen good reputations.
Nokia is one of the most highly valued electronics and consumer goods brands in the
world. Its roots are in Finnish paper, cable and rubber industries, but since 1992 the company has
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focused on the ICT sector. By the end of the 1990s, Nokia was the world leader in the mobile
phones. In 2008, the company produced 1.5 million phones a day and remained the world’s
leading manufacturer of mobile devices by market share, and a leader in the converging Internet
and communication industries. By 2011, over one billion people use Nokia phones across the
world. The company employs 128 445 people and has sales in more than 150 countries, reaching
to EUR 50,7 billion in 2008.210
In tracing the developments that have made Nokia to operate under the lowest level of
vulnerability, in which it is not confronted with normative pressure that hurts its profits, this
chapter begins with discussing the corporate social responsibility issues within the ICT sector.
This is done to establish the position of Nokia within its corporate social responsibility milieu,
both from the point of view of the industry in general and the particular measures the company
has taken to cushion itself from the potentially harmful criticism. The chapter thus explores
Nokia’s achievements in the corporate social responsibility front and how it has achieved the
reputation of being a good corporate citizen, although there have been some activist campaigns
against it and some adjacent negative publicity.
The chapter then moves on to discuss Nokia’s engagements with well-known NGOs as
symbolic gestures to achieve brand benefits and further strengthen the perception of the
company’s conformance to the norm of corporate social responsibility. The chapter concludes
that these engagements do not differ much from traditional philanthropy and corporate
sponsoring, and they therefore represent the “dating” stage of the relationship between business
and society. The actors interact, but both parties remain independent.
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Corporate Social Responsibility within the ICT Sector

Nokia as the world’s largest mobile phone maker operates within the larger rapidly
growing Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Each second thirty-six mobile
phones are manufactured. Everyday there is over 1.8 million new mobile phone subscribers,
majority of them in the emerging markets.211
In comparison to many other consumer goods industries, the ICT industry has a good
reputation and it is praised for many abilities.212 First, it provides increasing access to
information, increasing opportunities for participation in public debates as well as opportunities
to distance learning. Second, there is evidence that the ICT industry makes a major contribution
to the gross domestic production (GDP). According to London Business School study, an
increase of ten percent in the mobile coverage will have a positive effect of 0.6 percent on the
country’s GDP.213 Finally, ICT is also praised for enabling sustainable development through
“dematerialization” and “immaterialization”. The former refers to the significant environmental
gains that can be generated from substituting a service for hard product and enabling more
ecological working methods, such as remote working and video conferencing as they result to
lower pollution, energy use and green house gas emissions214. The latter refers to the replacement
of physical products with digital counterparts. For example, downloading music or digital games
over the Internet can replace the need for manufacturing, packaging and storing them in stores
with the related transportation and travel. In addition, the ICT sector can effectively be used to
increase awareness of global environmental concerns due to increased access to information, and
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Information Economy Report 2007- 2008.
Covalence Report 2010.
213
Waverman 2005.
214
Hassi, Kumpula & Riuttanen 2007.
212

92
thus its role has been regarded important in the fight against climate change215.
Furthermore, in comparison to traditional industries, the environmental impacts of the ICT
sector have been trumpeted as environmentally friendly, without producing significant damage to
the environment. Most of its impacts come during the production, use of the products and after
they are discarded into electronic waste. The most impacts come from the energy consumption
and the emissions as well as the toxic materials in batteries and cables. Also waste has been one
of the environmental concerns, as electronic consumer goods tend to have a short product life
cycle. 216
Despite the good image, there are few issues that have concerned the international NGO
community and thus can also give raise to consideration on Nokia’s process and systemic
vulnerability to normative pressure. One of them has been the heavy electricity use associated
with the industry. The sector consumes enormous amounts of energy and the need for
computational power and data storage is expected to grow significantly in the future. It is pointed
out that a newly constructed data centers can consume more power than the cities they are
located in. The energy consumption is closely connected to the sector’s impact on the climate.
The green house gas emissions amount to about two percent of global greenhouse gas emissions,
and it is expected to be three percent by 2020.217
The industry has put forward many energy efficiency programs and many improvements
are under way. Greenpeace found in its Green Electronics Survey issued in January 2011 that
there have been improvements in green features compared to the previous two surveys,
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conducted in 2008 and 2009.218 In addition, almost all products meet or exceed the current
Energy Star standards established by EPA. According to Greenpeace, electronics companies
seem to put much more effort in improving the energy efficiency of their products rather than
reducing the “embedded energy” – that is, the energy spent during the production of each
product, and according to Greenpeace, much still needs to be improved.219
In addition to environmental issues associated with the ICT sector, concerns for social
issues have been mounting. One of them is the so-called “digital divide”. Despite the
revolutionary changes the industry has made in people’s lives across the world, there are
growing concerns that the industry is causing the world to become increasingly divided by
uneven access to telecommunications services220. The industry is also seen to enable misuse for
criminal purposes, loss of consumer privacy, and unemployment due to efficiency improvements
caused by technology as well as reduced employee satisfaction due to reduced contact with
colleagues.221 Since the emergence of first mobile phones there have also been concerns of
health risks related to electromagnetic fields.222
Criticism towards labor conditions at the manufacturing sites has also been loud and
enduring. During the past decade, the manufacturing has moved increasingly from Western
Europe, the US and Japan to developing countries and emerging economies, where the costs are
low, workers are skilled, and the markets are growing. Particularly China, India, and the
Philippines have been attractive for the relocation of production. Between 1995 and 2006, the
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Asian Pacific area’s share of global electronics production has increased from twenty percent to
forty-two percent. Currently half of the mobile phone production takes place in China. In
addition to the concerns that the relocation of the production to low cost countries carry along
environmental and social issues, there has been political storms over jobs outsourced to low
wage countries such as India and the Philippines.223
This darker side of the ICT sector has been difficult to trace. Typical to the consumer
electronics industry is that the manufacturing of different components is scattered to many
suppliers. Various studies indicate that workers are treated well in large Western companies, but
these companies have difficulties to ascertain that their subcontractors follow the principles of
their codes of conduct. It has been claimed that rule respect gets weaker, the further down the
subcontracting chain the factories move. According to NGOs, some of the worst violations take
place down to these supply chains. This is because the factory workers do not know their legal
rights and they have no experience in demanding them.224
A multi-year European-fund project “Make IT Fair” by several European NGOs has raised
awareness about development issues in the production of the electronics industry. The group
focuses especially on products for young consumers, such as mobile phones, MP3 players, game
consoles and laptop computers. Their studies do not draw rosy pictures about the realities of the
manufacturing processes. Silence to Deliver. Mobile Phone Manufacturing in China and
Philippines report225 examined six factories in China and the Philippines that deliver components
to the world’s five biggest mobile phone companies, Nokia, Samsung, Motorola, LG and Sony
Ericsson, which currently hold more than eighty percent of the mobile phone market. According
to the study, the most common problems at the factories are: low wages, long working hours, and
223
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disrespect towards union organization. In both China and the Philippines, workers often earn the
minimum wage for full-time work at the factory. According to the report, the problem is that
minimum wage in the Philippines is not enough to cover the basic costs of an average Philippine
family. Due to growing protests and inflation, the Chinese minimum wage was raised in 2008.
However, workers still struggle with covering their basic needs with their incomes.
Another remaining controversial issue of the ICT industry has been the extraction of
conflict minerals, such as tungsten, tin, tantalum, and gold for consumer electronic production226.
Many international activist groups have raised the awareness of Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) conflict and the role of Western companies that source minerals from there. International
studies227 have confirmed that many laptops, mobile phones, and other electronic equipment
contain minerals mined in conflict zones in Congo228.
The issue emerged in the early 2000, when these minerals became extremely controversial
after a link between them and fueling violence in Congo was found out. According to Enough,229
miners working long hours in dangerous conditions earn only around one to five US dollars a
day, while “…. militias make millions and millions about $ 180 million from trading in these
minerals last year and they’re to continue their existence and their armed struggle on the basis of
this trade”.
International Rescue Committee views that the conflict in eastern Congo from 1998 to
2003 has been the deadliest since the World War II230. It has been estimated that in the conflict,
in which eight African nations fought for the control of Congolese’s mineral resources, about
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five million people have died and nearly a million people have died from starvation, conflict and
preventable diseases. According to the UN, 200 000 women have been raped and children have
been used for mining, fighting and other work. According to Powering the Mobile World report
by Make IT Fair project, 50 000 children are estimated to work in the mines of Katanga in
Congo were cobalt is extracted. The children are exposed to high health risks as they are exposed
to mineral dust that irritates their eyes and damages their lungs.231
In addition to these problems in the ICT sector, the complexity of the ethical challenges
that face the ICT sector is predicted to grow. In the future, the ICT sector will face a values
conflict over the use of Internet and software technology by repressive governments to censor
information and track down opponents. 232
Similar to many other major ICT companies, Nokia has been publicly criticized for using
suppliers that do not provide adequate benefits for workers and for supplying conflict minerals,
and indeed some misbehavior has been documented. According to the theory presented in this
study, these conditions would make the company operate both under process and systemic
vulnerability respectively, if the company had not been able to demonstrate its consistent
corporate social responsibility policy and programs that aim at improving its suppliers’
operations to create less harm to society and the environment. Next it is discussed why Nokia has
put these programs in place and how it has become recognized as a good corporate citizen by
many important external groups.
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Nokia – A Good Corporate Citizen

Nokia, among other multinational corporations, awakened to the importance of the
emerging norm of corporate social responsibility in the latter part of the 1990s. This awakening
was a natural consequence of the spreading of Nokia’s business operations abroad. The
management realized that the globalization of the operations will expose the company to variety
of new social and environmental risks and they wanted to ensure that those risks would be
effectively managed. By the end of the 1990s, the company had become global and expanded in
many countries where legal requirements were not the same than in Europe, or they were partly
or wholly absent. Exposure to these new risks was seen to threaten brand and shareholder
value.233 Therefore it was decided that an internal organization was needed to evaluate these new
potential risks and to find out how the company could be protected from them.
As a consequence, two divisions were set up in the early 2000. One was for corporate
social responsibility, and its primarily task was to consider the possible risks and equip the
company with a systematic strategy with consistent goals to protect the company from those
risks. The other one was set up to bring Nokia to comply with the European environmental
regulations. At the time, the EU’s environmental regulation was also strengthening and Nokia
needed to become compliant with the new regulations. This naturally directed the emphasis on
the environmental issues too. The two organizations within the company established the firm
foundation for Nokia’s corporate social responsibility.
To demonstrate its conformance to the norm Nokia incorporated the code of conduct to
guide all company operations as well as its corporate social responsibility and business ethics.
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According to its corporate social responsibility guidelines, the company fosters diversity and
equal opportunity among its work force; it strives to reduce its harmful environmental impacts of
its operations and products, and does not tolerate corruption and requires its partners to comply
with laws and regulations. Although these guides have been refined few times over the years, the
actions taken by the company since their incorporation in 1997 illustrate that Nokia has had a
sincere attempt to live up with them, and thus can be regarded a good corporate citizen.
Anne Klemetti234, who directed the corporate social responsibility department within Nokia
from its early years, emphasized in an interview in March 2011 that the senior management
decided that a consistent corporate social responsibility strategy was needed, above all, to build
an “insurance” to cover all offices and sites. In the early 2000, the management thus forecasted
that the company operational principles that were established within Finnish culture were to be
stretched to cover all Nokia operations as normative trouble could evolve unexpectedly and hurt
the company. According to Klemetti, the management was wholly aware of the importance of
systematic work that the company needed to do with these issues. Also, the need to become
compliant with the European level new environmental regulations was obviously influencing
Nokia’s decision to invest time and money in corporate social responsibility.
Hence, the company was not under any harmful normative attack or it was not exposed to
harmful NGO pressure, when the decision to conform to the emerging norm of corporate social
responsibility was made. There was no crisis to handle when the corporate social responsibility
function was established, rather it was established to prevent crisis. According to Klemetti, this
required a company-wide transparent model for dealing with social and environmental issues in
all operations and all sites to build a consistent track record to demonstrate that the company
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“walks the talk”. 235 Such determination to make the company responsible throughout its
processes across the countries demonstrates that Nokia’s executives were careful not to ignore
the consequences of negative externalities of activities, in contrast to the executives of those
companies that operate under process and systemic vulnerability. Rather the Nokia executives
acknowledged that those consequences are likely to lead to confrontation and risky publicity and
thereby create losses in profits. Hence, the management saw the clear causal link between the
external normative expectations of what constitutes a responsible behavior of a multinational
company and the bottom line. This was shown by the determination of the management to shield
the company from potential criticism and to invest in proactive strategy to ensure that its
operations are responsible across countries. The company thus took good care of its negative
externalities before external groups put a price to them.
For the senior management at Nokia devoting resources to corporate social responsibility
was thus a decision that was taken after weighing the cost and benefits of the issue, as the
rationalist understanding of norm compliance expects. Because the company needed to protect
itself from the possible new risks, there were hard business incentives to invest in corporate
social responsibility. Hence, Nokia did not comply with the norm as a result of harmful
normative pressure as is often the case with companies that operate under vulnerability – either
process or systemic vulnerability – as the Chiquita and Coca-Cola cases will exemplify in the
following. Nor did it comply with the norm as a result of norm internalization as suggested by
constructivists. It complied with the norm because it was regarded a smart thing to do to protect
the business.
This highlights how the company’s vulnerability differs from the two other types of
company vulnerabilities. While the two other types of vulnerabilities that are caused by ignoring
235
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externalities and result to risking material gains if a change of practices is not made, in low
vulnerability there is no pressure to change of practices.
But because it was considered highly important to proactively protect the brand and the
shareholder value, the early corporate social responsibility policy at Nokia was notably boosted
in 2002 by the decisions that the senior management should oversee the corporate-wide
corporate social responsibility policy, and that the executive board approves the activities as part
of the strategic planning process. These decisions signaled the boarder public that corporate
social responsibility issues have been regarded high in the company’s agenda early on.
Nokia has communicated on these undertakings to its external groups since 2002, when it
published its first environmental report. The first separate report on corporate social
responsibility came out in 2003. The first two environmental reports published in 2002 and 2003
reflected the company’s growing responsiveness to the concerns of corporate impacts on the
nature. They discussed Nokia’s efforts to improve employee wellbeing, community welfare and
the state of the environment, and described how these issues have been absorbed and integrated
into everyday operations.
In the beginning, special emphasis was placed on human rights and environmental issues,
reflecting the growing awareness on the potential of these issues to harm the brand. Because the
idea was to protect the company from possible risks, it was natural that Nokia emphasized
strongly its responsibilities as an employer with respect to human rights based on the UN
Declaration on Human Rights and ILO requirements. To support the active role in human right
and environmental issues, Nokia committed to the UNGC principles in 2001 as one of the first
companies. The company also put into place internal policies to provide concrete guidance for
employees who deal directly with human rights and environmental issues that they can monitor
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the compliance of human rights and environmental requirements within company operations in
different countries. Few years later all the employees took an on-line training course on these
issues.236
During the early stages of striving for environmental stewardship, Nokia’s goal was to
reduce the negative environmental impacts of its internal operations. To reinforce the goal of
becoming more environmentally responsible, employees were engaged through an on-line
magazine in 2002. A year later, Nokia worked with WWF to find new ways of enhancing
Nokia’s environmental performance and increasing the environmental awareness of
employees.237 Two years from the first environmental report, the company set a clear goal of
becoming environmental steward within the industry sector. According to Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo,
an executive vice president at the time being,
“Our continuous goal is to set the industry benchmark in environmental performance and
seamlessly integrate environmental aspects into our strategies and operative activities.
Caring for the environment is everybody’s business.”

On environmental management, the company complies with voluntary certification
systems ISO 14001, OHSAS18001, and PCMM conventions. One of the core targets has been to
reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Other important target has been
recycling. According to Mikkonen238, Nokia is currently actively researching the use of recycled
plastics in their products, which are currently used only in packaging.
The company’s awakening to the importance of environmental issues can be traced back to
the simultaneous developments in the market place. In the early 2000, the philosophy and
practice of corporate social responsibility was visibly emerging and corporate community sought
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to enhance their non-financial performance. The company goals thus reflect the recognition that
corporate social responsibility is a critical issue and as a market leader it is Nokia’s responsibility
to lead the way towards more responsible business practices within the industry.
Since 2006, the goal of being an environmental steward has been further intensified as the
general public awareness of the importance of sustainable development has grown ground and
gained world scale awareness. Nokia, then, expanded its goal of making a positive impact. On
one hand it decided to do it through its products and services that enable people to make more
sustainable choices and on the other hand through requiring the suppliers to be more responsible.
The company made a policy that its suppliers should also take a similar ethical business
approach. A survey conducted in 2004 showed that Nokia was sourcing from responsible
companies.239 However, since many external groups later questioned the reliability of supplier
assessments that Nokia had used to conduct the survey, Nokia admitted that the assessments it
conducted only provided “snapshots and did not cover the whole picture”. The company supply
chain specialist Abigail Oxley-Green responded to the critics and stressed that each company is
responsible for its own practices, but “it is the responsibility of the company to promote good
practices and supply chain management to our suppliers, and to help them improve in case gaps
are identified”. According to Oxley-Green, the main focus was on the first tier suppliers, but it
became soon apparent that effective upstream supply chain management is also essential to gain
broader credibility. She therefore suggested strongly that there should be a follow-up, and the
company should collaborate with suppliers and other constituencies to enhance supply chain
transparency and sustainable development of those chains. She explained that Nokia was to
239
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tackle the issue through communication, clear requirements, training, and supplier assessments.
The company did set new requirements. It decided that all suppliers have to have an
environmental management system and a company level code of conduct in place. According to
the company web pages, “Before agreeing to work with a supplier we ensure that these standards
are met, and we visit a number of suppliers on an ongoing basis to review standards. We also
work with suppliers on training and support to help them implement and improve standards.”
According to the 2009 Sustainability Report, a survey of suppliers’ code of conduct
implementation found that ninety-two percent met the requirements and the company will help
those that do not meet the expectations to take corrective action. Since 2007, Nokia has also
initiated supplier collaboration to work on energy efficiency targets that go beyond Nokia’s
current environmental supplier requirements. 240
A part of its corporate social responsibility work is that Nokia is a member of international
organizations and initiatives that promote corporate social responsibility. Active participation
and work in these associations also illustrates the company’s commitment to raising awareness
of ethical business conduct. Those organizations include membership in WBCSD, the European
Information, Communications and Consumer Electronics Technology Industry Association
(EICTA), Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA), Electronics Industry
Alliance (EIA), American Engineering Association (AEA), Mobile Manufacturers Forum
(MMF), Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce (GBDe), and The National
Electronics Product Stewardship Initiative (NEPS).
Summing up, Nokia has a consistent history of fostering good corporate conduct and it has
demonstrated its determination for continuous improvements through training employees,
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participating in industry associations and monitoring suppliers. Due to the systemic work on
these issues, Nokia has gained the appreciation for its environmental work from influential
environmental groups and industry associations. In its annual rankings for market leaders in the
electronics industry, Greenpeace ranked Nokia first in 2009. According to Greenpeace, Nokia
has a good track record in cutting the amount of toxic chemicals in its products, promoting
recycling, and reducing impact on climate change.241
Within the private sector rankings, Nokia has been rated for several years as the leader
within the Europe and Communications categories in Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, and in
2009 the company was named the world’s most sustainable technology company242. Nokia was
also ranked as one of the best twelve performing companies in Carbon Disclosure Project
rating243. Nokia is also included in the FSTE4Good index that measures companies’ performance
that meet corporate social responsibility standards. In 2008, Goldman Sachs ranked Nokia as a
leading company among thirty-nine technology hardware companies in the categories of
environmental performance, social performance and overall performance in a global technology
hardware analysis.

NGO Concerns for Nokia

To be sure, Nokia is considered a good corporate citizen and it is constantly improving its
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operations to become a more responsible corporation. Despite of that, it has also received
negative attention. However, as mentioned earlier, it has managed to maintain its normative
legitimacy and thus operate under low vulnerability. In cases where it has faced criticism, Nokia
has been drawn to the press due to improper labor conditions and the raw materials it has
supplied244. Although these cases have been unfortunate to the company, they have not caused
significant harm to the company reputation and profits, and the image of the company has
maintained rather polished.
This is partly due to the company’s policy to examine the allegations carefully and engage
in dialogue with the groups claiming for unethical conditions in order to ensure that they are not
continuing. According to the company, “Most allegations have been found inaccurate, but in
some cases there have been areas of improvement, which we have taken up with our suppliers
and will monitor in our regular supplier assessments.”245
In addition to specific issues that have raised the need for a dialogue, the company also
started a wider global-level dialogues in 2006 that brought together clients, suppliers, regulators,
consumers, NGOs, and European politicians to raise different issues and generate a better
perspective on them. According to Klemetti246, these events have been important occasions to
meet the opponents and listen their views and gain more comprehensive understanding on the
changing external expectations on the company’s operations.
In 2008, The Decent Factory film described the poor working conditions in one of the
Nokia’s suppliers’ facility in China, and questioned the company’s decision to use suppliers that
pay poorly and provide working conditions that are not so shiny; all the while Nokia was making
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record-high profits.247 The film pointed out that by Finnish standards the wage are quite modest
and Finns doing the equivalent work would earn more in a day than Chinese get per month.
Criticism with Chinese factories had intensified already in 2005, when two Finnish NGOs,
Finnwatch and the Finnish ECA (Export Credit Agency) spotlighted Nokia for faulty working
conditions at a factory in southern part of the country248. Their Reform Campaign report revealed
that Nokia and its subcontractors operations in southern China confirmed what the campaigners
had suspected249. The report claimed that factory employees work long hours, their working
conditions are poor, and the living conditions of some of the workers are inhumane. They
pointed out that Nokia’s factory in Dongguan in southern China compels its employees to do
more than the legal maximum of overtime work, and pays its workers less than the minimum
wage. Workers that work temporary were in the weakest position; their pay and terms of
employment were worse than among regular employees. Because temporary workers amount to
almost half of the workers at Nokia's Dongguan factory, the issue of temporary workers is
considerable. However, in comparison to the conditions at other Finnish-own factories, Nokia
factory was better in many ways.
Nokia was quick to respond to these accusations. Martin Sandelin, responsible for
corporate social responsibility, commented that the company obeys the law and legislations and
pays over the Chinese minimum wage250. According to him, the local trade union operates at
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Nokia's Dongguan factory, and Nokia helps finance it by paying the union two percent of the
factory's payroll costs.251
Another sensitive issue that Nokia has been associated with is the claims that Nokia uses
conflict minerals. A Danish documentary Blood in Mobile Phones came out in December 2010
and it linked Nokia to the conflicts in eastern Congo. The film was made to address the
connection between mobile phones and conflict minerals and to let people know that Nokia’s
corporate social responsibility might not be so consistent as it appears to be in the public. The
same critics has also been raised by a Finnish reporter Hanna Nikkanen, who wrote a book about
it in the end of 2010252.
The issue of conflict minerals did not strike Nokia by surprise. The company claims that
already since 2001 it has been aware of the possibility that it might use conflict minerals and the
potential link that exists between the mining of tantalum and the financing of the brutal violence
in Congo. According to the company:
“Even though we do not source or buy metals directly, we are very concerned about poor
practices at some mine operations around the world. We require high ethical standards in
our own operations and our supply chain. Mining activities that fuel conflict or benefit
militant groups are unacceptable.”
According to Nokia representatives, the company is actively working to tackle the issue of
conflict minerals in different ways and working to ensure that the materials are sourced in legal
or ethical ways253. The company is actively working to increase the transparency of the supply
chains of these materials. It has also created an internal substance list requirements. The
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company has also been working with suppliers of other minerals, such as cobalt and tin, to
improve transparency of the supply chain and find out how to use alternative new substances,
such as biomaterials. The work has been difficult:
“It's a big challenge to trace materials to their original sources. This involves thousands of
companies and changes in the mining industry. Also, because of the complexity in the way
that metals are produced and sold, sometimes ores from many different sources are
combined to make the final materials with no or limited traceability. To make further
progress requires industry-level action both amongst electronics companies and the mining
industry, and Nokia has been actively participating in this discussion.”

In 2004, Nokia began working within industry associations to resolve the traceability
challenges of supplying minerals and joined Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSi) and the
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC). Both of them seek to improve the traceability
of metal sourcing. One of the joint achievements of the organizations has been a research project
on the challenges of the supply of metals for electronic products, which they carried out in 2009.
The study analyzed how the traceability of their sourcing can be improved and how the industry
can influence the conditions. These results were later shared with NGOs who were invited to plan
the next steps. The groups are also tracing the supply of three metals, cobalt, tin and tantalum to
find out about the conditions under which they are extracted from.
In July 2009, Nokia replaced its self-assessments with the self-assessment questionnaire
developed by GeSi and EICC. The new assessment helps companies to collect and analyze social
and environmental responsibility data provided voluntarily by their suppliers. The questionnaire
revealed promising results254. According to Nokia 2009 Sustainability Report, the company will
work with the suppliers that needed improvements. It stated in its web site: “If we find that
standards are not being met we do not walk away but work with that supplier to address the issues
254
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and in so doing help to raise overall standards.”255 Nokia has also joined RosettaNet, a voluntary
industry initiative of over 500 major information technology and electronics manufacturers
worldwide committed to developing solutions for standardized exchange of information with
suppliers.
According to Isosomppi256, in addition to working with the traceability issue at the mineral
supply chain, Nokia continues with its commitment in working to enhance human rights in
business. In this effort, Nokia follows the work of John Ruggie, who works as a special
representative of the UN Secretary General on Business and Human Rights. Isosomppi has also
been involved with the development of the international standard on social responsibility, the ISO
26000. Due to these emphasis put on the responsibility issues, the company is defending itself on
the website:
“In the end, it is a bit disingenuous to suggest that we are not doing enough in this space.
We think our actions and activities show clearly what we believe in. That we haven't stood
on a soapbox or flung open our books does not mean that we are any less committed to
continued efforts in solving issues around mineral sourcing and local health, safety,
environmental, and labor standards. It goes without saying that we will continue our efforts
with the same high level of determination and hope to continue driving the electronics
industry in the right direction.”
Taking together, despite these concerns Nokia can be considered to have ethical operations
and thus to operate under low vulnerability. This means its profitability is not threatened by
external normative pressure. As of April 2011, NGO campaigns against the company have not
seriously harmed the brand, and the accusations have focused on issues that are not in its
processes but beyond the company’s reach, on the supply chain it uses. Nokia has demonstrated
consistent efforts to strive to reduce all the negative effects and works at the company and
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industry levels to monitor the operations of its suppliers. In the case of conflict minerals, Nokia
is actively looking for ways for alternative metals and working towards improved transparency
of metal sourcing. There are many other countries where these metals can be mined, including
Australia and Brazil257. Hence, the company’s operations are deemed ethical and it works to
improve its suppliers’ operations to be ethical too. In regard to conflict minerals Nokia is not
systematically vulnerable to activist pressure on the use of these minerals, because it is not
depending on these systemic resources as those minerals can be sourced somewhere else too.
This low vulnerability, identified in the theory, allows Nokia to maintain its relationship
with society at the symbolic level. Because it is not in the need of finding a trusted NGO partner
to begin comprehensive internal improvement programs to regain broader societal trust and
normative legitimacy as is the case with companies that operate under higher normative pressure
and are in the need of those changes in order to ensure shareholder value, that is to deliver more
social and environmental “goods” and fewer “bads”.
As discussed in the following, Nokia maintains its relationship with society via variety of
social and environmental programs it has created with international NGOs. Because these
programs associate the company with well-respected organizations, they are above all marketing
and public relations efforts to make the company known as a good corporate citizen in those
communities. The programs express the good will of the company. Next these programs are
discussed in more depth.
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Part Two: Programs To Do Good In Society

Symbolic partnerships evolve when actors seek to achieve further reputational benefits.
Symbolic partnerships are project-based and loose engagements in which interaction between an
NGO and a company does not need to be regular and no specific procedures of developing trust
are required. Typical to these engagements is that corporate input is limited to funding the
programs, whereas the role of the NGO is to provide a recognizable forum or a meaningful
framework for common projects. As a result, both parties gain positive attention and social
appreciation.
Nokia that operates under low level of vulnerability has chosen to engage with NGOs by
initiating a variety of “community involvement” programs carried out with NGOs in
communities across the world. The main reason for these NGO-engagements is thus to respond
to the spreading of corporate social responsibility as an emerging international norm in the
market place and to provide with concrete programs to demonstrate the company’s conformance
to that norm. During the years, this has paid back in PR-rewards. The programs have brought
positive publicity and garnered accolades from various institutions. They have been commended
as projects that use information and communications technology to improve living conditions
and increase economic growth.
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Youth Programs

In early 2000, Nokia decided to focus on youth and education to achieve brand-related
rewards of cooperation with NGOs. This was a logical decision. During the time, Nokia was
spreading its operations across the world and its technology was enabling new solutions to many
fronts in peoples’ lives, not least how they connect with each other. Because the company
identified itself as a “forward-looking”, youth became not only a natural focus for the
community programs but also a convenient link through which the company could connect its
programs in different countries. The main impetus of the programs was that the company needed
to show up positively in the new markets258.
Another reason to focus on youth was that the company also sought to establish
mechanisms to listen to and learn from this group and integrating the feedback generated into its
innovation processes and future visioning. The former CEO Jorma Ollila stressed the importance
of youth focus for the company:
“In the future that Nokia’s business is shaping, people will have the technology to
communicate anytime, anywhere. Helping young people improve their skills, knowledge
and connections to society is a natural outgrowth of Nokia’s business, vision and values.”17

Moreover the programs were designed to spark off wider societal impacts through
benefiting parents, teachers and other members of the community and suited therefore well with
the objective to demonstrate good corporate citizenship. Although this was first of all a market
tactic to make the brand known as a good corporate citizen, it was clear from the beginning that
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through them the company strives “significant impacts”, and the programs should be designed to
have a clear connection to the core business.259
Hence, early on these community involvement programs were designed to contribute to the
communities the company was present. They were similar to traditional corporate sponsoring
and philanthropy as the overall function of them was to enhance marketing activities in
communities where Nokia was present, but they were different from them in that they were built
to achieve longer-term strategic societal benefits through Nokia’s core capabilities, the
technological solutions.
The first programs with NGOs under the label of community involvement began in the
early 2000. According to Klemetti, these programs were built as a “natural evolution” of Nokia’s
turn to the US markets. Because there was a long tradition of the corporate community
involvement programs within the US, it became natural that Nokia too would establish such
programs in communities where it operates.
To launch the youth development programs, the International Youth Foundation (IYF) was
found a fitting organization. Founded in the 1960s by Rick Little, the organization works “to
build young peoples’ character, confidence and competence and to connect them to their
families, peers and communities”. The organization currently supports youth development
programs in nearly sixty countries and has a tradition of working with corporations. In addition
to the purpose of IYF, its geographic presence was also a good fit to Nokia’s own vision of
connecting people:
“We believe that access to various media such as radio, music video, the Internet, mobile
devices and television helps to empower young people. Engaging young people helps them
become active citizens and enables them to have a say in decisions that affect their lives.”
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In April 2000, Nokia and IYF launched a multi-year partnership called “Make a
Connection”. This global initiative focuses on locally driven programs that improve educational
opportunities for young people and teach them life skills. Nokia’s initial financial commitment to
the program was $10 million over four years and it was decided that Nokia will leverage more
money as well as ideas and technology through employee volunteer efforts. By December 2010,
the program has reached over 420 000 young people in twenty-six countries and Nokia has used
$ 34 million to fund these local programs which all share “a commitment to equipping young
people with essential skills that will empower them to become competent, confident, responsible,
and caring adults”.
It was decided that the country programs would be implemented by local NGOs, which
were seen to provide a means for achieving important youth development outcomes in different
countries. According to Greg Elphinston, director of corporate social innovations at Nokia, those
outcomes include improved performance at school, increased literacy, job placement, and active
citizenship260. For instance, Conéctate has provided Colombian youth with training in
information technology and developing their self-esteem, creative and critical thinking, and
communication skills. Kapcsolodj supports the efforts of young community volunteers in
Hungary and has equipped them with project management and budget planning skills. Mudando
a Historía has trained Brazilian youth to serve as reading mentors to disadvantaged children.
Similar to Hungary, the projects in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia have focused on
supporting young people to contribute to their communities. In Venezuela, the project has helped
disadvantaged youth acquire vocational and life skills aimed at helping them get jobs or become
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entrepreneurs. In the US, the project has focused on young people to learn to express themselves
through art. In Nigeria, young people have been trained to become leaders.261
Another youth program “BridgeIt”, designed to bridge the digital divide by bringing multimedia learning methods to classrooms in developing countries through utilizing existing mobile
products and satellite technologies and the 3G network, illuminates the similar aim of
demonstrating good corporate citizenship in communities where Nokia is present.
The program has been in operation since May 2003. It was developed after good results of
the engagements of IYF262. It is also a youth program that is implemented in communities where
the company operates in and brings together Nokia and IYF with Pearson and UNDP, partners
that also see the collaboration beneficial to them. It brought credibility to the project and for
UNDP concrete achievements in its goals. According to Terence Jones, practice leader and
former resident representative in the Philippines UNDP:
“Capacity development is a central goal for us. This means empowering societies,
institutions, communities, and individuals to access knowledge and use it to make more
effective decisions to better their lives.”

The main idea of the program is to make a contribution to the quality of learning and
teaching in underserved schools and communities. According to Mark Nieker, president of the
Pearson Foundation:
“BridgeIt is part of the ongoing effort to extend proven technologies to the world of
education. This initiative gives teachers the power that mobile technologies already offer
others as a way to share ideas and explore new ways of learning with their students.”

According to Klemetti, these organizations were seen as naturally fitting partners to
Nokia’s efforts to contribute to communities. The chairman of Pearson was sitting in the Nokia
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board at the time of the initiative and it was viewed that Pearson would gain equal reputational
benefit from the project.
In 2003, the program was launched in the Philippines under the title "text2teach" and 240
schools and 900 000 pupils across the country participated to the program. The program consists
of 480 supported lessons directed at 5th and 6th grade teachers. The material consists of a library
of 370 science, math, and English videos and is integrated into daily classes.
According to the University of Philippines, program has been successful: an impact
assessment demonstrates a significant increase in average academic scores and decrease in
absenteeism. The positive impact of the program has been studied to reach beyond the
classroom, as the project has motivated school officials, parents, and community leaders. Hence
for Nokia, BridgeIt program represents a new way of contributing to society in positive way that
can be measured by the test scores and enhanced teacher and parent involvement to learning
process. Not surprisingly then, the company views the collaboration successful. For instance
Anne Klemetti views the program as a good example of “how the public, civil society, and
private sectors can cooperate successfully both at the local and global level”.263
Because the partnership has been successful in bringing about concrete results in the
communities and generated good PR for the company and the NGOs involved, it has extended
and attracted more participating organizations. In December 2010, the program was launched in
eleven public elementary schools in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Philippines, in partnership
between Globe, Ayala Foundation, Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization
Regional Center for Educational Innovation and Technology and the Department of Education.
These organizations provide the learning environment of Dagupan elementary schools with the
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community launch of the Text2Teach program in Dagupan City. According to Globe president
Ernest Cu,
"Knowledge is increasingly becoming the most important currency today and modern
technology is a tool that helps transfer, share and apply that knowledge. With Text2Teach,
Globe strengthens its commitment to use its superior mobile technology to educate and
empower young Filipino students. Building a better life and reaching their dreams, this is
where Globe can help." 264

Both Nokia-sponsored youth programs are symbolic gestures to contribute to the society.
An important element of the programs has been the effective use of information and
communications technology. Text2Teach has won several awards and garnered accolades from
various institutions. It was a finalist in the 2006 Stockholm Challenge in Sweden – ICT Prize for
entrepreneurs and projects that use information and communications technology to improve
living conditions and increase economic growth. Text2Teach was also recognized as best in
Support and Improvement of Education Category during the 2006 Asian CSR Awards.
On environmental issues, Nokia has similar NGO-engagements that aims at positive
reputational gains under “Connect2Earth” program. It is a green on-line community launched by
WWF and IUCN in 2008 with Nokia sponsorship. The program enables young people to express
their views on the environment by uploading videos, pictures, and comments. It is a joint project
between Nokia, WWF and IUCN, which has evolved as a natural expansion on Nokia’s
collaboration with WWF from 2003 under the “Global Partnership Agreement”. Nokia has also
been a financial supporter of WWF’s project “Operation Mermaid” in the Baltic Sea.265
In 2008, Nokia intensified its collaboration with WWF and joined its “Climate Savers”
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program that works to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Until then, its collaboration with WWF
has been financial support to conservation work and developing mutually beneficial activities
promoting sustainable development. The Climate Savers –program requires internal reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions. WWF also helps Nokia conduct footprint assessments in different
areas and set environmental targets according to the findings. Nokia and WWF have also agreed
that WWF pilots its “Green Office Plus” program in certain offices. According to Liisa
Rohweder, executive director of WWF Finland, Nokia is an important strategic partner in that it
helps raise environmental awareness and provides mobile technology solutions that can be used
as WWF downloadable content to encourage people make sustainable choices in their everyday
lives. Given the size of the company and the magnitude of the brand, WWF Finland views the
collaboration as its most significant corporate partner. Nokia also supports WWF’s nature
conservation internationally, and is a major supporter of WWF’s “Living Himalayas Network
Initiative”.266 Nokia has similar engagements with other environmental NGOs. One of them is a
program with IUCN China in which they work together on an advocacy program for local people
in the Miyun County to enhance local knowledge of watershed management in an area that faces
serious water shortages. The Miyun Reservoir is the main source of drinking water for seventeen
million residents of Beijing.267
Symbolic partnerships are formed to bring positive reputational benefits and they are not
much substantially different from traditional corporate philanthropy. With the exception of the
Climate Saver Program, which requires commitment to internal improvements in energy use, the
above discussion shows that Nokia’s programs with NGOs are external to its operations.
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Mobile Technologies for Development

It has been described above how the scale and scope of Nokia’s social and environmental
responsibility has been reactive to the general evolution of these issues in global public
awareness, not by harmful NGO-pressure. This is also the case with the community involvement
programs. In the beginning of the twentieth-first century, the programs were philanthropic
socially conscious programs targeted to benefit mainly young people, but in five years the
emphasis started to change towards programs that provide solutions to global problems. This
again reflects the general growth in the awareness of the importance of corporate social
responsibility in the market place and the gradual evolution in the corporate social responsibility
thinking in which emphasis has shifted notably from taking responsibility of own operations
towards providing solutions to global problems, and thus Nokia’s policy and responsiveness to
this change.
This change in emphasis was visible in 2006, when Nokia set a more concrete goal to turn
the company’s core competences into “social innovations”. In the late 2010, Pekka Isosomppi,
who directs social regulation and corporate social responsibility at Nokia, explained that the core
of the new corporate social responsibility was to contribute devices and services that help people
and improve the planet268. This goal was stated in the 2009 Sustainability Report in the following
way:
“As well as exploring direct business opportunities, we have started research to help us
better understand and make the most of the impacts of mobility. There is plenty of
macroeconomic data, anecdotal evidence and common sense to suggest that mobility
benefits societies in many ways. Mobility also has benefits that are over and above the
generic benefits of ICT. Yet the full consequences of mobility are yet to be discovered.
Political, social and business processes, for instance, are rapidly changing because of the
268
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increased mobility of communication. When 4.5 billion people use mobile phones every
day, the sheer magnitude of this phenomenon must profoundly change the fabric of
society.“

Since 2006, a part of the community programs have been labeled as “Mobile Technologies
for Development”, and in December 2010 there were programs with different NGOs to “bring
the benefits of mobile technology to more people in ways that reflect our values and our
responsibilities”. These programs range from donations and sponsored programs to partnerships.
According to Greg Elphinston,269 the programs mirror the company’s dedication to bridge
communication gaps around the world through providing universal access to communications
technology. Through these programs, Nokia seeks to use mobile technologies to provide both
social and economic improvements. Those include better access to information, enhanced
business opportunities and increased potential to network with others in the community and
make the technologies a powerful weapon in the fight against social exclusion.270
One of the programs has been the “Village Phone”, which has helped to boost economic
development in rural areas in developing countries. In 2006 Nokia and the US-based Grameen
Foundation began collaborating with an idea to provide access to affordable telecommunications
services271. This was an important reputational gain for Nokia272. The program is build on the
work of Professor Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, who received the
2006 Nobel Peace Prize for their concept of microfinance as a tool to create entrepreneurship as
it develops network connections in areas with poor infrastructure. Microfinance has been widely
praised for its ability to build entrepreneurship in communities and generating extra income that
can be used to educating one’s children or paying for one’s own housing. For example, in
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Uganda five thousand new businesses have been created since 2006 and the number continues to
grow. Nokia considers the Village Phone –project to be an excellent example of today’s
collaborative efforts to make universal access a reality.
Since 2006 Nokia has been investing also in “Data Gathering” programs as a part of
demonstrating its corporate social responsibility. These programs base on the idea that utilizing
Nokia’s own expertise in mobile technologies good things for society can be done273. Instituto
Nokia de Tecnologia (INdT), which is a non-profit research and development centre in Brazil,
developed software that can be used to help the public sector and NGOs accurately collect data
in countries where infrastructure is poor or does not exist at all. It allows different organizations
to collect data using mobile phones in remote locations, and transmit for analysis. The Amazonas
State Health Department in Brazil has used the solution to fight against dengue fever in the city
of Manaus in northern Brazil in 2006. The application can also be used for other purposes, for
example to remind people to take their HIV/AIDS medicines on time. According to the parties,
this is a social innovation: if taking medicines is ignored, the virus will mutate and cause not
only health problems but it will also require a more expensive set of medicines.
Since 2006, Nokia has also worked with the international children’s organization Plan
International. In this collaboration Nokia offers its communication technologies to raise the
children’s awareness of their rights and opportunities to empower them in Africa. Various
projects have been carried out in East Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt and Senegal, as well as in
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone and Togo, where 5000 youth have been trained on children’s rights and radio
technologies. In Uganda, the project for children help line has reached children who have been
victims of violence and a weekly radio program “Kids Waves” have raised awareness on
273
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children’s rights. In Kenya, a birth registration pilot “Community-Led Decentralized Model for
Birth Certification” has been carried out.274

Conclusions

Nokia’s programs clearly reflect that Nokia operates under low vulnerability to external
normative pressure. The company has been exposed to NGO pressure, but the campaigning has
not hurt the company to the extent that it would have damaged its normative legitimacy. The
company is well recognized for its responsibility. This has allowed Nokia to run its NGOengagements as programs that are built to give back to society. These programs are spread
around various social issues to which mobile technology can bring new solutions. These
corporate citizen initiatives are carried out to create goodwill and improve relations with
significant corporate constituencies.
Because Nokia operates under low vulnerability, the conformance to the norm of corporate
social responsibility thus does not require any changes to internal processes. Because Nokia was
not under harmful NGO pressure and there were no crisis when the company began to build its
corporate social responsibility approach, the community programs were not designed to involve
issues or communities that have significantly been negatively affected by a company’s
operations or materially affected its long-term competitiveness. Instead, the partnerships were to
market the company as a responsible company. The impetus for symbolic partnerships is thus
more a moral duty than compulsion. Hence, instead of being embedded in the company’s
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operations, the driver for collaboration is the growing recognition of the need to balance
economic and social interests and the reputational benefits that come along doing so.
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Chapter IV

“We Opened the Door and Danced With the Devil. And We’re Better Off for It.”275

Introduction

Instrumental partnerships differ notably from symbolic partnerships discussed in the
preceding chapter. They are pragmatic engagements that are designed to make changes in
corporate practices. They therefore require direct NGO consultation in corporate operations in
hands-on manner. The main difference between the two is that in instrumental partnerships
companies let NGOs into their processes, whereas in symbolic partnerships companies and
NGOs have only agreed to advance a common social or environmental cause that is not caused
by the company, hence it is distant from it. In comparison to symbolic partnerships, instrumental
partnerships represent a much deeper cooperation between the actors and require understanding
for each other’s operating cultures. In instrumental partnerships actors become partners in
change. This difference should be highlighted, because there has to be always substantial reasons
before a company begins a dance with a possible devil.
A substantial reason for such a dance is a potential profit loss. It forces for-profit
companies to review their relation to society in a new way and makes them to correct their
courses. A company that has been defined irresponsible by society is harmed by external groups
and thus operates under considerable normative pressure. The driver for these instrumental
partnerships is thus the process vulnerability that a company has been exposed to and from
275
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which the company seeks to free itself from. The theory presented in this study predicts that after
realizing that the normative pressure to change corporate practices is in essence business issue
and therefore too substantial to ignore, executives seek NGO engagements to resolve the
situation and to regain the lost legitimacy. In order to do so, they are likely to form instrumental
partnerships with NGOs.
The underlying mechanism for instrumental partnership is a change in societal expectations
and the subsequent conflict between the society and the company that the change in normative
expectations on how a company should behave causes. A company whose practices are unethical
and reputation questioned will face conflict about societal expectations of their organization.
This is exactly what happened to Chiquita Brands International Inc, the world’s largest
agricultural company in the early 1990s, when it found itself vulnerable to normative pressure
that was hurting the company. The company produces, distributes and markets fresh and
processes food. More than a half of Chiquita’s $ 3.9 billion revenue comes from bananas.
Chiquita supplies twenty-five percent of the banana consumption to North America and Europe.
It employs some twenty thousand workers in 127 banana farms in five Latin American countries,
Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama and Columbia. The company operates primarily
through its owned farms and distribution operations: a half of the banana sold by Chiquita comes
from the company-owned farms; third party suppliers produce the others.
It was not that the company had not been widely known for its dirty banana practices
across Central America, rather it was the changing societal expectations on how the company
should behave that became to shake the long-established bad practices of Chiquita. The Smart
Alliance. How a Global Corporation and Environmental Activists Transformed a Tarnished
Brand by Taylor and Scharlin describes how Chiquita emerged over the course of more than a
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hundred years from predecessor companies including the United Fruit Company (UFC) and the
United Brands Company. Throughout its century-long history, the company has been a synonym
for American dollar-company. It has been known as “the Octobus” (El Pulpo) for its broad reach
and influence throughout Latin America. The company employs the largest number of laborers in
the region, and has dominated the banana export and exerted its influence throughout rural
communities in Latin America, where it has been leading the banana industry for a century. 276
This chapter explores how in the early 1990s the practices that had been stereotypical to
banana business for the past hundred years were no longer acceptable after local people in Costa
Rica and large European retailers raised their concerns how bananas are grown and expressed
their expectations of how the company should operate its business. The chapter explores how the
subsequent management decision that followed to improve the internal processes was made by
rational business reasons. Because the company needed knowhow to carry out such
improvements, it needed to engage with an NGO to help it out, and therefore it invited the
environmentalists in.
The case discusses the cooperation between Chiquita and Rainforest Alliance as an
example of instrumental partnership between a multinational company and an environmental
NGO. The partnership was instrumental as it helped Chiquita to conform to the norm of
corporate social responsibility and regain the lost legitimacy and acquire respect from external
groups such as trade unions and established social auditing institutions.
The chapter begins with discussing the corporate social responsibility issues within the
banana industry and the rapacious history of Chiquita that made it to operate under process
vulnerability. In contrast to symbolic partnerships, instrumental partnerships require risk taking
from the side of the company to let an NGO into company operations in day-to-day bases.
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This is where the partnership differs from a symbolic partnership in important respects.
Using the metaphor of a relationship, the instrumental partnership illuminates the engagement
stage before marriage. Close collaboration between the NGO and the company requires mutual
understanding, commitment and compromises, and the actors need to trust each other. The
chapter discusses how such qualities of an instrumental partnership between Chiquita and the
Rainforest Alliance were built, and how each actor gained in the partnership context.

Part One: Growing Normative Pressures to Change the Image of the Notorious American Dollar
Company

In the late 1990s when Chiquita formed an instrumental partnership with Rainforest
Alliance, it operated under process vulnerability. The public image of banana industry has
traditionally been one of the most unethical ones and its bad processes have been known widely.
The industry is large: bananas are ranked the fourth most important crop in the world after rice,
wheat and maize. They are produced in about 120 countries in tropical countries. The global
market size of banana business is around $ 5 billion a year. For many South American, Central
American and the Caribbean countries bananas are an export commodity that makes a significant
source of income and employment.277
Since the beginning on the twentieth century, banana business has traditionally been
dominated by big players. According to Vorley278, there are sixty million consumers, five
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retailers with seventy percent of the market share, five companies in alliance of distributors with
eighty-eight percent of the market share, and five transnational banana companies that control
eighty percent of the world market. All together, there are 2500 plantations of which 15 00 are
small-medium sized farmers and 400 000 plantation workers.
For many years, the big banana companies have been the symbol of all that was wrong
with big multinational agricultural corporations, and their irresponsible agricultural practices
have been widely criticized, especially during the 1990s279. According to Cohen, economic and
political problems and the mistreatment of workers date back to the late 1800s in Honduras,
when the first railway system that connected Central America with North America was built and
American large fruit corporations began to buy land for production and shipped bananas to the
US. Especially UFC, the predecessor of Chiquita, owned major parts of agricultural land in
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and controlled the trade that grew exponentially between
1900 and 1930. Because these countries were politically and economically weak, they became to
known as “banana republics”, countries that have been perceived powerless against the large
corporation.280
In addition to these structural factors, there is a long tradition of environmental degradation
and unethical working conditions that have come along with the multinational banana
companies. For these reasons environmental and human rights activist groups have been
concerned of banana companies’ practices for many decades. Advocacy groups have criticized
many internal mal practices, and thus made also Chiquita exposed to harmful outside pressure.
One of the main concerns for environmental activists has been the large-scale
deforestration resulting from clearing tropical forest for banana cultivation. This was especially a
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heated issue in the 1990s, and has also affected Chiquita. A public concern over forest
destruction grew when big banana companies bought Costa Rican land and forests in the
northeastern part of the country and turned them into massive banana plantations. This monocrop cultivation meant loss of cattle farms and primary rain forest and their location near many
forest preserves and conservation areas disrupted sensitive ecosystems.281 Banana farms, as
described by Taylor and Sharlin, were:
“chemical-laden, soil was impoverished and big areas of deforested wasteland; gullies
filled with plastic waste and discarded cord; rotten banana carcasses and stalks; shanties
with outdoor latrines and no shower and changing rooms for workers to remove protective
clothing; murky rivers and streams; heaps of discarded chemical drums and other
containers; and a noticeable absence of plant and animal diversity.”282

Environmentalists and other activist groups have actively campaigned to raise awareness of
pesticides used in the banana cultivation that are known to damage the nature and its ecosystems.
The use of these chemicals grew dramatically when banana production grew in the late 1980s283.
Towards the late 1990s it was common that workers pumped the chemicals directly into the
ground or used irrigation guns to spray it into the air. This has been documented to cause
allergies, cancers and sterility among the exposed workers.284
Activists have accused banana companies for killing or seriously sicken thousands of
people every year due to these toxic chemicals. One of the pesticides that they have campaigned
against is DBCP, known as nemagon, used to eliminate insects attacking the roots of the
plants285. In 1992, the issue was raised in the international arena at the Second International
Tribunal on Water in Amsterdam, where Dole was condemned for seriously polluting the
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Atlantic region of Costa Rica through its banana operations in the Valle de la Estrella. Also
former workers took legal proceedings against Del Monte, Dole, Chiquita and agrochemical
companies during the period of 1965 to 1990 for injuries sustained from direct exposure to
DBCP286. A plantation worker has described the use of DBCP in film named Bananas in which
twelve Nicaraguan banana plantation workers are suing Dole for concealing the dangers of a
pesticide that they claim made them sterile:
“I was 21 years old, what did I know? Nobody told us anything. For two years, I applied
Nemagon without mask, gloves or protecting clothing. You pump it directly into the
ground. Sometimes, the pressure made the liquid splash right in your face. You could feel
the hideous smell across 100 meters.”287

In 1997, class-action lawsuits against Dow Chemical and the banana multinationals, including
Chiquita, were filed in US courts by some 24 000 banana workers. They claimed that the
chemicals caused their sterility.288
In addition to these adverse environmental and human impacts, the banana industry has
been widely known for its miserable working conditions and suppression of labor unions.
Because bananas grow year around and need to be harvested daily, the work at plantations is
demanding. Workers work long hours in the package-houses and often suffer from both
occupational health issues and psychological effects of excessive control by management,
isolation from family and poor or non-existing maternity benefits. Especially, women workers
away from their children have been a concern for many activists. There have also been reported
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cases of sexual harassment.289 Some producers justify sexual harassment as a part of the banana
culture.290
Activists have also addressed the child labor issue at banana plantations. In the Spring
2002, Human Rights Watch produced a report, Tainted Harvest that focused on the child labor
issue. The report was based on careful research on children, workers, government officials, and a
three weeks visit in Ecuador for data collection. In the report, all three American banana
companies were accused for not demanding fair treatment of workers on independent farms in
Ecuador that sell to the companies. According to the report out of forty-five children interviewed
all but four had begun working on the banana farms or packing stations between ages eight to
thirteen. The report also accused independent farmers of spraying children with pesticide from
crop dusters.291
The banana industry is also known for low wages and poor prices for local producers.
According to Banana Link, an English NGO, only retail traders make large sums of money.
Also, the banana trade has been surrounded by claims of bribery.292

Chiquita and the Awakening of Political Consumerism in Europe

Chiquita started to face the potential of obvious business losses in the early 1990s as a
result of change in normative expectations on how it should operate its business. This forced the
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company to consider its relation to society in a new light. The company had found itself
vulnerable to normative pressure from its European retailers and it soon became obvious that the
new expectations were starting to harmfully affect the business. Large important European
retailers started asking questions about how social and environmental concerns were dealt at the
farm level. They indicated strongly that they would refuse doing business with companies that
would not adopt their practices according to these expectations. In other words, retailers drew a
clear causal link between the expectations of corporate social responsibility and profits, and
brought front the issue and its criticality to corporate executives at Chiquita.
Behind this was that European consumers had raised their concerns about the origins of the
bananas the retail chains pay as a consequence of NGO activism against the banana business293.
New political consumerism had emerged and people were increasingly concerned of the ethics of
food production and trade. These consumers acknowledged that their action is a form of political
participation in that it mobilizes public opinion. They sought to “civilize” globalization by
paying attention to the products they pay and where the products are produced and how workers
are treated. They wanted to know if the bananas they buy are “eco-and-people-friendly” and
“guilt-free” products.294
This political consumerism affected Chiquita. Europe was its large market and many
retailers increased their demands for “certified” bananas. Especially supermarket chains in
Scandinavia, the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany were concerned of the financial
implications of these consumers who were changing purchasing practices accordingly to their
ethical preferences.295 NGOs pressured the big customers of Chiquita, which began to put
significant weight on corporate social responsibility issues. According to Marco Werre, these
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requirements were motivated by the wish to minimize the risk that one of the suppliers would be
involved in unethical business. One the other hand some retailers wanted their suppliers to be
leaders in corporate social responsibility because they wanted to lead in corporate social
responsibility themselves. Supermarket chains in the UK were particularly concerned about the
conditions on the farms. Asda and Tesco visited the plantations in Central America.296
Because the pressure to improve environmental and social processes was coming from
Europe, it had clear affect on Chiquita297. At the time, it was estimated that as a consequence of
the growth of political consumerism twenty percent of Chiquita’s European markets were
threatened. And the game with the supermarkets was straightforward and did not leave much
option. Mogens Werge from FDB, a Danish supermarket cooperative chain298, told Chiquita that
there were only two ways to do it: “Either you improve the environmental and social conditions
on your farms, or we’ll find a supplier who will.”299 Although expensive and time consuming,
Chiquita had to take the issue seriously, yet at the same time there were considerable losses in
market share as a result of the European trade restrictions300.

Social and Environmental Issues at Chiquita

Chiquita’s exports have been a major part of the foreign trade of the Central American
countries in which it operates. The company’s influence to the economic and social development
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of the region has been massive. It has created thousands of jobs and built railroads, houses,
hospitals, ports and ships to bring bananas to market. The other side of the coin has been that
being such a powerful player, as pointed out by Taylor and Scharlin, the company has also been
capable to control land, railroads, a huge fleet of refrigerated vessels, workers, and governments,
even certain members of the US Congress.301
In fact the history of the company has been murky. In the late 1920s, there were allegations
of Chiquita’s participation in labor rights suppression in Colombia, the use of company-ships in
the US government-backed overthrow of the Guatemalan government in 1954 and involvement
in a bribery scandal in Honduras in 1975. In the 1980s and early1990s, the company was known
for its closed and defensive culture.302
In 1990s, the main concerns have been addressed over Chiquita’s large environmental
impacts and improper labor conditions. Environmental groups have been especially concerned
of Chiquita’s deforestration practices, water pollution and pesticide use. There is also a
documented history of worker abuse.303
One of the persistent anti-Chiquita activists has been Stephen Coats and his colleagues at
the US Labor Education in the Americas (USLA) project. The project was found in 1987 as the
US/Guatemala Labor Education Project, with trade unionists and human rights advocates who
were first concerned about the basic rights of Guatemalan workers but have later expanded their
work in other countries in the region. The organization works for the basic rights of workers in
Central America, Columbia, Ecuador, and Mexico, especially those who were employed directly
or indirectly by US companies.
Also Alistar Smith, who heads Banana Link, has been visibly protesting Chiquita. Banana
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Link is an English NGO that advocates small-farmers Fair Trade in the UK. According to Alistar
Smith, the organization doesn’t have a problem with multinationals per se, but it does “have a
problem with companies that abuse their power toward people who work for them, and the
environment.”304 The organizations have brought together European NGOs and trade unions to
form the European Banana Action network of EUROBAN in 1994305. It is a coalition of trade
unions, including IUF, environmental and development NGOs and fair trade organizations in
thirteen European countries that has defined its role in the following:
“The role of EUROBAN and its members, though, is to open the space, so that dialogue
can actually take place, to enable the workers to join trade unions, to enable trade unions to
engage in dialogue with the companies. As organization in consumer countries, we can just
put pressure on the companies and governments through consumer pressure, through
different kinds of actions and campaigns to open up that space for the unions to be able to
engage in that dialogue.”306

Part Two: Program to Become a Responsible Company

The developments that led Chiquita executives to understand that the company’s poor
processes had put the company under harmful external pressure forced them to reconsider the
company’s relation to society in a new light. It became clear that under such pressure the
company couldn’t continue its business as usual, and the management decided that it was time
“to shake off the one hundred years of banana republic reputation in order to protect a valuable
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brand name”307. In addition to increased awareness of the moral value of corporate social
responsibility, a certainty emerged that there was a strong business case for implementing
corporate social responsibility, especially in regard to European buyers and the growing political
consumerism in Europe. Steve Warshaw, who became CEO in 1997, stated the new impetus for
corporate social responsibility:
“Things have changed. Our stakeholders expect more of us. We expect more of ourselves.
Our understanding of … what it means to be a responsible corporate citizen is quite
different than it was not long a ago”.308

Better Banana Project

Along the public awareness on the negative externalities of the banana industry grew in the
early 1990s, the initial need to pay more careful attention to the cultivation practices at Chiquita
farms arose in Costa Rica, where local managers were forced to deal with the growing attacks
against the banana companies. The expansion of banana plantations was “causing local Costa
Rican citizen groups to take up the cry against the Yankee Devil and his banana company
capitalists”.309 According to Dave McLaughlin, who worked at the time as a general manager at
Chiquita’s Costa Rican farms, every Thursday night a local TV program discussed how horrible
the industry practices were and forced Chiquita to respond. As McLaughlin told in an interview,
“the growing confrontation from the local communities needed to be handled well”.310
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So in 1992 McLaughlin contacted the Rainforest Alliance, an environmental NGO that
works against the destruction of the rainforests, and invited the organization into one Costa
Rican farm. Earlier in 1990, the Rainforest Alliance had joined NGOs to denounce the
multinational banana companies and used “months to break down the initial hostilities that had
built up between greens and bananerous”311. Instead of boycott, the alliance approached big
banana companies for an industry-wide standardization for responsible farming, and found out
that certification was a method that allowed all sides to begin talking at a common place, with
shared objectives. According to Chris Wille, chief of sustainable agriculture at the Rainforest
Alliance312, boycotts are meaningful as they pay attention to problem but do not fix them, but the
alliance wanted to work to fix the problems. After approaching the banana companies, the
Rainforest Alliance experienced that the companies were interested in talking to
environmentalists who could share their knowledge and ideas for solutions that did not threaten
and who really knew about banana farming and its economic, ecological and technical
challenges.313
Despite the fact that the banana industry was suffering from terrible reputation as a
consequence of the growing concern for deforestration, pesticides and a large sterilization case
due to the use of DBCP, Chiquita alike others, dismissed the certification proposal as too
expensive. The Rainforest Alliance, found in 1987 by Daniel Katz, has been one of the first
NGOs to develop initiatives with multinational corporations and local communities to improve
the conservation work. The organization is today one of the largest NGOs working on verifiable
best practice programs in forestry, agriculture, and tourism and active in eighty countries.
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after gaining some experience of certification with
tropical timber management under the organization’s Smart Wood –label, Katz together with his
colleagues contacted big banana companies with the idea of improving the banana business. By
then green labels were already widely known and used from light bulbs to toilet paper, and Katz
was determined that certification was a better way to save wildlife habitats and to help the people
in developing countries who produce export commodities than just protesting imports of tropical
hardwoods, rainforest beef, coffee and bananas.314
So instead of confrontation, the alliance initiated the Better Banana Project (BBP) to
reduce the negative environmental impacts of banana cultivation and to improve working
conditions in the industry. The method was to conduct annual inspection and certification against
the BBP-standards by external auditors from local NGOs. As a result, the Better Banana Project
would provide a seal of approval for those banana farms and plantations that meet the criteria for
responsible farming. The Sustainable Agricultural Network, a larger network of other
environmental NGOs that works to improve commodity production in the tropical areas, set the
requirements for certification that included the following nine principles:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Ecosystem Conservation
Wildlife Conservation
Fair Treatment and Good Conditions for Workers
Good Community Relations
Minimal, Strictly Managed Use of Agrichemicals
Integrated Management of Waste
Conservation of Water Resources
Soil Conservation
Environmental Planning & Monitoring
Before Chiquita made the decision to adopt the Better Banana Project, it wanted to make
sure that Better Banana scheme was liable. It asked another NGO, CI, to conduct a review of the
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program to make sure that it was scientifically and environmentally solid. After a six-month field
study carried out by CI and Tropical Science Center, it was concluded that the Better Banana
Project should be continued and supported for its goals because it “is an innovative system that
looks for environmental improvement…serves as a guide for the establishment of environmental
measures, and promotes gradual changes in land use and practices.” 315
The first meeting between the Rainforest Alliance and Chiquita in Costa Rica in 1992 was
a steppingstone for a company-wide transformation in which Dave McLaughlin of Chiquita and
Chris Wille of the Rainforest Alliance played key roles. In the same year, McLaughlin allowed
the alliance to use two Costa Rican farms as test beds to end the environmental abuses. Based on
this experience, McLaughlin was convinced that standardization would work316:
“The Better Banana Project standards provide comprehensive requirements that must be
met by each farm for both initial certification and ongoing annual compliance inspections
by independent auditors. Because of its scientifically valid and increasingly rigorous
performance standards, independent verification by local conservation organizations, and
continuous recertification, the Better Banana Project establishes clear performance
standards that significantly exceeds those of other standards in use in the banana industry.”
Next, the partnership between Chiquita and the Rainforest Alliance is discussed as an
example of instrumental partnership as it has been instrumental for improving the company’s
corporate social responsibility and to regain its normative legitimacy. The partnership is based on
the company’s perception of its vulnerability to external normative expectations and the
following decision to improve the social and environmental issues at banana farms and to use an
independent NGO to publicly benchmark the new commitments to gain credibility for the
process317.
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According to Werre, the partnership that started as a Better Banana Project influenced
Chiquita significantly in several ways. Firstly, the project exposed Chiquita’s executives to a
“radically different point of view” and gradually changed the bad corporate practices to
responsible operations and made the company an industry leader. Secondly, NGO audits on
farms were critical to making the company culture more open and transparent. Thirdly, through
third-party standards and external verification Chiquita adopted the idea of continuous
improvement in its environmental and social issues.318

Building Trust

An important part of the partnership deal was that Chiquita opened its front door and let
the NGO in. This required enormous amount of trust, as according to McLaughlin, “in the early
1990s it wasn’t common that companies trusted environmentalists, neither was it common they
opened their doors to environmentalists”.319 In 2004 Taylor & Sharlin320 wrote: “… no other
multinational in any industry had been willing to make such a bargain with a possible devil. The
pact represented a highly unusual level of trust between an advocacy group and a multinational
company”. Similarly within the four walls of the Rainforest Alliance, engagement with the
corporate sector was a new thing. As Chris Wille recalls:
“There was no reason to think that a small group of activists coming together in New York
City to decry the destruction of distant rainforests would eventually form partnerships with
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some of the same companies it was protesting or that businesses would ever welcome
NGO guidance and oversight”.321

Somewhat telling is that at first McLaughlin didn’t tell others that he was talking to
environmentalists. More specifically, he didn’t tell that he was listening them how to reduce
chemicals, recycle materials, protect forests and improve workers' rights. As McLaughlin told
later in an interview, his initial concern was to settle down the situation in Costa Rica with the
angry local people and he was quite convinced that working with the environmentalists was the
way to do it. He was determined that he needed to raise the bar of the farms, and was convinced
that standardization was the way to build the needed credibility.322
But what he didn’t know was that the certification was a difficult and time-consuming
process. He told in an interview that the overall purpose of the process was to address land
degradation and prevent the spread of deforestation resulting from old-fashioned agricultural
practices and to ensure worker health and safety standards that the principles called for. The
problem, as it turned out to be, was that the SAN standards needed to be put into practice in
farms, but no one had prior experience or sufficient knowledge how to do it in concrete terms. So
McLaughlin was puzzled by what does companies compliance mean in practice. He, for instance,
needed to establish what kinds of infrastructural improvements were needed in working stations
to be in compliance with the new standard.323 According to him,
“Certification is much more than a tech fix. It is ongoing – day in and day out. For
instance, when we started off in Guatemala, we got the infrastructure in but we couldn’t get
the people part in gear at first. The people part is the hardest. It’s not just an engineering
job. You’ve got to have that commitment from the people. You can have the best
infrastructure in the world but you can also not use it right. That’s where you run into the
challenge of changing the mind-set of the people on the ground.” 324
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Nor did the Rainforest Alliance have any previous on the ground experience to put a
certification system in place for banana plantations. The building work was therefore very
resource intensive and took eighteen months to finish. The process involved major changes at
every step of the production process. According to McLaughlin, the work took a long time and
required that each side had to be willing to make sacrifices in order to gain more in the end. “At
the end of the day we learnt to work together very well and respect one another’s point of view”.
According to Wille,
“We gave them two important things: first, guidance – banana farmers didn’t understand
what environmentalists were complaining about because they didn’t understand the impact
their farms were having. We were able to outline the issues for them and then give them
concrete, measurable, practical, and doable ways to fix, avoid, eliminate, or mitigate many
of the problems. Of course, some banana company technicians helped design these new
practices. Second, we gave them political cover. It was difficult for banana company
people to talk to environmentalists. It made them look like wimps or apologists. But we
gained enough credibility so that it was okay to work with us. That allowed the few closet
environmentalists to ‘come out”.325

In addition to learning to work together hands-on, instrumental partnerships often require
the ability to make compromises for the shake of the bigger gains for the actors involved. In the
cooperation between the Rainforest Alliance and Chiquita there were two larger disputes. One of
them was about the certification label on the fruit, which the Rainforest Alliance wanted to put
but Chiquita refused to. The other conflict arose about aerial spraying of fungicides against
Black Sigatoka, the virulent leaf spot fungus, which Chiquita refused to stop using because it can
wipe out a farm in just few days. According to Taylor and Scharlin, the spraying was a major
concession for the Rainforest Alliance, but it viewed it is better to continue partnering than to
loose the chance to improve many other environmental abuses in large areas of land.326
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Although McLaughlin was convinced of the criticality of the needed internal process
improvements, finding support for it within the company wasn’t easy. He faced considerable
difficulties inside his company while beginning talking to the Chiquita executives about the
benefits of standardization and the expansion of standardization to all Chiquita-owned farms. He
needed to sell the idea to his managers, and faced two shorts of reactions. At the beginning, some
people found his work absolutely nonsense and thought that he was crazy if he talked with
environmentalists. Others were ready to let the NGO in and help the company to fix the
operations.

Public Eye Turning to Chiquita

The cooperation between the Rainforest Alliance and Chiquita that started in 1992 was
fueled by a local level struggle that Chiquita managers needed to handle. However the possibility
of large losses in profits grew significantly in just few years, as the company gained bad
publicity nationally and internationally. This made the company more vulnerability to external
normative pressure.
According to McLaughlin, one of the reasons that the cooperation with the Rainforest
Alliance intensified in 1994 was because the Chiquita CEO Carl Lindner received the letters
from children begging him to stop killing turtles. According to McLaughlin, this was a real
wake-up call and the letters helped Chiquita executives realize the situation and the harm it made
to the brand. Because this harm was too substantial to be overlooked, the CEO became strongly
in favor of improving the operations and supported certification and McLaughlin’s work on
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improving the plantations processes became much easier. In 1996, Chiquita committed $ 20
million to become certified across its operations in all of its 127 farms in seven Latin American
countries.
But all this was driven first of all by material interests associated with the accusations of
ignorance of social and environmental implications of the company’s business and the serious
damage caused by that ignorance. An important evidence of this is the following quotation of
Bob Kistinger, president and chief operating officer of the Chiquita Fresh Group:
“We believed that it was critical for Chiquita to take a leadership position on
environmental matters, because Chiquita has always been a leader and we need to be a
leader in this. Our whole certification discussion was totally customer and consumer
driven. That’s the bottom-line. The brand is our most critical asset we don’t want to
anything that jeopardize this brand”327.

Hence, although Chiquita started to pay greater attention to ethical sides of its business and
improve the negative externalities embedded, the mechanism for the change was not a norm
internalization process but pure rational business interests.
Another episode that further stressed the business criticality of the normative concerns was
the harsh criticism and negative press Chiquita became exposed to in 1998. While working on
the standardization of all farms, external pressure grew significantly and clearly reinforced the
decision to move forward with the corporate social responsibility agenda. Behind the pressure
was The Cincinnati Enquirer’s screaming headline “Chiquita Secrets Revealed”. An 18-page
section described how the company was lagging far behind rapidly changing global norms and
pictured Chiquita “exploitative company without a conscience”. The newspaper described
Chiquita’s political, environmental, and human rights abuses in Central America, its terrible
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working practices and illegal activities such as bribery, tax evasion, violence towards some
workers and even killings.328
The articles claimed that Chiquita is disturbingly arrogant and that in Honduras, Guatemala
and Colombia it secretly controls many supposedly independent banana companies, “evading
laws limiting foreign companies' ownership of farms by setting up local fronts for the
corporation's under-the-table investments”. One Honduran lawyer who works for Chiquita had
told the newspaper that the company was trying to "hide its assets to evade ownership
restrictions”, to "get rid of its Honduran labor union and protect itself from lawsuits and child
labor law violations."329
The environmental violations that the articles described were equally upsetting. The
company sprays pesticides banned in the US and Europe throughout Latin American farms. The
company crudely neglects employee protection and as a consequence an 18-year old worker had
died at one of the Chiquita subsidiaries in Costa Rica. The newspaper had found out that his
coworker had told the local authorities that "He didn't have any experience in this kind of job and
he wasn't using any protective gear like gloves and mask either”.
According to the articles, the company does not allow external audits on its plantations.
Workers’ drinking water is also contaminated, which threatens their health. In addition, the
security guards are accused of using brute force to enforce their authority on plantations. In one
case, Chiquita called in the Honduran military to enforce a court order to evict residents of a
farm village; the village was bulldozed and villagers run out at gunpoint.330
The impact of these articles was notable and caused pressure to change practices, despite
the fact that just few days after they were published it turned out that the reporter had illegally
328
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listened Chiquita’s voice-mail and the newspaper decided to publish a front-page apology and
fire the reporter after agreeing to pay Chiquita $ 18 million in damages. But because significant
harm was already done, the articles forced Chiquita executives to reconsider the identity of their
company. The company needed to reconsider its corporate social responsibility and demonstrate
it to wider public.331 Hence, the articles were the last wake-up call for the management to start
working on the corporate social responsibility issues. It was clear that Chiquita had become
vulnerable to external normative pressure and it was threatening the business. Chiquita’s
processes were unethical and the news about it was spreading around.
Summing up, activist campaigns against the practices of banana industry and the
awakening of the European political consumerism led Chiquita found itself in a vulnerable
position. According to Werre, at the time corporate responsibility was not part of the company
policy and different locations showed “substantial variability in their operations”. Nor were there
any management systems to provide the information needed to react appropriately to these
allegations in the press.332 Hence, Chiquita had become vulnerable to normative external
expectations due to its processes and its brand was under fire. There were fears that Chiquita
would loose its brand image which had been built during the decades, starting from advertising
campaign that featured the Carmen Miranda –esgue Miss Chiquita and the popular Chiquita
banana song that have been one of the most memorable in history and helped make banana the
world’s most widely consumed fruit333.
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Decision to Become a Responsible Company

As predicted in the theory introduced in this study, companies whose processes are deemed
unethical by the society and harmed by such bad reputation, seek to improve their processes and
are likely to turn to NGOs for help. After having suffered from external normative pressure,
Chiquita realized that it would be better off by working with the environmentalists.
The company began to cooperate with the Rainforest Alliance in 1992 to improve
environment, health, and safety issues on Costa Rican farms to gain certification for
environmentally and socially sustainable bananas, and in 1996 extended the cooperation to cover
all the farms owned by the company in Central and South America. By 1999, the certification
had been applied at Chiquita farms throughout Central America.334
A critical element was the monitoring and auditing process that the actors agreed to. It was
agreed that certifiers from the Rainforest Alliance could come in uninvited. And they did, and
when violations were discovered the parties began working on the issues to fix them. This didn’t
cause any big issues. McLaughlin recalls: “Generally, if they want to change something, we’d
talk about it and try to understand it.”335
However, it was not until 1998 that the company made these improvements more public336.
According to McLaughlin, this was simply because the standardization and the internal process
improvements had taken a long time and the company was not ready earlier to come to public
with its work. Since 1992 Chiquita had built credibility through standardization and concentrated
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first to the farms that produced for European markets and by the end of 1990s the company had
reached the level of improvements that it became meaningful to talk about them publicly.337
Another reason was that the formal decision to adopt corporate social responsibility was
made in October 1998, when a senior management group for corporate social responsibility was
established. The CEO Warshaw led the group and the decision to integrate corporate social
responsibility into its overall management structure was made. According to Werre, the scope
wasn’t first very clear and the group needed to build better understanding on corporate social
responsibility issues. However, based on the experience in the market place it had become clear
to the managers that the issues were increasingly valuable and customers were placing more
attention to them.338
According to Werre, much of this was due to Warshaw’s high motivation in corporate
social responsibility. Warshaw understood that responsibility mattered and he didn’t want to see
any more bad press. He drove strongly that responsibility should to be more integrated with the
corporate strategy.339 The view of Robert Dunn, a leader of the Californian-based Business for
Social Responsibility (BSR), an organization advocating corporate social responsibility, supports
this. He recalls the visit of Mr. Warshaw in San Francisco in August 1998:
“What was extraordinary was that when we meet a CEO in person, he usually wants us to
visit him. In this case, Warshaw came to us. After a very short exchange of pleasantries,
Warshaw reached into his briefcase and from several pages of a yellow pad, consulted a
list of maybe eighty-seven or eighty-eight questions he wanted to pose about a potential
partnership between his company and BSR.”340

In August 1999, concrete steps were taken towards a new corporate culture emphasizing
responsibility. They were taken after engaging almost one thousand employees throughout the
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organization in thinking about the culture in which responsibility was to guide the daily actions
and decisions of all Chiquita employees and to provide the context for strategic business
decisions. Moreover, in May 2000 Chiquita expanded its code of conduct to include also social
responsibilities. It included standards in the areas of food safety, labor standards, employee
health and safety, community involvement, environmental protection, ethical behavior, and legal
compliance.341

Standard for Labor Conditions

What was revolutionary in regard to the company’s adverse relations with the union
members in history was that in 2000 Chiquita started using the international standard for labor
issues, the well-respected Social Accountability International 8000 (SAI 8000). The standard
was adopted to set the level for new labor treatment. SAI 8000 is a voluntary standard for
workplaces based on the core ILO conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child.
The Better Banana certification requires that the farms are also socially responsible. The
standard requires that there is an auditable social plan in place, namely allowing workers a right
to organize and to join labor unions. Chiquita began to work on the social issues in order to
establish broader trust in its corporate social responsibility efforts. Because of the company’s
vulnerability to external normative pressure, it was clear to the management that the company
needed the support from and cooperation with the labor unions to build trust and gain broader
341
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legitimacy to become recognized as a responsible company342. According to Gonzales-Perez and
McDonough, within the banana industry and its tradition of lousy labor treatment and protection,
the code of conduct and other internal improvements would have been pointless if the
relationship with the unions maintained bitter343.
Two years earlier, in 1998 Chiquita engaged in a dialogue with labor organizations such as
the International Union of Food Workers (IUF) and COLSIBA. In terms of gaining credibility,
especially the COLSIBA involvement was critical. It guaranteed a review committee meeting at
least twice a year. An agreement between IUF, COLSIBA and Chiquita was reached, and it
provided unseen labor rights to banana workers: a freedom of association and the right to join
unions, minimum labor standards by core ILO conventions and the appointment of a review
committee to oversee the application of the agreement. In addition, the agreement granted fair
dealing and collaboration to ensure a continuous improvements in number of fields, including the
quality of Chiquita’s products, productivity, efficiency and flexibility of workplace practices, the
quality of work life for employees and the commercial success and sustainability of Chiquita’s
operations.344
After completing the code of conduct in 2000 massive training program was run
throughout the company. Employees were educated about the new corporate values, code of
conduct and culture, all the way from management to the lowest management level of farms.
Their rights and duties as workers were told to them and they were also made more familiar with
the issues via a corporate responsibility newsletter.345
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The first performance review was published in Chiquita’s first public report on corporate
social responsibility, based on data gathered in 2000. Between September 1998 and February
2000 sample audits were performed across Chiquita’s operations. Even though the first audits
were not satisfactory and pointed out a number of significant areas of non-conformance with the
standard, Chiquita’s management considered that adopting SAI 8000 was a good decision due to
its higher credibility and for being an excellent driver in forcing progress. Indeed, because the
standard had been developed with union participation, it was the best insurance for credibility.
According to IUF agriculture representative:
“Once we have trade unions working, we think that is the best way to ensure that workers
in the banana industry have the chance to negotiate decent wages and good living
conditions and for us to ensure that right is there. There is a lot of discussion these days
about corporate social responsibility and codes of conduct, but our position is very clear:
trade unions are the best way for workers to win their rights and to be sure that their rights
are enforced and monitored because the trade unionists are in the plantations every day…
The reality in the banana sector is that in many countries trade unions do not have the right
to operate. There is a lot of trade union persuasion of trade union leaders, black lists, and in
fact in some countries, death threats and actually murders of union leaders… One of the
strategies that the IUF is trying to take is a more global approach to look for the major
players in the industry and say ‘We want you as a responsible company to agree to
framework of rights in your company’… rights based on the convention of International
Labor Organization to ensure workers in that company have the right to join trade unions,
and we use that to be sure that workers have the right to bargain for health and safety,
decent wages, and increasingly issues concerned with women workers like maternity leave,
child labor, and education for children.“346

The social audits thus were critical in civilizing the traditional hostile relations between
Chiquita and the labor unions. Previously the relations were conflictual, but they improved
considerably after Chiquita began to work with the union. It was clear that the agreement was a
turning point and improved the company’s relationship with society dramatically.347 According
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to Warshaw, Better Banana was thus the “granddaddy of Chiquita’s whole social thrust”348.
Chiquita management considers this agreement critical in forging stronger external relationships
and improving the reputation. Also, the new relationship with the unions improved Chiquita’s
position in the banana industry. Georg Jaksch, corporate social responsibility director at Chiquita
stated,
“The agreement with the IUF was one of the most important decisions that we made, if not
the most important decision that we made. It is creating an on-going dialogue with trade
unions and workers in Latin America. It has become an instrument of cooperation and
continuous improvement … We believe that doing this, looking at this from a purely
Chiquita perspective, this was very important step…, not only establishing ourselves in the
eyes of our consumers as a corporately responsible company, because we realized we have
much to do in that respect. We have seen great benefits in our own company. One of the
consequences, which is visible to everyone, is that we have changed the way that we
conduct our labor relations. From very difficult conflictive relations often leading to strikes
and work stoppages to a situation were problems are solved through a structured process of
dialogue and cooperation, this was very important within the atmosphere within the
company.”349

According to Werre, not all labor unions treasured the new code of conduct. For some, the
code was clearly a positive step, but some reacted with suspicion and skepticism, which they
perceived as a window dressing operation to ease the pressure coming from the external groups
and general public.350
In 2001 the company management was ready to integrate the corporate social
responsibility vision and the corporate values into a five-year business-strategy, making
corporate social responsibility formally one of the five main long-term goals of the company.351
In practice, this meant that each strategic business decision is evaluated in terms of corporate
social responsibility criteria. For example: a decision to acquire a new farm will only be taken
348
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when the due diligence investigation either proves that the farm is already in compliance with the
code of conduct, or that compliance can be reached with a reasonable effort.352

Cleaning Up Chiquita

When the Rainforest Alliance and Chiquita started to build the certification system in
1992, the work needed to start from the scratch and considerable trust was needed to carry out
the profound changes throughout the plantations. With the help of McLaughlin, the Rainforest
Alliance began its close, independent scrutiny of company-wide practices which later, due to
different external and internal company developments, led to a transformation in which damaged
Chiquita brand became an industry leader in corporate social responsibility. Critical to this
process was that McLaughlin was open-minded and let the environmentalists inside the farms to
do their job.
To become certified through Better Banana Project required that Chiquita's farms had to
implement and pass more than two hundred criteria that cover environmental protection,
reforestation, biodiversity, fair worker treatment, and good workplace conditions. Within the
work, the principle of continuous improvement was highlighted. That meant that Chiquita
allowed Rainforest Alliance onto its farms to certify that the company’s performance was
improving every year.
Four months after the initial four-hour visit at Chiquita Costa Rican farm in 1992, where
McLaughlin agreed to work with the Rainforest Alliance, Chiquita started reducing in
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agrichemical use and banning those chemicals forbidden in the US and Europe. During the next
two years, several action points were defined. Those included phasing out the toxic pesticide
paraguat, replacing it with the milder glyphosate and building new warehouses to store the
chemicals. On its own, Chiquita had eliminated the use of Bravo (chlorothalonil), a fungicide
registered by EPA for use on a wide variety of crops.353
To conserve land from soil erosion, Chiquita also reforested reserves in the eastern region
of Costa Rica to help conserve water and soils. According to the Rainforest Alliance, more than
800 000 trees and bushes have been planted on Chiquita farms since the collaboration began.
Recycling programs within farms were also an important part of the improvements and they were
designed for all materials that can be reused. As a result, Chiquita recycles 3 000 tons of plastic
per year and all plastic bags are reused to protect banana stems from insects, the sun and leaves.
Now all packing stations have waste traps, which help to keep the rivers and streams clean.
Plastic bags are also reused as material in water pipes, buckets, building materials, and paving
stones. Composts have been built to recycle waste and conserve soil and water. Banana leaves
and stems that are composted and release natural nutrients are used to fertilize the soil. The
bruised bananas that cannot be sold are given to farmers who use them for cattle feed.354
By 2001, all Chiquita farms achieved certification on more than 71 000 acres of its 127
company-owned farms in Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. By
December 2005, ninety-three percent of independent farms supplying for Chiquita were certified.
Together the certified bananas amount to fifteen percent of the exported bananas from Latin
America. Certified bananas make more than ninety percent of Chiquita’s total volume to Europe

353
354

Taylor & Sharlin 2004, 75.
McLaughlin, interview in December 2010.

155
and approximately two-thirds of the volume to North America. Since 2005 Chiquita has sold
bananas in Europe with the Rainforest Alliance label.355

External Recognitions

The collaboration with the Rainforest Alliance led to the incremental process changes and
Chiquita begun to be known as a frontrunner for corporate social responsibility. This is
demonstrated by the intensity and effectiveness of its corporate responsibility measures through
both internal and external monitoring. The company remains transparent to external groups
through annual corporate responsibility reports, which evaluate the positive and negative aspects
of Chiquita’s corporate social responsibility. The company is also an active member of many
corporate social responsibility incentives and programs. According to Fernando Aguirre, the
current chairman and chief executive officer:
“Chiquita is a passionate, global corporate citizen and we take that responsibility to
heart…. Through collaboration, energy and imagination Chiquita strives to turn each
challenge we face into an opportunity to invest in a sustainable future both for our
company and for the environment. We continue to make green initiatives a priority, and
challenge others to do the same because we’re all shareholders in the well being of our
planet”.356

Chiquita’s commitment to responsibility also influenced the industry, given that Chiquita is
the largest agricultural company in Latin America. When Chiquita started the Better Banana
project, its competitors – Del Monte and Dole – started to work on their corporate responsibility
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issues too. But, as Taylor and Scharlin have noted, their work has been concentrated on building
ISO 14001 environmental systems, and Chiquita remains the only global banana company that
has undertaken and met voluntary environmental and social standards of the Better Banana
project. According to Bob Kistinger:
“We are proud to have raised the bar for ourselves and the entire banana industry…We
have invested over eight years of effort and many millions of dollars, and we can credibly
demonstrate now that Chiquita is truly a better banana. The Better Banana Project is a
smart mix of improved business practices, better social standards and real environmental
benefits.” 357

The Rainforest Alliance agricultural certification program have since been refined through
the engagement of a variety of organizations, including unions, governments, scientists, and
other NGOs. Tensie Whelan, executive director at the Rainforest Alliance, commented the
Chiquita partnership in the press:
“We commend Chiquita for their vision in choosing to participate in our Better Banana
Project. Through their extraordinary efforts, the company has demonstrated their
commitment to environmental and social responsibility, leading the way for the rest of the
industry.”358

As a result, Chiquita is today highly respected company among many environmental
groups359. Chiquita has been applauded by Social Accountability International, with the
Corporate Conscience Award for Innovative Partnership for its work with Rainforest Alliance
and its high standards of environmental and social stewardship.360 In 2002, BSR named Chiquita
corporate social responsibility report in environmental and ethical labor standards as number one
in the food industry, number three among the US companies and number eighteen worldwide.
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The company has also been recognized for its corporate social responsibility reporting by
CERES-ACCA with Award for Outstanding Sustainability Reporting. CERES-ACCA is a
coalition of more than eighty environmental groups361. In 2004, Chiquita was also recognized by
the Trust for the Americas organization for its employee home-ownership project in Honduras.
Chiquita received the Corporate Citizen of the Americas Award for the project that provided six
hundred families with new homes in 2003.
According to Werre362, “the implementation of corporate social responsibility at Chiquita
can be considered as a sincere attempt to transform the company, building a new sense of
common purpose and aligning all business actions to this purpose”. Looking back on what
Chiquita has achieved and the system-wide changes it made, McLaughlin has commented:
"I am in awe of the impact our values clarification and integration has had across all
geographies, and on people. The level of discussion and transparency we have now is all
due to the values. It is woven into our management performance systems. In many cultures
and organizations with hierarchical structures, it is what the boss says. We had to bring
these barriers down and give people a greater sense of participation and empowerment
throughout the organization."363

Improving environmental and social conditions has also proved to be economically wise.
According to McLaughlin, "Tracking from 1995, productivity on our farms went up twentyseven percent and costs decreased by twelve percent because of a whole shift in cultural
operating discipline - a way to do things right first".364
The Rainforest Alliance has gained too. Working with Chiquita helped the Rainforest
Alliance to establish credibility at a mainstream level. The agricultural certification has grown to
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include 6 500 farms and 200 000 hectares of land. According to executive director Tinsie
Whalen,
"What we learned about certification as an approach is that it is very concrete, with clear
goals. We learned to use a language that field workers and managers can understand, rather
than the polemic way sustainability is often talked about.”

Although through Better Banana Project, Chiquita improved environmental conditions
such as soil improvement, water quality, and rainforest conservation as well enhanced workers’
health and safety on banana farms in Latin America, the purist conservation groups have
maintained its critics towards the project. They claim that Chiquita paid the Rainforest Alliance
for the certification, making an objective assessment impossible365. These groups have raised
questions about the objectivity of the Better Banana Project. According to Campaign for Labor
Rights,
“Chiquita’s use of pesticides degrades and destroys rainforests and poisons workers,
sometimes fatally. Chiquita executives have found that it is far cheaper to pay willing
“environmental” organizations to apply their stamp of approval than to pay for cleaning up
the problem. Chiquita’s environmental cover comes chiefly from its participation in the
“Better Banana” program. Chiquita’s primary partner in greenwashing is the Rainforest
Alliance but the company also paid Conservation International for its services on behalf of
the company image…. Anybody who is certifying as sustainable the extraction and
liquidation to any degree of the world’s native forest systems, now reduced to 40 percent
or less of what they once were, is not doing humanity any service.”

According to Chris Wille, Chiquita has reimbursed the costs for traveling and certifiers’
time spend on the farms, but substantial funding for the Better Banana project comes from
private foundations, mostly from the US and are raised independently by the Rainforest
Alliance366.
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Conclusions

In the early 1990s, Chiquita faced new normative pressure from different external groups
to change its socially and environmentally destructive operations, and found out soon that the
pressure was to be execrating and harmful to its brand and business. A century-long tradition of
growing bananas and the negative social and environmental externalities it generated was
strongly questioned first by the local people in Costa Rica and just few years later by large
European retailers who no longer wanted to buy Chiquita bananas if the company did not
improve its polluting processes and lousy ways to treat labor. Because profits were threatened by
the loss of sales in Europe and the local unrest in Costa Rica, the company decided to take action
and make improvements in its processes. There were strong signs that by the end of the 1990s
and early 2000 public awareness on unethical business practices had grown, and Chiquita
decided to correct its course. Towards the end of the decade the norm of corporate social
responsibility was increasingly adopted in the market place and Chiquita needed to conform to
the norm.
To be sure, the company operated under harmful external normative pressure to change its
processes, and the impetus for investing in corporate social responsibility was driven by
materialistic reasons, not through norm internalization. The fact that CEO Lindner was worried
about the normative implications of the practices that had killed turtles and partly because of it
initiated company-wide program to improve the situation can, however, be seen to result from
pure materialistic incentives. If he had been concerned about the normative issues of the business
practices before he was accused for them, he would have fixed the situation much earlier. This is
because, as explained above, norm internalization requires that all decisions of an actor should be
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made through norm lenses, and the norm itself is then the primary mechanism for changing
corporate behavior for the better, not harmful pressure.
As discussed above, the reasons for rational decision were more evident. NGOs were
publicly campaigning against the company and the media reporting about its business practices
wasn’t flattering to the managers and owners. The processes were poor and the management had
not been interested in improving the conditions of plants, mainly because the company had been
profitable for the past hundred years and the poor conditions were taken-for-granted in the
banana business. For the managers, there were no rational reasons to improve the operations –
not until they realized that the norm of corporate social responsibility was starting to gain
currency in the market place and Chiquita becoming increasingly vulnerable due to its lagging
social and environmental processes.
In the course of events that changed the processes of Chiquita, and reshaped the banana
brand, the engagement with the Rainforest Alliance has been instrumental. The Better Banana
project, which Chiquita began with the alliance, was a time-consuming undertaking that
questioned the agricultural practices and concentrated in the reduction in overall agrichemical
use and improved the labor conditions. It led to new and less environmentally damaging
agricultural methods and reforestation of tropical forests. The Better Banana project also led to
independent scrutiny of company-wide labor practice, which are audited by independent thirdparty auditors who use a recognized international labor standard.
This transparency that came along with the process improvements carried out with the help
of the Rainforest Alliance turned out to be key element in building the relationship with the labor
unions. The results achieved by the certification boosted Chiquita’s brand reputation. Customers
became to associate Chiquita with appropriate labor conditions. In addition to the improvements
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at all Chiquita farms and the majority of its suppliers, the partnership has thus been instrumental
in bringing together the banana industry, environmentalists, local communities, workers, and
labor unionists to achieve positive changes on ground, common understanding, and results.

Table 3: Chronicle of Events of Chiquita’s Corporate Social Responsibility
1990-1992

•
•
•

1994
1996
1998
2000
2001

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Rainforest Alliance sends a list of environmental and worker-rights standards
required for gaining certification in the early 1990.
Talks with Chiquita begin in 1992 and the cooperation begins under the Better
Banana Project.
First farms certified in Costa Rica in 1992.
Rainforest Alliance begins certifying other Chiquita owned farms.
Chiquita decides to budget 20 million dollars to certify all farms.
Formal management decision made to invest in corporate social responsibility.
Chiquita adopts corporate social responsibility policy.
Code of Conduct is written.
Chiquita expands its existing Code of Conduct to include social responsibilities.
Chiquita adopts SAI 8000 as a labor standard in the Code of Conduct.
Signing of an important labor agreement with the IUF/COLSIBA federation of
unions, entitled Freedom of Association, Minimum Labor Standards and
Employment in Latin America Banana Operations.
Chiquita uses internal social audits for the Social Accountability International (SAI
8000) auditing team. COLSIBA and COVERCO, (based in Guatemala) invited to
inspect the process.
Chiquita publishes first corporate social responsibility report.

By 2002 to 2004•
2004

Chiquita as the first shipping company to earn certification from the ABS for its
Marine Safety, Quality and Environmental Management System (SQE), which the
Chiquita shipping fleet adopted in 1998.
Chiquita’s corporate social responsibility initiatives actively supported by Mr.
Cyrus Freidheim, and also by Mr. Fernando Aguirre, President and CEO appointed
in January 2004.
All farms SAI 8000 certified.
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Chapter V

“Water Sustains Us. Conservation Unites Us”

Introduction

This chapter explores The Coca-Cola Company’s (TCCC) collaboration with WWF as an
example of pioneering partnership. Coca-Cola has several engagements with different NGOs, but
the chapter concentrates on its partnership with WWF. The partnership represents a novel way of
NGO-business collaboration, in which a multinational company and a well-respected
environmental conservation group commit to collaboration that affect both company internal
processes and community, aiming for a higher goal of global resource management. By the
partnership agreement, the company becomes accountable to the NGO in meeting the goals.
Because the actors are strange bedfellows and the depth of relationship between them is
extraordinary, there is sizeable global media coverage and external skepticism involved. Both
actors thus take substantial risks in order to gain high strategic rewards the cooperation provides.
Hence, in pioneering partnerships actors improve company processes as in the case of
instrumental partnership, but they also work together to achieve broader societal benefits they
publicly commit to.
The chapter explores the events that led Coca-Cola to close cooperation with WWF as a
result of severe external pressure that affected the company’s brand and business. Similar to
Chiquita’s partnership with the Rainforest Alliance, Coca-Cola’s cooperation with WWF is
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driven by hard-core materialistic factors. However, as the theory developed in this study predicts,
the two companies’ engagements with NGOs differ from each other in important respects. Due
to its dependency on water, the common of the communities where the company operates, the
pressure Coca-Cola faces from external groups is systemic in nature, hence not fixable as
processes are. According to the theory, Coca-Cola operates under systemic vulnerability, and its
normative legitimacy is therefore ultimately depending on the communities. This requires close
cooperation with the communities; otherwise there is a possibility of a conflict between the
company and the communities, which can become extremely costly to the company and threaten
the continuity of its business. Water has thus become a critical business issue for the company
and it therefore unites the company and WWF.
Due to this dependency on the scarce common, regaining the normative legitimacy is not a
one-time-fix as it was in the case of Chiquita, which regained back its normative legitimacy by
cleaning its processes through instrumental partnership. Instead, as the theory predicts, the
chapter concludes that Coca-Cola will continue to be challenged by external groups that will
claim the communities’ right to water over commercial use of it.
Because the two companies’ vulnerabilities to external normative expectations and NGO
pressure differ from each other in important respects, there are significant differences between
pioneering and instrumental partnerships. In addition to mutual understanding, commitment,
compromises and trust that are critical to the success of an instrumental partnership, pioneering
partnership require long-term commitment to achieve the goals, as reflected by the collaboration
between WWF and Coca-Cola. The level of commitment needed is thus beyond engagement,
and can be described as a marriage - when using the terminology of the relationship. This longterm commitment emphasizes the high strategic relevance of the cooperation to the performances
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of the actors involved. Actors view partnership work necessary in advancing their own
organizational goals.
The chapter explores how Coca-Cola and WWF have developed their relationship in three
years to the level that Coca-Cola director Greg Koch described in an interview in January 2010
as “old couple with kids”367, that is the actors have achieved the level of mutual trust to think of
each other like partners and learned to work as a team. The chapter thus illuminates how a
widely-trusted international NGO and a multinational corporation work together in concrete
terms in various field teams in different parts of the world to conserve the fresh water resources
in ways that are pioneering in society-business relationship.
The chapter begins with discussing how the beverage sector has been highly influenced by
the declining of the world water resources, and how in 2003 Coca-Cola arrived into a severe
conflict with the local communities in India, a conflict that grew into an international public
protest against the company. The chapter discusses how Coca-Cola has since struggled with a
strong anti-Coke movement across the world. It explores the developments in the mid-2000 that
led Coca-Cola leaders eventually to realize that instead of fighting against the growing
discontent, the only way to protect the business was to build a dialogue with a recognized NGO
and work closely with it on internal process improvements and on global fresh water
conservation to ease the pressure.
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Part One: Vulnerability to the Growing Water Scarcity and Pressure to Conserve Water

The developments that led Coca-Cola to discover how painful it can be when the terms of
the social license for business operations are called into question are directly linked to the
worldwide concern of commercial use of water and the criticism against large beverage
companies whose number one ingredient fresh water is. Companies using heavy amounts of
water are often seen to contribute to the tragedy of the commons.
The soft drink industry is one of the water intensive businesses and it uses other raw
materials such as sugar, wheat, hops, corn, grapes, and various other fruits that require waterintensive production processes. Because their close ties to agricultural productivity and changing
customer preferences, beverage companies are especially vulnerable to water-related physical,
reputational, and regulatory risks. According to the recent review of Pacific Institute and UNGC,
physical water resource constraints that have become increasingly common across the world are
likely to make beverage companies susceptible to NGO pressure as tensions are likely to
intensify between businesses and local communities over commercial water use. There is a
heightened risk of water-related conflicts between communities and the companies depending on
heavy water use.368 In the light of the theory presented in this study, beverage companies are
operating under high vulnerability.
According to the report, the industry requires high quality source water, which can put the
industry’s water use in direct competition with local populations’ water needs for drinking, food
production, and other vital uses. Community awareness of the economic, ecological, and cultural
value of regional water sources prompts opposition to the introduction or expansion of beverage
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or bottling plants. As it is expected that these controversies will arise in the future in regions
where water is scarce and where local populations lack access to affordable drinking water,
heavy water-use companies acknowledge that water is a serious issue that is likely to impact the
business. Declining freshwater resources and the depletion of aquifers, risks of costs rising,
constant activist pressure and the increasing competition for water are now serious risks that
need careful attention. For instance, after years of organized opposition by local residents and
environmental NGOs, Nestle Waters decided in September 2009 to scrap plans entirely to bottle
spring water in McCloud, California369.
The soft drink industry has already been under considerable NGO pressure, the earliest
campaigns date back to 1971 when the newly found Friends of the Earth campaigned in the UK
under a mass “Bottle-drop” outside the office of Schweppes against the plans to start selling
drinks in the non-renewable plastic bottles370. Environmental NGOs have accused beverage
makers for the environmental impacts of their products and organized large-scale consumer
boycotts. Campaigners are working to raise awareness of the negative impacts of bottled drinks
and they seek to influence people to drink tab water instead of bottled water371. One successful
campaigning against bottled water has been the Polaris Institute and its “Inside the Bottle”
campaign. As a result, twenty-one universities and colleges have established “bottled water free
zones” and city governments of Seattle, New York and San Francisco have ended contracts with
bottled water companies.372 The Wall Street Journal reported in August 2009 that as a result of
both recession and activist campaigns, US sales of bottled water has dropped six percent, from
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July 2008 to July 2009, amounting to losses of 7.6 billion. Also Nestle Waters reported in
February 2009 that the activists have affected its sales of bottled water in Canada.373
Under the threat caused by water crisis and other pressure by external groups, international
business-led bodies, such as WBCSD and the UNGC, have formulated the private sector’s
respond.374 In particular, the industries that are highly dependent on water have been actively
involved, as they are increasingly concerned about the link between the declining availability of
water and the continuity of their business. For instance, CEO Water Mandate encourages
business leaders to recognize the role of the private sector in addressing water challenges faced
by the world and enlists companies to make water-resource management a strategic priority.375

Coca-Cola and the Growing Water Scarcity

A long time before water scarcity became an international concern, the Coca-Cola
Company started selling Coca-Cola, for a nickel at Jacob’s Pharmacy, near the intersection of
Marietta and Peachtree Streets in Atlanta, Georgia in 1886. The following year Coca-Cola was
registered as a trademark. In less than ten years, by 1895 the company had reached every state in
the US. In 1899 it franchised its bottling operations in the US and in next ten years the number of
franchisees reached 370. The growth of the business has been enormous and the company is the
largest consumer goods company in the world, which markets more than 450 brands and 2 800
beverage products, amounting to 1.5 billion servings a day, with operations in two hundred
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countries. The company produces its beverages locally with around 7000 employees at twentyseven wholly owned bottling operations and seventeen franchisee-owned bottling operations.
Through its procurement, supply and distribution network, the company indirectly employs
another 125 000 people.376
Because the Coca-Cola System comprises the company and its over three hundred bottling
partners worldwide and it is operating through multiple local channels, the company is exposed
to wide variety of social and environmental risks. In past, Coca-Cola’s operations have come
under the public eye after claims for discrimination, contaminated beverages and involvement in
the murder of a union organizer in Columbia and in other anti-union violence377.
However, the fact that Coca-Cola is highly dependent on a systemic common, fresh water
of the local communities brings along a new layer of social risks associated with its business378.
Dependency on community fresh water – hence the system - links the company directly to
growing global concern for fresh water availability, and thus makes the company systematically
vulnerable to NGO pressure. This vulnerability is widely predicted to grow along the imperative
to sustainable development grows and gains momentum.
According to WWF, the company uses approximately seventy-six billion gallons or three
hundred billion liters of water annually379. The amount of used water is expected to grow with
millions of potential new customers entering the middle class in the developing countries. These
emerging markets present large markets as in Africa, Asia, and Latin America the middle class
grows every year by fifty million people who are expected to consume as the middle class in
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Western societies380. The future market for Coca-Cola thus lies in the emerging markets such as
China and India, where water supplies are often polluted or increasingly stressed and where
communities, agriculture and industry compete for water. So how to secure water resources, how
to use water more efficiently, and how to waste less water have become highly important
questions that the company seeks solutions to381.

Coca-Cola in Water War Against People of India

One example of how Coca-Cola’s dependence on a shared natural resource has made it
vulnerable in systemic ways that differ from other cases discussed in this study can be seen
clearly through the case of India. This case shows how resource dependency and successful
mobilization of external pressure follow when a company fails to reflect the growing interests of
external groups and how it can escalate into a worldwide movement that ultimately puts the
company, its reputation, and its brand at risk.
In August 2003, Coca-Cola became to face the growing normative pressure over its waterintensive operations in India, where it has fifty-seven bottling plants. Behind the pressure was the
Center for Science and Environment (CSE), an Indian NGO that a group of engineers, scientists,
journalists and environmentalists founded in 1980 to “catalyze the growth of public awareness
on vital issues in science, technology, environment, and development.” The Pollution Monitoring
Laboratory (PML) of the CSE had conducted a study from April to August in 2003 that revealed
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that twelve major cold drink brands sold in Delhi contained a “deadly cocktail” of pesticide
residues. CSE claimed that the chemicals cause cancer, damage to the nervous and reproductive
systems, severe disruption of the immune system and birth defects. CSE tests on three samples of
twelve Coca-Cola and Pepsico brands in Delhi found that they contained residues of pesticides
surpassing global standards by 30-36 fold. The NGO contacted the Indian government to
implement legally enforceable water standards to stop Coca-Cola and Pepsico to ban their
beverages.382
This led to a series of events that built pressure on Coca-Cola to review its relation to
society. At first, the government took action and banned Coca-Cola and Pepsico in parliament,
and ordered independent investigations of Coca-Cola and Pepsico products. The results of the
investigations showed that nine out of twelve samples produced by Coca-Cola and Pepsico failed
to meet EU safety standards for pesticide residues. Indian Minister of Health Sushma Swaraj
countered the CSE’s claims and told the parliament that residue levels fell within the Indian
safety limits for bottled water. The government insisted though that the companies would apply
EU standards in the future and a parliamentary committee would inspect the matter.383
People were also asked about how they viewed the results of the CSE study. A survey
conducted showed that a majority of consumers believed that the results of the CSE study were
correct and they viewed that parliament should ban the sale of soft drinks384. One medical
student in Delhi commented:
“For a person drinking at least one bottle a day, the report came as a rude shock. I haven’t
picked up a bottle today and most definitely will not consume soft drinks in the future. The
reports of pesticides and other pollutants have made soft drinks a strict no-no and we will
now stick to juices and plain drinking water.”385
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According to Hills and Welford, it was soon clear that the US $1 billion that the company
had invested in Indian soft drink market was at risk, and it took only two weeks that the sales of
Coca-Cola dropped notably, by thirty to forty percent on the heels of a seventy-five percent fiveyear growth trajectory and twenty-five to thirty percent year-to-date growth. Stock in the CocaCola Bottling Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises dropped by also US $ 5 on the New York
Stock exchange from US $ 55 to US $ 50 in the six trading sessions following the release of the
CSE report. Also many clubs, retailers, restaurants, and college campuses across the country
stopped selling Coca-Cola.386
However, the unacceptable levels of pesticides found in Coca-Cola beverages were not the
only problem at the time. A growing local discontent towards commercial use of water in many
Indian villages was also becoming louder. In regions where water had become scarce, local
people were furious of Coca-Cola’s water use and campaigned to stop its operations. Public
authorities had told them that the water in wells and hand pumps was unfit for human
consumption and people associated Coca-Cola to the water crisis.387
Hence, activists had raised the link between soft drink companies and the water scarcity.
IRC and its campaign leader Amit Srivastava in particular began their enduring and noisy protest
against Coca-Cola, claiming that communities across India were “under assault” from CocaCola’s practices in the country. Srivastava claimed that Coca-Cola “.. is destroying lives, it is
destroying livelihoods and it is destroying communities all across India”388.
Another persistent activist group against the company has been an international human
rights and environmental justice campaign group Hold Coca-Cola Accountable. Its main
message has been that communities have the right over natural resources. It demanded that
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corporate and private interests must be secondary to the rights of communities. According to the
group, the access to water is a fundamental human right. The campaign has been highly visible
and engaged thousands of people who have regularly marched and rallied against Coca-Cola.389
According to an activist Vandana Shiva390:
“The processes used in manufacturing these soft drinks are inherently damaging. The
extraction of groundwater deprives poor people of their fundamental right of access to
clean water. The factories spew out toxic waste that threatens health and the environment.
And the products themselves are harmful — the Indian parliament has set up a joint
committee to inquire into the presence of pesticide residues.”

Moreover, in July 2005 Wall Street Journal reported about the improper waste handling in
the company’s largest bottling plant in Dasna, near New Delhi. The article described how the
company was not handling its hazardous waste right and the sludge was stored in large holding
tank at the plant. It was produced and stored per day and disposed on a small empty tract owned
by a local landowner. When investigated, the Central Pollution Control Board had found
excessive levels of lead and cadmium in the waste.391
All these events fuelled distrust on the company and the accusations against the company
became many and heated. Anti-Coke activism spread across Indian villages where Coca-Cola
bottling plants were operating. In August 2003, wide demonstrations against Coca-Cola were
organized and they lasted for the next five months. The demonstrations took place in the local
Coca-Cola plant in Mehdiganj, which is located twenty kilometers from the holy city of
Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh State. In September, five hundred people marched to the factory gates
and were attacked and beaten by police and security guards.392 As an outcome, enormous

389

Srivastava 2008.
Shiva 2005.
391
Burnett & Welford 2007.
392
Hills & Welford 2005.
390

173
pressure against the company practices grew both in local communities and internationally. Hills
and Welford have categorized the allegations against the company into four categories393:

1) Water shortages caused by the company’s bottling plants across India as a direct result of
Coca-Cola’s water use from the common groundwater resources.
2) Pollution due to the company’s discharge of wastewater into the fields around its plants and
rivers, including the Ganges. This has polluted groundwater and soil.
3) Distribution of toxic waste to farmers in two communities, Plachimada and Mehdiganj, as
‘fertilizer’. 394
4) Products containing pesticides confirmed by various agencies, including the government of
India.

The water-use in Plachimada, Kerala, plant in particular became heated by the end of the
year. In December 2003, Justice K Balakrishnan Nair commented the company’s use of water in
the following way:
“Groundwater under the land of the company does not belong to it. Every landowner can
draw a ‘reasonable’ amount of groundwater, which is necessary for its domestic and
agricultural requirements. But here, 510 000 liters (110 000 gallons) of water is extracted
per day, converted to products and transported, thus braking the natural water cycle”.395

However, the Judge Nair ordered the village council to renew the plant’s license so the
council would not interfere with the functioning of the factory. This evoked a protest against the
company, yielding to a nationwide campaign against Coca-Cola in India in September 2004.
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Vandana Shiva of the Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology (RFSTE) was
using strong rhetoric:
“Coca-Cola and Pepsi are engaged in a water war against the people of India. Their
bottling plants are daily stealing millions of liters of water, thereby denying local
communities their fundamental right to water.”396

Later campaigning expanded to bottling plant in Kaladera and villages near Jaipur,
Rajasthan. The mobilization involved altogether thirty villages. A number of organizations
joined under the banner of Jan Sangharsh Samiti, the People’s Committee for Struggle.

Coca-Cola Refuses the Criticism

However, Coca-Cola was not yet ready to admit that it had neglected the social aspects of
its business and the embedded negative externalities. Instead, both Coca-Cola and Pepsico
publicly questioned the method of testing the CSE had used. Coca-Cola also questioned the
standards used for the tests. Furthermore, the company claimed that the CSE was not an
accredited laboratory and did not qualify to fixed standards. Coca-Cola made clear that its
products had been tested using EU standards and they did not break any laws in India.397
Both companies used the tactics they know best, efficient PR. They launched campaigns to
tell the public that the accusations were wrong. They published full-page newspaper
advertisements directing consumers to their corporate web sites to review their own tests results
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and safety protocols.398 Coca-Cola India’s CEO Sanjiv Gupta published the following statement
for the Indian public to advertize the site:
“I want to reassure you that our products in India are safe and are tested regularly to ensure
that they meet the same rigorous standards we maintain across the world. Maintaining
quality standards is the most important element of our business and we cannot stand by
while misleading and unaccredited data is used to discredit trusted and world-class brands.
Recent allegations have caused unnecessary panic among consumers in India and, if
unchecked, would impair our business in India and impact the livelihoods of our thousands
of employees across the country. This site is about the truth behind the headlines. It
provides some context and facts on these issues and we hope it helps you understand
exactly why you can trust our beverage brands and continue to enjoy them as millions of
Indians do each day.”399

Coca-Cola also responded to the pressure by claiming that the company had been
demonized by anti-globalization activists. Coca-Cola Asian director of communications David
Fox told Wall Street Journal in 2006 that activists such as the IRC “are making false
environmental allegations against us to further an anti-globalization agenda”. Cox accused CSE
leader Sunita Narain of brand jacking. Cox said that they use Coca-Cola’s brand name to draw
attention to her campaigning against pesticides.400

More Fuel to Harmful Activism and Bad Press

Two years after the intensified anti-Coke activism, it was fuelled more in August 2006
when a new study of CSE was released. The new study documented high and dangerous levels of
pesticides, including banned carcinogens such as Heptachlor and Malathion in all fifty-seven
398
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tested samples from twenty-five different Coca-Cola bottling plants across India. Some of the
samples showed pesticide residues twenty-four times higher than EU standards.401
Five years later, in March 2011, the anti-Coca-Cola campaigning has spread around the
world. The activists have attended and spoken out at Coca-Cola shareholders meeting since 2003
calling the company to “stop stealing water” and informed the socially responsible investment
communities that Coca-Cola engages in unethical practices in India. Activists have also worked
closely with faith-based communities across the world, which also emphasize water as a
fundamental human right. The campaigning has mobilized students to protest Coca-Cola to
suspend the sales of the company products. Some twenty universities have been involved,
including the University of Michigan and New York University. The campaign has also engaged
campuses in the UK, Canada and Norway.402 In July 2006 it was reported that the largest US
retirement fund, TIAA-CREF, sold US $ 52.4 million worth of Coca-Cola’s stock because of the
concerns about the company’s responsibility403.
Not surprisingly, international media has been following the campaigning against CocaCola carefully. There have been articles of the company’s unethical practices in New York Times,
Wall Street Journal, BBC and Al Jazeera. In June 2005, Wall Street Journal ran a front-page
article on Coca-Cola in India, revealing that water allegations remained unproven. The article
raised the concerns that Coca-Cola had given toxic waste to local farmers. The article also
discussed that Amit Srivastava had compared Coca-Cola’s environmental practices to the
industrial accident at Bhopal, which killed thousands.404
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In March 2010 after a long-term pressure put on Coca-Cola as well as the Indian
government, a High Power Committee established by the state government of Kerala
recommended that Coca-Cola be held liable for Indian Rupees 216 crore (US $ 48 million) for
damages caused as a result of the company’s bottling operations in Plachimada.405 The CocaCola bottling plant in Plachimada has remained shut down since March 2004 as a result of the
anti-Coke activism and the court rule that it was ruining the environment. 406
Summing up, the outrage against Coca-Cola broke in India and spread around the world
although the company was in compliance with the local Indian standards of pesticide residues.
This campaigning hurt the company both financially and socially. The financial consequences
have been estimated to amount to millions of dollars in lost sales and legal fees in India and the
growing damage to the Coca-Cola’s reputation407..
Damage to the normative legitimacy is much harder to estimate. Distrust of local people
against the company, a series of messages of misbehavior to shareholders annual meetings and a
worldwide protest against the company since 2003, are the ingredients of a widely told unethical
story. It is a story about a corporation that sites its bottling plants in strictly business point of
view and ignores the public concerns of its operations, and takes the advantage of the emerging
middle-class consumers in India for bigger profits. This story appeals to people who put weight
on the right of the local people to access to water instead of commercial use of water. For these
people, such a corporation has seriously underestimated or wholly ignored the societal impacts of
its business. Because they do not accept it, they have boycotted buying Coca-Cola to display
their commitment to these values.
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Due to these substantial materialistic reasons, Coca-Cola eventually decided that it is time
to change the story. It decided it had to take the company water use more into account and to
build a new relationship with society if it was to continue its business in water scarce areas and
regain its lost normative legitimacy in the eyes of the wider public. This represented a new page
in its history as it realized that societal and environmental consequences of its activities are an
important business matter.
Next this decision is discussed in more detail and the NGO-engagements that followed,
especially the pioneering engagement with WWF to create larger scale social benefits that go
beyond the company’s internal processes and conserve the world’s most important fresh water
resources. Although there is a patchwork of different initiatives, programs and projects that
Coca-Cola is involved in and strives to make social impact at local levels, the partnership with
WWF - one of the largest environmental organizations to save endangered spices - has been
critical to Coca-Cola in implementing the needed improvements to achieve results of the
consistent water neutrality program. In comparison to other programs the company has launched
with NGOs, this partnership is a joint public commitment to carry out a thorough program to
make Coca-Cola improve the company processes and become more trusted partner within the
local communities.
Similar to instrumental partnerships, in pioneering partnerships an NGO and a company
agree to build common programs that help the company to cause less harm to local communities
and the nature. WWF agreed to help Coca-Cola to improve the internal processes, most notably
its water efficiency and wastewater treatment. According to the agreement, WWF applies its
scientific knowledge to examine how the company operations rely and affect nature, and thereby
help Coca-Cola find out new approaches to the company water usage and water conservation
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goals. The ultimate goal of such collaboration for both parties is to achieve wider societal
benefits through collaboration that maximizes WWF’s conservation work and better shields
Coca-Cola from external criticism and thus better protects the company from harmful normative
pressure.

Part Two: New Corporate Water Agenda

An NGO-business partnership is pioneering, when it represents more advanced level of
relationship between an NGO than the two other types of partnerships discussed in the previous
chapters. A symbolic partnership is a socially conscious program run by an NGO and financed
by a company. An instrumental partnership is a pragmatic approach that a company sets up with
the help of NGO to improve corporate internal processes. A pioneering partnership is chosen
when larger societal benefits are needed than can be achieved by symbolic and instrumental
partnerships.
After being accused of having turned a blind eye to the need of the local people, Coca-Cola
was forced to reconsider its relation to society. The reality was that the company was facing a
severe conflict against people in India and the accusations that it was exploiting water were
becoming louder and spreading widely. The company was operating under high vulnerability and
needed to ease the pressure.
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What the activists campaigning had powerfully showed was that water has also an
“emotional” side.408 This was new to Coca-Cola executives and they didn’t know that they
would need to take it into account in their business plans until the activists raised their voice
about it and used their power to make change happen. This made the management to realize that
the company was ultimately dependent on the availability of fresh water, a scarce systemic
resource upon which the communities and their wellbeing is directly depending on. After
realizing that it was confronted with a powerful force of global activism, Coca-Cola decided that
it would be critical for its business to rethink its relation to society and take corrective steps.
However, it was not that the company had not focused on water earlier. But the earlier
focus on water had been placed solely on the internal water management, and the water was not
considered to be a social or emotional issue. Water had been purely a cost issue and water use
was calculated to reduce costs associated with its inefficiency in wastewater treatment and
managing water within the plants.409 According to Daniel Vermeer, director at Coca-Cola,
“Coca-Cola has been focused on water management for about 120 years, really since the origin
of the business, but in the past, the emphasis has been on operations performance: efficiency,
waste water treatment, managing water within the plant.”410
After the NGO pressure, the situation changed dramatically in 2004. Jeff Seabright, vice
president for environment and water resources within the company, admitted that the company
had “missed the point”. In regard to Kerala case, Seabright admitted that the company didn’t
help the community to solve its problem:
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“Regardless of whether we were technically right, we should have been more involved in
helping the community solve its problems. The fallout from the incident was significant
reputationally in that Coke became linked in many people’s eyes with water scarcity.”411

The company managers recognized that in order to ensure the availability of fresh water
for its business to be less normatively questioned it needed to improve its water use and support
the communities where its bottling operations are located in. The company needed to respond to
the growing public demand on more sustainable and responsible production processes, and more
attention was needed to put to where or how plants got water for their bottling operations, and
the overall conditions of water availability for the larger community412. Vermeer told in the
interview in 2008,
“…we did a project of the future of freshwater in 2002… Soon, we and others in the
company came to understand the state of freshwater resources and the depletion of
aquifers, risks of costs rising, and the increasing competition for water. It was clear that
this was one of the great sustainability issues.”

Coca-Cola had already in 2002 worked with its largest bottling partners on a joint program
called Citizenship@Coca-Cola. The program provided a general framework for conducting
business responsibility throughout the Coca-Cola system by establishing shared commitments
and practices. The program had issued the Workplace Rights Policy, Human Rights Statement
and Supplier Guiding Guidelines, thus reflecting the values and commitment to international
human and labor rights principles and the efforts to put them in place within the company
operations. However, it was really after the company had realized that it had a direct link to
wellbeing of the communities where it operates and that water is that critical link that can affect
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the company’s business that Coca-Cola started to rethink its relation to society, and particularly
to water.
In August 2004, the senior management determined that the commitment to the
development of the communities and the conservation of the natural resources around the world
is an essential part of the company strategy. The strategy stated that the success of the business is
depending on the sustainability of communities in which the company operates. The CEO Isdell
stated: “We’re focusing on water because it’s the main ingredient in nearly every product we
make… because all of our products are made by local people in local communities, which means
the success of our business depends on the availability of local water resources”.
The first non-financial report on corporate social responsibility was also published, and it
introduced the company’s social and environmental impacts according to the international GRI
guidelines. In the report Isdell stated the new policy:
“The Company is launching a new framework for long-term sustainable business success.
Our Manifesto for Growth, commitment to the sustainable development of the
communities we serve is an integral part of Our Manifesto… This is a business imperative.
We depend on – and must contribute to – socioeconomic development and the
conservation of natural resources around the world... The issues facing the world are more
urgent than ever and they affect us all. If local communities suffer from water scarcity, so
do we. If HIV/AIDS ravages the communities in which we operate, the people impacted
are our employees, our customers and our consumers.”

The company had hired Jeff Seabright from USAID into a new position as vice president
for environment and water to lead a team pointed to advocate water issue across the worldwide
operations. In 2008, Fortune Magazine described in its article that the team is operating almost as
an “in-house NGO”. The same article referred to Kert Davies, research director at Greenpeace

183
USA, who had commented the work of the environmental team by saying that "the inspiration
and the perspiration are real".413
The 2006 Corporate Responsibility Review documented the work on sustainable business
and sustainable communities, and contained detailed information on the company impact in the
areas of workplace and human rights, product quality, wellbeing, water stewardship, energy and
climate protection and sustainable packaging. The report was the company’s first report that
followed GRI, which cross-referenced with UNGC principles. The report stressed that the
company continues to work toward mapping and prioritizing material issues and implementing
the necessary systems and targets to gauge performance and gather data globally.

Water Neutrality

The pioneering partnership between WWF and Coca-Cola had several components that
developed aspects that affected both process and community, aiming for the higher goal of
global water management, hence a new role of business within society. This can be seen in its
“water neutrality” pledge and programs that the company designed together with various NGOs
to enable diverse communities access to water and conserve the world fresh water resources. As
a reflection of this commitment the company decided to take a strong public role on the
conserving the world water.414
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In the early July 2007 CEO Isdell came public with the new strategy when he spoke to the
attendees of the Triennial Summit of the UNGC. He said that Coca-Cola’s guiding principle in
growing its business in the future must be that “we should not cause more water to be removed
from a watershed than we replenish”.415 The core of this new water agenda was the public pledge
Coca-Cola made “to return to communities and nature an amount of water equivalent to what we
use in all of our beverages and their production.” The idea of the pledge was to make the
company "water neutral".
The goal has several elements. First, to use water more efficiently. Secondly, to pledge that
by 2010 all of the water discharged from its bottling plants would be clean enough to support
agriculture or aquatic life416. The company announced that it will align the entire global system
with stringent wastewater treatment standards which require “returning all water that is used in
its manufacturing processes to the environment at levels that supports aquatic life”. Finally, the
company will replenish the world's supply of fresh water by an amount equal to all the water
included in its drinks; it will do so by supporting healthy watersheds, such as the catchment areas
that feed streams and rivers and underwriting clean-water projects around the world. “On a
global basis we will expand support of healthy watersheds and sustainable community water
programs to balance the water used in our finished beverages.”417
By making this commitment, Coca-Cola revised its relation to society and showed that by
working towards these goals it cares for the local communities and wants to resolve issues of
resource conflict with them. It had realized that the only way out of the distrust was to build
strong relationship with the local communities. A strong societal dimension in its corporate
policies is expressed in the 2008 Sustainability Report:
415

Isdell 2007.
As of January 2011, about 85 percent meet the standard.
417
The Coca-Cola Company, Replenish Report 2008.
416

185
“To us, sustainability means evolving our business for continued success, recognizing that
the health of our business is directly linked to the health of the communities we serve.
Sustainability is a significant driver of value that offers meaningful long-term benefits for
our business and society. In 2008, we elevated sustainability into our business growth
agenda…. We are assessing everything - from our operations and our processes to how we
work with partners and market our products - to see where we can build better, more
effective systems and improve our overall productivity, so our business can continue to
grow.“

To achieve this goal required an intensified cooperation also with external groups both for
the needed technical expertise and to simply gain credibility. Because water is a difficult and
multi-dimensional societal issue, Coca-Cola turned to various NGOs and intensified
collaboration with the ones it had already engaged with. NGOs became a critical element in
building the needed credibility to ensure that the company operations will be normatively
legitimized. Isdell stressed that “….successful collaboration is built on finding the common
ground where a company’s self-interest and the need of communities converge”.
What followed was an intense collaboration with many NGOs to build results-oriented
community support programs to form a key part of Coca-Cola’s corporate social responsibility
policy. For Isdell418 this was critical, because “the social license to operate in a global economy,
and to form a foundation for long-term success, as discerning consumers choose businesses that
are aligned with their larger social interests and values requires public private partnerships”.
Together with NGOs, including WWF, USAID, CARE, and UNDP, Coca-Cola has built
numerous community programs, out of which 120 are community water projects, aimed to
protect and preserve water and sanitation.419 In 2005 Coca-Cola created a program called a
Global Water Challenge. It helps bringing safe water and sanitation by replicating programs that
work, such as “Water for Schools” in Kenya. The program has provided safe drinking water,
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sanitation and hygiene education to thousands of students. In 2009, the company launched the
“Replenish Africa Initiative”. It is a US $ 30 million effort to create safe clean water for two
million people in Africa. In India, the company partners with BAIF in raising awareness among
school pupils across India. They use an animation film, "Our Environment - Let Us Protect It",
translated to regional languages such as Marathi and Hindi, and it is expected to reach to 20 000
schools. In partnership with Rotary International, Coca-Cola launched the "Elixir of Life" project
to provide potable water to 30 000 underprivileged children in and around Chennai, India. CocaCola has also signed an agreement with UN Habitat that includes the provision of clean drinking
water to hundred schools in West Bengal.420
A project with USAID on community water initiatives has helped 250 000 people in
twenty countries gain access to safe drinking water. These projects include joining the USAID in
Mali to install hand- and pedal pumps for wells throughout the country. In Mali’s capital city
Bamako, Coca-Cola has partnered with women groups to set up a water-free program to expand
and maintain the system and fund microenterprise to create jobs, and helped reduce waterborne
illnesses, increase crop yields, provide new sources of income and improve local living
standards.421 According to Ingrid Saunders, head of the global community connections and chair
of The Coca-Cola Foundation,
“Sustainability and social responsibility are the fundamental building blocks to the success
and longevity of any business in today’s 21st century competitive global market… Given
Coca-Cola’s strong international presence, we strive to create an environment in which our
employees are engaged with the communities in which we operate and maintain a strong
understanding of global diversity.”
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Pioneering Partnership with WWF

In 2007, Coca-Cola and WWF intensified their collaboration, which until then had been
philanthropic in nature. WWF is known widely as a scientifically oriented conservation
organization. According to Seabright, “it became clear now that we needed expertise in
understanding the broader systemic issues and watersheds”422. In July 2007, Coca-Cola and
WWF jointly announced a multi-year partnership to combine both organization’s strengths and
resources to make Coca-Cola more sustainable and help conserve freshwater resources. With the
commitment, Coca-Cola pledged $ 20 million, which was raised in 2009 with an additional $ 4
million. The goal of the collaboration was to initiate large community programs to improve the
company’s water efficiency, reduce carbon emissions, enhance biodiversity, and build up
community water conservation and sustainable agriculture programs. The partners committed to
make Coca-Cola an industry leader in water efficiency and stewardship, and inspire a global
movement to support conservation of freshwater ecosystems, species, and resources423.
For these purposes, engagement with WWF was viewed fitting. Since its inception in 1961,
WWF has grown from a small conservation organization into a trusted international institution
that has been ranked as the eight most trusted brand in the world and the second most trusted
brand in Europe. WWF is also trusted partner for governments. This role has developed
gradually after successful negotiations on important international environmental issues. One of
them has been the involvement in bringing about an international moratorium on whaling in
1985. Since then, a whale sanctuary has been established in the Antarctic feeding grounds. WWF
has also successfully negotiated “debt-for-nature swaps”. They enable a system under which a
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portion of a nation's debt is converted into funds for conservation, including Ecuador,
Madagascar, the Philippines, and Zambia. WWF has also played a notable part in integrating
development with conservation. Since the 1980s, it has collaborated with IUCN and UNEP on
the publication of a joint World Conservation Strategy, which was endorsed by the UN Secretary
General and launched in thirty-four world capitals. The publication recommended a holistic
approach to conservation and highlighted the importance of using natural resources sustainably.
Since the launch, fifty countries have formulated and initiated their own national conservation
strategies, based on the recommendations.424

Partnership Goals

In pioneering partnership actors share specific goals that improve both company processes
and communities. Hence, it is not just that the NGO provides a reliable and recognized platform
for a company to make a pledge to a social or environmental cause as in the case of symbolic
partnership, or that the NGO helps the company to improve its poor practices as in the case of
instrumental partnership. In pioneering partnerships actors commit to a comprehensive common
goals and action points to bring about improvements inside the company and to the broader
public. In order to do so, both actors need to view the benefits of collaboration far bigger than the
potential risks. Only through this understanding they are able to gain the needed trust to work
like partners in change.
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In 2007, the WWF - Coca-Cola partnership started with identifying shared goals. The main
ones were to conserve the world’s declining fresh water resources, improve Coca-Cola’s water
efficiency by twenty percent by 2012 compared to 2004, and to achieve business growth without
carbon growth from 2004 to 2015, while cutting carbon output in developing countries. The goal
was also to have 100 percent of the local facilities aligned with internal wastewater standards by
the end of 2010. The partnership also aims to promote water and energy efficiency among the
agricultural suppliers of sugar, citrus and other ingredients. To achieve these goals of the
partnership, the following project architecture was designed to comprise five work streams:

•

River Basin Conservation: freshwater conservation initiatives in seven river basins.

•

Plant Performance and Water Stewardship: a water-efficiency and stewardship initiative targeting
Coca-Cola bottling plants and other production facilities across the world.

•

Supply Chain: technical assistance and engagement with Coca-Cola on better practices in its
agricultural supply chain, beginning with a key commodity, sugar.

•

Climate: a joint plan for setting emissions targets including a third-party data review.

•

Communications: a stepwise communications framework, which supports the tangible goals and
outcomes of the partnership.

Strong Commitment to Partner

Characteristic to a pioneering partnership is that actors are highly committed to it and
actively involved in pursuing the goals. Because they enter into a pioneering partnership to
improve their own performances through collaboration they are highly motivated to work within
the partnership context. This has been the case with WWF- Coca-Cola case as well. Right from
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the beginning, the partnership was highly prioritized by both organizations and viewed
strategically important to both organizations’ future. When Coca-Cola and WWF signed the
partnership agreement in July 2007 at the WWF Annual Conference in the Great Hall of the
People in Beijing, China, the press release reflected the both sides’ content on the deal:
“Water is critical to sustaining nature, communities, and businesses. Our organizations,
TCCC (The Coca-Cola Company) and WWF, have come together to conserve and protect
freshwater resources in key ecoregions around the world. By bringing our networks,
people, and brands together, we can achieve meaningful and large-scale results.
Furthermore, we believe in the power of partnerships – we can accomplish far more jointly
than we can on our own.”

Massive media coverage followed the ceremony, with 2.4 billion impressions in the US
alone, including coverage in Bloomberg, Reuters, The Associated Press, The Wall Street Journal,
The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, Marketplace, NPR, CNN Headlines, and BBC
World News.425 The Financial Times reporter Ross Tieman described why the partnership was
interesting press:
“To a cynic, few partnerships might seem more unlikely than that between Coca-Cola, the
world’s largest soft-drink maker, and WWF, the not-for-profit conservation organization.
Coke is capitalism at its most global, selling sugary drinks often in place of water, to the
masses. WWF aims to protect the river basins from which the water for those drinks is
drawn”.426

According to Isdell, the business advantage that comes from such engagement is not
merely to reduce criticism. The partnership enables effective engagement that can be a catalyst
for programs that improve local living standards. This, in turn, “will lead to new or more
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satisfied consumers, who prefer companies not only on the basis of brands and products, but
because of the values they hold and how they conduct business”.427
If Coca-Cola viewed the partnership with WWF critical to building public trust and gaining
technical knowhow for its environmental programs and the new water initiative, the partnership
was equally of strategic interest to WWF and its goals. WWF ranks water as the second biggest
danger facing humanity after the climate change. WWF has identified fresh water and
watersheds as one of its priority conservation areas and working with corporations has not been
an issue. Indeed, it has been known for its corporate partnership approach, and it has introduced
specific criteria for partnerships and a training program. With these efforts the organization aims
to raise interest, support and understanding about partnerships and to interstate these better into
its activities. Many WWF partnerships with the private sector have achieved an established
status, especially the partnership with Unilever to enable certification for sustainable fishing
under the label of MSC. According to James Leap, director general of WWF International428, to
save endangered species,
“We must get to grips with the challenge of humanity’s ecological footprint. If we are to
achieve our goal of reducing the global ecological footprint to a sustainable level by 2050,
we will need innovative partnerships among business, governments and civil society. We
are promoting the concept of One Planet Living to help people understand and respond to
this challenge, and our partnerships with business are at the heart of our strategy.”
Suzanne Apple, who is responsible for business and industry collaboration at WWF USA,
views the Coca-Cola partnership as an exciting opportunity to WWF. She thinks that the
company’s geographical presence, its purchasing practices, and brand value “opens direct access
to influence the world’s largest producer of soft drinks and to reduce its sizable environmental
footprint”. According to Apple, the partnership goal to improve Coca-Cola’s water efficiency
427
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will have a sizable impact while the water use is being expected to increase as business grows.
WWF has counted that the company’s water efficiency goal will eliminate fifty million liters of
that increase in 2012 alone. According to Apple, this equals to 20 000 Olympics size swimming
pools.429
Apple also emphasizes that the engagement with Coca-Cola and the positive effects
generated by it can be multiplied, because Coca-Cola is the leading buyer of sugar, major buyer
of aluminum cans, of citrus, and one of the largest purchasers of coffee, and class. It is thus in
WWF’s interest to shift the Coca-Cola’s purchasing to sustainable sources. In addition, CocaCola is present worldwide, which enables WWF to form teams of people in many parts of the
world to work together on ground.430 Finally, WWF “can utilize Coca-Cola’s understanding of
the commercial system and its vast distribution network, political clout, and financial resources”
in its conservation work. This generates positive PR, which WWF also needs. In Apple’s words,
“we work with them to help them understand their environmental impact in places, which we
care about”. WWF benefits from the ability to help a high-profile company achieve best practice,
creating a model that others can draw on.431 According to her,
“Targets like these (water neutrality) are very much consistent with our mission and our
conservation priorities… We are pragmatic in our approach. We are pushing companies to
set ambitious targets. But they have to balance their economic interests and their
environmental interests.”
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Developing Trust
Similar to instrumental partnerships, pioneering partnerships require high level of trust.
Although both parties stated the partnership highly strategic, the beginning of the actual work
between the corporate people at Coca-Cola and environmentalists at WWF wasn’t easy. Pulling
together disparate parties wasn’t as easy as the architects of the partnership had planned, and
people turned out to be highly suspicious of each other and they didn’t understand why they
should cooperate. At Coca-Cola, people didn’t understand what was the point with working with
environmentalists and they wondered why environmental issues had suddenly become so
important to their business. Daniel Vermeer described the situation:
“People in the company understandably had hard time seeing the business relevance of
biodiversity issue. They say: ‘Okay, I may really care about the panda in China or the
catfish in the Mekong, but I didn’t know why my business cares about that.”432
People at WWF were equally suspicious at the beginning. For environmentalists, being
open to a long-term partnership with a multinational like Coca-Cola was “much less about
identifying water as a common ground and much more about rethinking its own mission and
vision”433. According to Apple, the challenge is that,
“You have to help people see the abundance of resources available, for example the talent
and knowledge within the corporate sector. We may know all about watersheds, but we
discovered they had some very sophisticated watershed analysis as well, and they know a
lot more than we do about commercial decision-making, which can have impacts well
beyond plants and facilities.” 434

It took few first years of fieldwork that the trust to think like partners developed gradually.
Trusting and appreciating one another’s view began with creating understanding why the
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partnership was important to each organization before people from different cultures and
backgrounds began to see the worth of the collaboration. Senge et al provide an illustrative
example of this by describing how in a workshop in Guatemala, one of the bottlers with twentyfive years of experience told about the change that had come alone with working with the WWF
staff on sustainable fishing and habitat protection in the Mesoamerican Reef:
“Let me tell you, we have not been encouraged by the Coca-Cola Company in the past to
engage with external public groups like WWF. Though it’s not on paper anywhere, for
people like me ‘Did you notice me?’ is always a question. You know, you keep your head
down, stay under the radar, and if there’s no press, you’ve had a good year – lots of
visibility is not a good thing.”435

The relationship thus developed gradually. Trust was a key to develop common working
practices. In 2008, Greg Koch, who directs the partnership at Coca-Cola, described the parties as
“sisters and brothers” working towards joint goals. Two years later, in January 2010, Koch
described the partnership in an interview by saying that “we are like old couple with kids”.436 To
reach this level of certainty it was also critical that both actors believed in each other’s interests
are sincere.
This was especially important to WWF: when it announced its partnership with Coca-Cola,
it was accused for taking corporate money. The Center for Media and Democracy437 criticized
the partnership:
“WWF, the corporate-funded environmental giant often accused of taking greenbacks in
return for greenwashing its corporate benefactors, has a new partner. WWF and the CocaCola Company proclaimed a ‘bold partnership’ that has Coke paying WWF $20 million,
WWF touts the deal on its website. A full-page New York Times advertisement
announcing the deal is headlined ‘This is our drop’, a phrase that Coke has trademarked.
For Coke, $20 million is just a drop in the bucket, a cheap fee for the PR boost from its
WWF partnership”.
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According to WWF and Coca-Cola representatives, both organizations are aware of the
potential skepticism and accusations of window dressing and greenwashing. Therefore they
agreed in the beginning upon communicating publicly about the progress towards their common
targets. They agreed that WWF would hold Coca-Cola accountable to meeting these targets.438

Partnership Achievements

The work began by setting conservation targets on Coca-Cola plants, water stewardship,
supply chain, climate, and the river basin conservation. WWF team developed plant-level water
efficiency toolkit to help reduce water consumption within the plants. Their work included over
three hundred independent bottlers in two hundred countries. As a result, since 2004 Coca-Cola
improved water efficiency by thirteen percent. The energy use ratio was improved by nineteen
percent between 2002 and 2007. These efficiency measures indicate that the company consumes
less water and less energy and emits fewer greenhouse gases per unit of product sold.439
The partnership has also focused on improving wastewater treatment in regions where
municipal or other external treatment facilities do not exist or do not fully treat wastewater, and
to require that manufacturing operations must construct on-site treatment systems. According to
the Coca-Cola 2010 Sustainability Review, nearly eighty-five percent of operations aligned with
the standard pledged by the end of 2010.440

438

Koch, interview in July 2008.
The Coca-Cola Company, Replenish Report 2008.
440
The Coca-Cola Company Sustainability Review 2009-2010.
439

196
Community Water Conservation

In addition to internal company improvements, pioneering partnerships are designed to
bring benefits to the communities from which the companies are systemically dependent on. This
positive contribution takes often the form of community capacity building in a way or another,
and it is aimed at engaging local people in ways that they benefit from those partnerships. The
work is done within the communities, including local authorities, NGOs, associations and other
important groups who know the local challenges and have an interest to be involved in the work.
WWF - Coca-Cola collaboration was early on designed to improve the health of river
basins in different parts of the world. This work was an important part of the new corporate
strategy to return the water the company uses to make its beverages; hence to bring about
broader societal benefits within communities Coca-Cola is present. According to Apple, in
reaching this ambitious goal the first task was to identify seven major watersheds in the world in
very different, but equally crucial locations. Choosing seven regions was important as Apple
commented: “We knew we couldn’t do all the places that matter, so we picked these seven to see
what it would take to bring in bottlers and our fresh water people and do some things together in
a big way”.441
The seven watersheds chosen were Danube, Mekong, Mesoamerican Reef, Rio Grande/Rio
Bravo, Rivers and Streams of Southern US, Lake Niassa and Chiuta, and Yangtze. These seven
river basins were selected for their unique importance to humans, biodiversity and the freshwater
resources which conservation WWF considers to be significant both environmentally and
socially. Danube is known as Europe’s lifeline and the world’s most international river basin
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shared by nineteen countries. Mekong provides freshwater for sixty million people in Southeast
Asia and there are more fish species than in any other river other than the Amazon.
Mesoamerican Reef Catchments are the longest barrier reef in the world, a water provider for
local communities. Rio Grande, also known as Rio Bravo, supports ten million people in the
fastest growing region in the US and the northern Mexico. Southeast US Rivers and Streams are
also globally significant center of freshwater biodiversity. Lake Niassa and Chiuta are unique
fresh water ecosystems from which surrounding communities are dependent on for food and
tourism. Finally, Yangtze is the third longest river in the world and holds forty percent of
China’s freshwater and supports four hundred million people and fish and wildlife species.442
All these watersheds face complex problems that seriously threaten the fresh water
availability. The partnership started to work with the local communities, NGOs, governments
and regulators to identify projects that help make models to address four central challenges to
river basin conservation. These challenges are governance and management; resource protection;
conservation and development, and biodiversity conservation.443
The work that improves governance is important environmentally and socially, as it bears
recognizable societal benefits to larger communities, hence the important goal of pioneering
partnerships. In many of the regions, poor governance and inefficient management of water
resources result in poor water quality, water scarcity, habitat degradation and declining species.
When these water resources are governed more properly, they can safeguard important economic
resources, including fish stocks. Better water governance also contributes to public health when
water supplies are better protected and purified.444

442

WWF, Press Release 2008.
Koch, interview in January 2010.
444
Koch, interview in January 2010.
443

198
In Danube, the partnership work has been concentrated on restoring wetlands, especially in
Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. According to WWF, more than eighty percent of the basin's
wetlands, floodplains and forests suffer from loss of biodiversity due to channeling, dams,
shipping routes, hydropower and agriculture. Also rapid urbanization has resulted into overgrazing, deforestation and erosion.445 Because of these conditions, the partnership teams have
concentrated in protecting critical habitat and restoring sturgeon migration across the Iron Gate
Dams. They have used best practices exchange. In 2009, the partnership also helped prepare for
the restoration of Liberty Island in southern Hungary. The team helped revitalize the two-milelong forested island and its surrounding waters by removing impediments to water flow. They
also replanted native tree species and created areas for local residents and tourists, aiming for
creating an undisturbed natural floodplain forest, securing safer drinking water resources for the
nearby community, and enhancing opportunities for environmentally wise tourism and
recreation.446
In Mekong, the partnership teams decided to focus on national conservation policies for
freshwater resources and they have promoted community management and local sustainable
agricultural practices. The river has suffered from hydroelectric dams, overfishing, mining, and
agricultural methods as well as poorly planned roads, bridges and levees that have caused
sedimentation and aggravate flooding and declining populations of Mekong Giant Catfish and
the Mekong Dolphin. The partnership work has concentrated in restoring watersheds and
improving resource management in two sub-basins, one in Chi River Subcatchment in Thailand
and the other in Plain of Reeds in Vietnam. In the Chi, the team has worked to produce native
seedlings and they have plant trees for erosion control, both in public and on private forest areas.
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On the Plain of Reeds, the team has advocated reform of wetlands policy in Vietnam. The
partnership has also worked with local Coca-Cola bottlers to promote more sustainable sugar
production and watershed stewardship.447
In Mesoamerican Reef Catchments, the emphasis of partnership has been in rooting new
ways to solve local water management challenges. The team has introduced the benefits of
private investment in freshwater conservation and river basin management to the local people.
The team helped create the Water Fund of downstream water users to provide support to
conservation efforts of upstream communities, which helps maintain water quality downstream.
As a result, six private companies support the Water Fund. It supports reduction of household
firewood consumption and fire control and prevention. For instance, in Teculutan and Rio
Hondo fire control and prevention reduced the area affected by forest fires by eleven percent in
2007 - 2008. This ensures less erosion to pollute the water supplies of downstream users.448
Benefiting both surrounding habitat and the communities, in Rio Grande the team has
worked to set up an integrated river basin management system to improve conditions at seven
key sites along the Rio Grande and its primary tributary, the Rio Conchos. The team introduced a
new management system in order to conserve and restore the health of the river. The river suffers
from over-exploitation of water resources, especially in the US. Another problem is extinction.
In 2001, for the first time Rio Grande failed to reach the Gulf of Mexico. Dams and canals
disrupt the river and divert water to support the agriculture and inefficiencies in irrigation
systems waste up to forty percent of water, totaling to billions of gallons every year. Low water
levels increase salinization and loss of biodiversity in the river. The partnership has also worked
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to control the thirsty invasive plant species and voluntary transfers of water rights to keep water
in streams for environmental purposes.449
As pioneering partnerships aim to engage local people and bring wider societal benefits, a
good example of this was the project in 2009 in which WWF and Coca-Cola worked through
river rehabilitation projects in both the US and Mexico. These projects engaged the local people
to see how the projects’ results would directly benefit them. For instance, the team trained
residents of Mexico’s Ejido Panalachi community to perform soil conservation, habitat
restoration, and to improve forest conditions. It also worked with citizens of Boquillas to remove
two highly invasive species.450
In the Tennessee/Cumberland and Mobile River Basins of the Southeastern US Rivers and
Streams, which rank highest in freshwater extinction in North America, the partnership has
decided to pursue stream restoration, small dam removal and species reintroduction. The
watersheds are increasingly stressed due to poorly planned development and sprawl, which
pollutes them with sedimentation. Local agriculture, mining and forestry industries have
impacted the water quality and dams alter stream habitats. The partnership seeks to harmonize
these areas by increasing sustainable water policies and practices, especially water reuse
practices including efforts to modify Birmingham, Alabama’s water resource plan. In addition,
the partnership has collected about 1500 rain barrels from Coca-Cola to store rainwater and
distribute it in middle Tennessee to capture water run off during rain events. This helps stem the
amount of runoff that occurs in urban areas and reduce harmful effects to the river basin such as
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downstream erosion, water quality degradation and flooding. The program has also initiated a
national launch of local watershed groups and bottlers.451
Another illustrating example of how a pioneering partnership aiming for broader societal
benefits through capacity building is the partnerships efforts in Lake Niassa. The lake is
threatened by increased sedimentation, timber and firewood harvesting as well as overfishing by
local communities. Also migrant fishermen from Malawi who fish illegally in Mozambique are a
problem. In addition, the communities are also threatened by bilharzias, a disease transmitted by
a parasite in Africa. In the past, the cichlid fish populations helped keep the disease out of the
lake, but the disease can now be contracted in the lake. The partnership works to secure the
livelihoods of local communities and the biological diversity of Lake Niassa. It has worked to
establish a new protected area freshwater reserve, which will represent one of the largest
freshwater protected areas in Africa. This work is extensive and it includes establishing reserves
in Lakes Niassa and Chiuta, training people, and certifying community fishing councils to
oversee fishing licenses and registration of fishermen, boats, and nets .452
In Yangtze, the partnerships efforts have centered on developing river governance and
local water management practices to help the communities to improve their living standards.
The region suffers from rapid population growth, rapidly expanding industry and deforestration
resulting from the timber and agriculture industries. There has been severe habitat loss, and land
reclamation has harmed species populations, declining the natural fisheries production by
seventy-five percent. This is why the partnership works to inspire better governance and
sustainable river management practices across the basin. It has concentrated on watershed
management projects in two upper Yangtze tributaries, the Minjiang and Jialingjiang Rivers. The
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team has also worked with Coca-Cola bottlers to develop practices for water use and water
management. It created training programs for local residents on a scorecard to help raise
awareness and engage them in tracking environmental indicators over time. Another project has
developed low cost pollution control measures for villages. The team is also engaged in local
events where it builds awareness about river management practices. One of them was the 2008
“Wetland Ambassador Action” program, designed to encourage students to create ideas on how
to mitigate the impact of climate change through wetland protection.453
In October 2008, the partners decided to extended the partnership until 2012, with a nearly
four million dollars budget by Coca-Cola. The water conservation work was refocused to
concentrate into three river basins: Mekong, Southeastern US Rivers and Streams, and
Mesoamerican Reef Catchments. This decision was made based on the reconsideration of the
partnership’s best potential to make the most difference at the local levels, hence to reach the
best possible societal impact. According to Koch, this was viewed more valuable in terms of the
final results of the partnership. The three river basins were chosen through selected criteria of
their survival. Those were 1) the survival of the local partnership, 2) the potential contribution to
both the partners and their systems as well as to the larger conservation community, and 3) the
potential of policy change.454
The first criterion was used to evaluate the dynamics of each local community work in
regard to their potential for long-term survival, hence sustaining the new methods, models and
programs. The second criteria evaluated how each river basin project could be replicated as a
model. This was important, as the groundwork already done within seven river basins had
generated four different models. As Koch explained it, this criterion “told us how did we do
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this”. The teams had learned along the way that what was critical for successful outcomes was
the models and that they can be replicated. Koch told in an interview that the partnership teams
had encountered so many challenges on the ground while forming relationships at the local level,
and that in each community they needed to figure out how they would go about doing their
conservation work, and how it can be made sustainable. This included questions such as who
they should work with and which local NGOs or group to trust in. But because the teams wanted
to share the information they learned, they also paid emphasis on the models how local level
partnerships emerge. The third criteria evaluated the policy change, which has been defined as
the ultimate goal of the partnership.

Steward for Global Awareness and Action to Address Water Challenges

A critical element of Coca-Cola’s new water agenda has also been the visible
participation in global business communities and promotion of sustainable development to
“mobilize the international community to drive global awareness and action to address water
challenges”. In July 2007, at the annual meeting of the UNGC in Geneva CEO Isdell urged
more companies to get involved in protecting the environment. Coca-Cola has also been
involved actively in World Economic Forum (WEF) where Mr. Isdell has led discussions
with CEOs to catalyze holistic water management actions.
External engagements have also been part of the new strategy. In 2005, Coca-Cola was
one of the first companies to join the Global Greenhouse Gas Register of the WEF. CocaCola has also adopted the Greenhouse Gas Protocol of the WBCSD and the World
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Resources Institute (WRI), which both aim to harmonize green house gas accounting and
reporting standards.

External Recognitions

Coca-Cola’s consistent environmental work has been recognized by the business
community, which views the company’s efforts sincere. In 2005, a group of institutional
investors, who are concerned about the corporate greenhouse gases and climate impacts under
Carbon Disclosure Project, recognized Coca-Cola as one of the most improved company
responses. Two years later, after the launch of the WWF partnership, the Covalence study455
ranked Coca-Cola as the best company within the food and beverage categories for Ethical Quote
Progress and Best Reported Performance, and second in the Leaders Across all Sectors for Best
Reported Performance. According to Covalence’s director Antoine Mach,
“Coca-Cola’s vastly improved performance in our ranking in the past quarter is quite
spectacular and is almost entirely due to the company’s high-profile engagement on global
water stewardship…This was greatly enhanced by the CEO’s personal involvement, by the
announcement location in Beijing, and by the prestige of the conservation partner – the
World Wildlife Fund.”456

In November 2010, Corporate Responsibility Magazine named Coca-Cola CEO Muhtar
Kent the "Responsible CEO of the Year" in the Large Market category. Coca-Cola has also been
recognized in Mexico for continuous commitment to foster sustainable development among the
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Top 10 Enterprises with the Greatest Sustainable Social Responsibility in 2009 and in India by a
Golden Peacock Global Award for Corporate Social Responsibility for replenishing ground
water and setting a target to reach a "net zero" balance with respect to groundwater usage in
2009. Earlier same year, Coca-Cola was the recipient of the World Environment Center's (WEC)
Twenty-Fifth Annual Gold Medal for International Corporate Achievement in Sustainable
Development for implementing business initiatives in water stewardship, sustainable packaging,
energy management and climate protection. WEC’s award dates back to 1985, when it was
established to recognize top industry initiatives in global environmental excellence and
sustainable development. The WEC Gold Medal Jury is independent of the WEC and its
programs, and is composed of international leaders from academia, government, and NGOs and
retired industry professionals.457
Coca-Cola has also been criticized for using the programs to polish its image and for
misleading information on water usage. According to Richard Girard, a researcher at the Polaris
Institute, “there is no way to verify the amount of water this company uses, when in many cases
Coke’s bottlers do not disclose how much water they are taking. The claim of a 4 percent
reduction is strictly an exercise in public relations.” Girard also claims that the international
water projects that Coca-Cola is funding are about “cleaning the company’s image,” because
“they can be used as ammunition to respond to critics at events like their annual general
meeting”.458
The Polaris institute also accuses Coca-Cola for contributing to the 6.56 billion pounds of
plastic that was burned or thrown in landfills in the US in 2005, and the company’s squandering
and polluting of water resources in India. For these reasons, in 2006 the Polaris Institute chose
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Coca-Cola for its first recipient of Corporate Greenwashing Award. It is presented to “companies
that have pushed profits higher while investing millions of dollars into covering up
environmentally damaging practices with corporate social responsibility projects”. According to
Verda Cook, campaigns coordinator at the Polaris Institute,
“After careful consideration, the Coca-Cola Company stood out as the company that has
worked the hardest this year to present itself as socially and environmentally responsible –
while continuing to harm environments and communities through the production and
distribution of its products”.

Both CAI and the Polaris Institute are also suspicious of the intentions of the CEO Water
Mandate, an initiative visibly supported by Coca-Cola. They regard it as a corporate attempt to
cover-up the criticism for water withdrawals in water-scarce India. According to CAI, the
initiative was created at the same time. Also the growing public concern about the social and
environmental impacts of bottled water in North America was growing and thus influenced
Coca-Cola to take action to ensure its future business growth - bottled water. In 2006, the
pressure on CEO Water Mandate companies got heated at the World Water Forum in Mexico
City, where NGOs questioned the good will of the private sector participation in water issues,
and shifted the discourse towards a debate on how to ensure that access to water was upheld by
governments and the international community as a fundamental human right.459
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Conclusions

Taking into account the systemic nature of global environmental and social problems, the
challenges of Coca-Cola are not going to be any easier or smaller in the future. Instead, along the
growing global attention to corporate social responsibility and sustainable development,
businesses that affect negatively local communities will be jeopardized, and thus will continue to
be highly vulnerable to external normative pressures and harmful NGO campaigns that damage
their brands. Soft drink business depends on freshwater, which is already a scarce resource in
many parts of the world and is expected to become scarcer in the future. Soft drink
manufacturers, alike other companies that are systematically dependent on the declining
commons, are not only exposed to reputational risks that can cause customer protests and
investor concerns but will also confront to extra costs and regulation constraints as the
international community continues to search methods to find price for the commons.
Continuous activist campaigns since 2003 and accusations that Coca-Cola is stealing water
from the local people made Coca-Cola management aware of the negative externalities the
company has been causing to the communities it operates in and that the company needs to deal
with the new challenge that water is increasingly also an emotional issue. This made Coca-Cola
aware of its vulnerability to normative expectations and eventually accountable to its water use at
the international level. Because of the systemic vulnerability to external normative expectations,
Coca-Cola has no other option than to build a relationship with the local people through
responsible business practices and responsible water use and thereby demonstrating the local
people its commitment to be a part of the solution instead of being a part of the problem. It had
no other option than to change its relationship with society.
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In improving its relationship with society, the partnership with WWF has been significant.
WWF has helped Coca-Cola to improve its internal programs and thus establish credibility for
the corporate environmental agenda. In particular, the partnership has been strong in advancing
Coca-Cola’s water conservation work on the ground and significant improvements have been
made. The partnership is hence more than an instrumental partnership. If it were an instrumental
partnership it would only concentrate on improving the internal processes of the company:
operational efficiency in water and carbon management and in developing sustainable
agriculture, processing and packaging and thereby attempting to regain the company’s normative
legitimacy. But because Coca-Cola is facing constant conflict over the use of scarce water, it
needs to maintain an open dialogue with its external groups to gain credibility to its efforts. The
partnership is thus pioneering as it is designed to rebuild the company’s relation to society not
only by improving internal processes but also by empowering communities themselves by
enabling people’s access to water and establishing water governance mechanisms and models,
and thereby bringing positive social benefits for the people in those communities.
This implies a new role of a multinational corporation. The societal benefits generated
through the partnership go beyond the ones generated by symbolic partnerships. The partnership
is pioneering in that it facilitates the company to participate in capacity building of the local
communities where it has business. Pioneering partnership involves an NGO that facilitates the
needed cultural shift within the company to become active actor in sustainable development,
hence not only to bring its operations in line with external normative expectations but also to
work towards sustainable development in a global context.
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Chapter VI

Conclusions

In 1962, the economist and Nobel Prize Winner Milton Friedman wrote the famous words
in his Capitalism and Freedom: “There is one and only one social responsibility for business to
use its resources and emerge in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays with
the rules of the game.” This has been interpreted that each agent only minds his own business
and therefore companies do not have any other responsibility than the maximal return of equity.
Five decades later, in the twenty-first century, the rules of the game seem no longer to
hold. In the era of nearly seven billion people and badly stressed ecosystems, corporations are
often blamed for societies’ failures. In recent years multinational corporations are seen as major
causes of social, environmental and economic problems and widely perceived to be prospering at
the expense of the broader communities. These claims have been successfully fuelled by tacticresourceful NGOs that watch out for irresponsible companies, scientifically question their
operations and pick them as targets for their campaigns to raise public concern on those issues.
NGOs inflict harm on companies that do not respond to their demands. In addition, multinational
corporations are also confronted with a growing variety of policy developments and regulation
that also call for greater corporate social responsibility. Companies feel they are expected to
conform to this new social demand and standard of behavior and many of them take action to
reduce the negative social and environmental impacts of their activities and create corporate
social responsibility programs that aim for larger societal benefits.
Skeptics have questioned corporations’ willingness to take into account the larger
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consequences of their activities and bare responsibility for them. Although it would be naïve to
think that all companies care about the ways in which they make their profits, skeptics still
ignore the fact that the market’s actors must consider their own profits when making their
decisions, especially under pressure. Growing concern for corporate social responsibility
suggests that a norm has emerged in the market place and is setting a price for externalities.
Corporations can no longer prosper by ignoring externalities as it has become more difficult for
them to free ride. Those that neglect their externalities and do not take responsibility of them are
punished by other market actors. Therefore, corporations as rational self-interest agents show
interest in corporate social responsibility. This is because maximizing shareholder value is no
longer so straightforward; globally operating corporations are involved in a series of global
challenges that might essentially affect their business and economic functioning itself. Corporate
social responsibility concerns increasingly involve issues that threaten the shareholder value.
NGOs are in the center of this development. They are organizations that are generally
believed to be value-driven actors that use informal networks to mobilize change. What should
not been under-estimated is that NGOs are as equally rationally acting agents as corporations and
drive their results using market mechanisms. These influential actors in international politics
have also become powerful market players as they can use their resources, networks and
influence to directly or indirectly pressure corporations to change.
It has been surprising to many private sector actors that NGOs can seemingly hurt
multinational corporations even though those corporations are obeying regulations. NGOs
continue being critical to corporate public engagement with corporate social responsibility. They
think that it can create the perception that it is implausible that such companies would do harm.
Instead, many NGOs criticize private sector standards for responsible behavior and certification
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institutions for their subjective criteria and demand for more strict criteria. They rightly ask, to
what extent are such perceptions founded on glossy public relations materials and to what extent
are they founded on the realities on the ground. On the other hand NGOs publicly praise
companies that seek to change their behavior and do it consistently. Greenpeace, for instance,
gives publicly recognitions to companies that have chosen to change their practices in issues
important to Greenpeace agenda.
It seems that in many conflicts NGOs seem to be more powerful than multinationals. The
fact that states are weak in finding consensus and solutions to the most important challenges of
sustainable development and the adoption of the norm of corporate social responsibility as well
as the gradual growth of the significance of sustainable development have been favorable
conditions for NGOs to strengthen their status and weight. NGOs have thus not only gained
power in international arenas as trusted negotiators, they are also increasingly powerful actors in
markets.
Hence, although NGOs accuse corporations for being a major cause of social,
environmental and economic problems; many of them have adopted a dual role to achieve
maximal results. They manufacture new public expectations for corporate social and
environmental behavior and monitor companies whose actions are irresponsible, but they also
invite the same companies to engage with them in collaboration. Some of them do this in the
shadow and publish joint projects with their corporate partners. Others work under the scene first
and use more aggressive means to bend corporations to change their course if needed. When a
successful solution is reached, they publicly reward the corporation for a good practice. Despite
different ways NGOs bring about change, what they all do is they help corporations to change
their behavior to better.
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If NGOs previously were known as activists pressuring governments and corporations to
change their courses, they are increasingly also facilitators for corporations to get clean with
negative social and environmental externalities. The public trust NGOs enjoy over governments,
companies and the media and the growing public concern of environmental issues, especially the
climate change, all increase their appeal as partners for corporations in their social and
environmental efforts.
Key to this new role has been the evolution of tactic in how NGOs operate. They now
openly utilize the significance of shareholder value as a corporate driver and frame the potential
benefits of collaboration in those terms. By stressing how corporations can ensure shareholder
value by working with them to reduce their negative externalities, NGOs have been successful in
finding common ground with executives to become partners in change. In other words, NGOs
have understood that the corporate social responsibility has less to do with altruistic managers
misusing corporate money but all to do with protecting shareholder value and thus maximizing
profits. Because in many cases ensuring shareholder value requires compromising with NGOs
agendas, and aligning corporate operations according to NGO demands, corporations are willing
to collaborate with organizations to address society’s needs, even with the same NGOs that have
questioned their normative legitimacy.
What we are witnessing is thus a new era of transnational cooperation in which NGOs and
corporations negotiate trade-offs to achieve their respective goals. Both actors adjust their
behavior to achieve their own goals. This study explores NGO-business partnerships as a new
form of transnational cooperation that actors choose when they seek to balance their interests
within the wider systemic context they are a part of. NGOs have increasingly engaged with
corporations to take the advantage of market mechanisms to achieve their specific targets and
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companies use these engagements to balance the social and environmental risks they face. In the
core of these engagements is thus a trade-off both actors are willing to negotiate.
There is relatively little research on this kind of new transnational cooperation in the study
of international relations. There has been surprisingly little research in the ways in which NGOs
and corporations become partners in change and what drives them to do so. This study thus
contributes to the literature by bringing empirical exploration on three different kinds of
engagement strategies that NGOs and corporations form to achieve their respective goals. The
study differentiates between these different types of engagements and explains their differences.
The study argues that because corporations use cost-benefit calculations when responding
to the demands of demonstrating corporate social responsibility, they weigh their need to
improve the social and environmental consequences of their activities, and use their vulnerability
to external normative pressure as a yardstick for those investments. Hence, it depends on those
drawn to the company with a social or environmental agenda and how they are able to put
corporations under costly and harmful campaigning. Although all corporations are at least
vulnerable to the external normative pressures, some companies are more vulnerable than others.
The study shows that the more a corporation is vulnerable to external normative pressure, the
more it is likely to seek NGO-engagement to ensure its legitimacy that is threatened by the
confrontation.

xxx

Certain limitations related to the scope of this study, however, should be pointed out. First,
in framing the topic of the study as a new dynamics of society-business relationship, that is
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cooperation instead of confrontation, the universe of the study concentrates on those
multinational corporations that have perceived their need to demonstrate their corporate social
responsibility and decided to work with NGO/NGOs to gain credibility for their efforts. This
excludes corporations that are under pressure but have not perceived their need to align their
operations according to NGO agendas or they have not been able to find common ground with an
NGO and have therefore not reached into an agreement with one. In these cases, actors lack
comprehensive understanding on each side’s goals and they are not willing to negotiate for a
needed trade-off. In respect to failing cases, the theory presented in this study predicts that
companies vulnerable to normative pressure will continue to be attacked by the NGO community
and the normative pressure to change the operations is likely to intensify.
Two Finnish globally operating corporations, a paper, packaging and wood products
company Stora Enso’s and Neste Oil’s different approaches to their vulnerability illuminate this.
While still being accused by Friends of the Earth Brazil and Friends of the Earth Uruguay of
violating workers’ rights in Brazil, of deforestration, of limiting water availability in the
communities close to their plantations, of violating land laws and of lobbying to weaken
environmental laws460, Stora Enso has begun an open dialogue with Greenpeace on some of the
issues and has thereby gained more credibility to its corporate social responsibility within the
environmental groups461.
In contrast, Finnish oil refinery Neste Oil, accused of deforestration, is also under high
pressure by actions taken by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth International and suffered from
damages due to their campaigning, has taken another approach. Alike Coca-Cola was
questioning the accusations of the activists and claiming that its operations are responsible, Neste
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Oil is refusing closer collaboration and thereby in fact inviting more harmful NGO campaigning.
In January 2011, the environmental groups voted the company the worst company in the world.
The theory developed in this study predicts that, similar to Coca-Cola that under intensive
pressure eventually realized it could not win the battle due to the systemic nature of its
vulnerability, Neste Oil will continue to suffer from intensive harm organized by NGOs, most
notably by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth.
Secondly, in focusing on solely successful cases, that is NGOs and corporations have
ended up collaborating, and explaining why they collaborate in different ways, the study
provides little to our knowledge on the cases that have not been so successful. This clearly
weakens our understanding of the phenomena wholly and should be a matter of investigation on
its own. However by establishing the reasons for NGO-business engagements, the present study
provides some insights to these cases too. It highlights the role of corporate understanding of the
power of the NGO community that works against it. It might be a long process before the
management confirms that they are powerless against the NGOs and that the only option to
ensure shareholder value is to bend and begin to work with them, hence to negotiate a trade-off.
As discussed, not all NGOs compromise their mission and are not therefore open to all
companies for collaboration. Corporations that are not invited by their opponents for
collaboration often seek other NGOs to engage with.
Studying failing partnerships would strengthen our understanding beyond the impact of
vulnerability and the corporate perception of its vulnerability that plays a decisive part in efforts
to ensure normative legitimacy, which is, in this study, viewed to drive NGO-engagements.
Focusing on failing partnerships would perhaps bring front other variables such as lack of
motives and respect for each other’s capabilities.
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Third, because the study concentrates on NGO-business engagements, it excludes by
definition some interesting and promising forms of public-private engagements that also
illuminate a new relationship between business and society, emerged during the past decade. One
of them is the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) founded in 2005 by former president Bill Clinton.
CGI is a non-partisan organization that “convenes global leaders to devise and implement
innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing problems”. Each September, CGI hosts an
annual meeting in New York, scheduled to coincide with the UN General Assembly. Throughout
the year, CGI helps its members, corporations, NGOs, and government leaders, maximize their
efforts to create positive change. Another similar initiative has been established to save the
world’s most polluted sea, the Baltic Sea, by a nonprofit Baltic Sea Action Group (BSAG). The
group involves states, local authorities, businesses, NGOs, foundations and governmental
agencies. Based on commitments that each organization makes, both of these initiatives are
forums for different actors to tackle social and environmental issues.
This study contributes to our understanding on these initiatives in that the key driver for
them is also the need of corporations to demonstrate corporate social responsibility and the need
of the state and civil society actors to achieve concrete results with the resources corporations
share with them. However, because CGI and BSAG are not designed to fix corporate internal
operations to regain corporate normative legitimacy, they are multi-stakeholder forums that
contribute positively to corporate public relations by providing a recognized platform for
corporations to live up to their pledges.

xxx
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This study explores NGO-business engagements as a new society-business relationship and
stresses the collaboration as a trade-off that rational actors choose in order to achieve their own
self-interests. It thus explores how the rules of the game are changing and how corporations
balance with the new uncertainty that they have become exposed to. On the other hand the study
stresses the strength of NGOs as influential international actors that can pressure other actors to
change their behavior.
This balancing has made NGO-business relations increasingly complex and variegated.
The relationship remains both controversial and collaborative. NGOs can initially pressure
corporations to urge a change but work with the same corporation to implement the change. And
corporations do it because there is evidence that they can gain greater credibility when they bring
an opponent into their coalition than by referring to industry association or supporter. All this
suggests the change in the relationship between business and society.
Perhaps because there is much to win and much to loose for both society and business, the
topic of society-business relationship will develop fast. One interesting question has already
evolved. Michael Porter has predicted that businesses will be seeing business cases in creating
“shared value”, hence creating economic value for society by addressing its current needs and
challenges. This represents a new way to achieve economic success.462 This, as trumpeted by its
proponents, will require a deep appreciation on current global problems and connecting
companies’ success with societal needs, and would be a much deeper engagement of society and
business than the conformance to corporate social responsibility norm, that of a new standard of
behavior that companies are increasingly expected to comply.

462
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